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ABSTRACT
This population micro-study was undertaken in Chamarajanagar
taluk, a rural region of the Indian State of Karnataka. The
aim of the research was to ascertain the effect of community
cultures on fertility. Fox- this purpose six caste-groups
were chosen to represent the two main cultural traditions
coexisting in the area of fieldwork. Dual methods of inves¬
tigation were employed: a formal questionnaire survey, com¬
plemented by participant observation with unstructured inter¬
views. The results of data analysis revealed that, although
the figures for current family size for the total sample were
low by all-India standards and contraceptive practice corres¬
pondingly high, there were considerable differences between
the communities studied. The traditional methods, lengthy
lactation and post-birth abstinence, were shown to have a
positive effect in reducing fertility, while higher education,
especially of women, had the same effect. Ignorance and fear
of contraception, the indifference of husbands, and the desire
for sons manifestly increased fertility. Such elements of
social and economic change as inflation, increasing urbanis¬
ation, the spread of Western ideals, and mass education are
inducing couples to adopt birth control, since a large family
is becoming a perceived liability. But the evidence of both
quantitative and qualitative data indicates that the principal
determinant of low fertility is the autonomy of women, especi¬
ally in regard to the right of wives to control their own re¬
production. The caste-group with the smallest families in
the sample is poor and illiterate but accepts the relative
independence of its women. The fact that the group has fair¬
ly low child mortality appears to encourage wives to termin¬
ate childbearing after one or two children. In the light of
these findings, it is suggested that development planners
should act vigourously, not only to educate women but also




The choice of location for the fieldwork on
■which this study is based, as well as my primary quali¬
fication for undertaking the research, were largely the
result of nurture. In short, I grew up in the area. My
parents and grandparents had in living memory been close¬
ly involved in the affairs of a large number of the in¬
habitants of Chamarajanagar taluk, and are remembered
with affection. As my parents' child I was made wel¬
come when I returned there.
Since the family's connection with that part
of south India did not end until the mid 1950s I was
furnished with a valuable entree into the local social
structure when I went back more than twenty years later
in the role of a social anthropologist. These anteced¬
ents also provided a serviceable foundation of background
information, to say nothing of the opportunity to observe
the effects of social change in the area over the past
quarter century.
Between 197^ and 1981 I made a series of ex¬
tended visits to Chamarajanagar, living first with an
orthodox Hindu joint family in Chamarajanagar town and
subsequently in a one-room farm dwelling, mud-walled and
palm-thatched, on the fringe of Somavarapet, a mixed-
caste village not far from the town. I was also able
to spend time in the hill range where our family had once
lived, renewing the acquaintance of old friends among the
workers on the coffee estates there and among members of
the local jungle tribe.
My paternal grandparents were the first foreign¬
ers to settle in the wild and remote massif which forms
part of the south-east boundary of the taluk. In the
penultimate decade of the 19th century they began to
plant the coffee estates there which still give employment
to the villagers of the taluk interior and which were the
abode of three generations of the family for nearly seventy
years. In all that period no other planters owned estates
there. Thus, in the thirty-five years for which
the hills were my own home place, the role of my
parents, Heather and Ralph Morris, was much closer
to that of the Indian hereditary landowner than that
of the British planters in the large planting communi¬
ties which, with their nuclei of clubs, shops and other
amenities, had been established in the more accessible
of the hilly regions of the South. To this day there
are Only two roads, barely navigable, to the hills,
both built by the Morris family, and the rest of the
taluk remains now as it was then, an isolated rural
backwater with little to attract the Indian visitor or
foreign tourist.
The social environment of Chamarajanagar is
therefore that of a traditional small-town and rural
society, slowly changing under the pressure of modern
communications and ideas, secularisation and - recently -
inflation. The influences of modernisation have been
altering both circumstances and attitudes very gradually
over the years, while the powerful agency of economic
determinacy has achieved its own effects rather more
rapidly and directly. These agents of change are af¬
fecting traditional attitudes to some degree, though
the changes are not all desirable ones.
The research project to be discussed in the
following chapters was funded by the Overseas Development
Administration and conducted under the auspices of the
Department of Sociology, University of Edinburgh. Through
the good offices of the Indian Council for Social Science
Research.permission was obtained at the beginning of 19795
from the Indian Ministry of Education, to undertake re¬
search in south Karnataka. My Institutional base in
India was the Centre for Theoretical Studies, Indian Insti
tute of Science, Bangalore, though the staff there did
not see much of me owing to the distance of the State cap¬
ital from the fieldwork area.
The goodwill earned by my parents which, twenty-
five years later^led to an early acceptance of my
presence and motivations, was summed up by one
Chamarajana gar worthy in a welcoming address: "We
will not call her a visitor. She belongs here
and she is one of us." However, conscious as I
was of the advantages of being afforded, so to
speak, the freedom of Chamarajanagar taluk, I was
often very much aware of the advantages of not in
fact belonging there and indeed of the positive
value for an anthropologist of this ambiguous position
On the one hand people were able to 'place' me. On
the other a well-disposed stranger and foreigner with
no axe to grind was regarded not only as a sympathetic
listener but also as a safe recipient of confidences,
which I hope I have honourably kept, but which afford¬
ed me many insights.
The same conditions were applicable when it
came to conducting the demographic survey, about the
feasibility of which I had had the reservations to be
expected of an anthropologist wedded to the methods of
participant observation. There were plenty of people
about to introduce me and my interviewers and allay
the fears of those who may have suspected us of offi¬
cial designs on their reproductive capacity. Once
their fears that we represented some alarming new pro¬
spect of duress were relieved many of those who agreed
to be interviewed replied so freely and at such length
that the interviewers found themselves the recipients
of confidences which subsequently proved difficult to
classify and code. This was particularly the case
with the wives, who often used the interviews as an
occasion for unburdening themselves of pent-up domes¬
tic grievances.
But participant observation was by no means
neglected in the course of the fieldwork for this pop¬
ulation study. Living alone and cooking for myself
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on the cow-dunged floor of the verandah of my
shack, as I did for a year in 1979-80,(carrying
on the habit of previous years), I received a
constant stream of callers of both sexes and of
all classes, castes and ages, many of whom were
prepared to gossip by the hour. The use of a place
of my own where people were able to relax without
self-consciousness outweighed the advantages, in
terms of methodology, of living with a family,
although both situations led to fruitful insights.
Living alone meant, for instance, that I was not
confined to the company of any particular caste or
group of castes, and so was able to receive a fairly
unweighted impression of the local social structure.
It also meant, of course, that the investigator en¬
joyed a modicum of privacy from time to time.
It is much to the credit of the inhabitants
of Somavarapet, many of whom were extremely poor, that
although the door of the shack had no more than a prim¬
itive latch on the inside, it did not occur to me to
fear burglary or assault. Other aspects of the sim¬
ple life were less pleasing. I could have done without
the vociferous rats which shared my bedroom, the ubi¬
quitous cockroaches, mosquitoes, eye-flies, ants and
hornets, the presence of centipedes and scorpions, the
heat, the noise, which were all part of daily - and
nightly - life in the village. Visits to the hills
were a great joy, not least because they afforded a
respite from these inconveniences. On the other hand
my congenial and helpful neighbours, kindly landlord,
the good-natured and generous people with whom I daily
met and conversed, as well as the friendliness and hos¬
pitality of the people on the hills, whose interest in
my family never seemed to flag, was heart-warming, and
it was truly sad to have to say goodbye when I left.
xii .
In winding up this introductory note it
remains for me to record my grateful acknowledgments
to: The Population Bureau of the Overseas Develop¬
ment Administration, and in particular to Susan Long
for her support and encouragement; to Roger Jeffery
of the Sociology Department at Edinburgh University
for his patience in nursing me through what must have
seemed to him an endless series of crises; to Lynn
Jamieson for her staunch support in my running battle
with the Regional computer; to Tom McGlew and Trevor
Jones, the former for his specialist advice on the
demographic aspects of the research and the present¬
ation of this thesis, and the latter for his help
with the intricacies of data preparation; to Anthony
Good of the Department of Social Anthropology for his
invaluable criticism; and to Geoff Cohen of the Dep¬
artment of Statistics for his unfailing kindness and
prompt assistance. Turning to India, I am also deep¬
ly indebted to my alter ego of many years, Laeeq Fut-
ehally, and to my honorary aunt 'Ivy' Muthanna, both
of Bangalore; to that hospitable pair de Wet and Joubert
Van Ingen of Mysore; to the staff of Honnametti and
Kartikerri estates and to Sri K.S. Vaidyanathan and the
staff of Attikan estate; to the Director of the Anthro¬
pological Survey of India, Mysore; to the Director of
the Indian Institute of Science for accepting an unlikely
cuckoo in his academic nest; to my friendly landlord and
his family; to gentle Dr. Jaya of Chamarajanagar; to my
four interviewers for their good natured endurance; and
to all the friends in the town, villages and forest set¬
tlements of the area, whose tolerance I so often imposed
upon. To these and to all those others not mentioned
here whose kindness is remembered, my appreciative thanks
are due. And lastly I should like to take the opportu¬
nity of thanking my husband not only for his co-operation
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and aid but for putting up with my absence, and (worse)
the traumas and dramas of my presence in the course of
the project.
Two final points: firstly, I have chosen to
add the English 's' to form the plural of Kannada nouns
where I have had occasion to use them in the following
pages, since in Kannada the plural suffix often depends
on the context. And secondly, in the chapters on caste
kinship and the status of women, I have had perforce to
draw on material discussed in my previous thesis in con¬
sideration of the fact that the hypotheses on which the
present work is based arose out of my previous fieldwork
in the same area of Mysore.
INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM
( 1) Background to the Research
When the suggestion was first mooted that I
should carry out a population study in Chamarajana gar
taluk using the techniques of demographic anthropology,
I was acquainted with the works of only five anthropol¬
ogists who had written on societies in the old State of
Mysore. These were: Alan Beals (1962), Scarlett
Epstein (1962,1967,1973), E.B. Harper (1959,1967,1968),
W. McCormack (1958) and M.N. Srinivas (1952,1959,1962,
1968,197^)• As far as I know there had been no studies
at all, either demographic or anthropological, made of
the Chamarajanagar taluk other than my own previous
research in the area, with the exception of that of
S.G. Morab of the Anthropological Survey of India, who
wrote a memoir on the local hill tribe based on two
months fieldwork (Morab 1977)- Judging by his comp¬
laint (personal communication), that the men tended to
reply to his questions with a surly or bland "gothilla"
("I don't know"), and the women often refused to speak
to him at all, his was a creditable achievement. My
interviewers sometimes encountered similar problems,
and the fact that I was more fortunate in my inter¬
action with members of the tribe was entirely due to
my family's long connection with the area as a whole
and the tribe in particular.
In view of the paucity of literature on popul¬
ation subjects in the region I had perforce to fall
back on my own field notes, which embodied evidence
that was largely qualitative. My hypotheses were
therefore mainly inferences based on genealogies
(but not enough of them to be measurable statistically);
household composition data; informal, unstructured inter¬
views and participant observation. I had, however,
already made an analysis of certain community norms
(to be discussed below), with regard to kinship, marriage,
and the status of women in six representative jati, local
communities or castes, and was interested enough by the
strong association of jati-specific kinship norms with
the status of the female members of the groups to suspect
that there would be a further association between family
size and the wife's status in household and community.
This in turn led me to believe that there could well be
a relationship between the ideologies of castes, as local
communities, and fertility. The only way to find out
whether this was so was to return to the taluk and under¬
take a formal questionnaire survey, using the anthropo¬
logical techniques of participant observation and case
analysis to validate and amplify the demographic data.
This I did in the course of the year between May 1979
and May 1980.
(2) Issues which the research was designed to investigate
From the beginning it was clear that a number of
important variables must intervene to crosscut any direct
relationship between community culture and fertility and
that no single factor in isolation was likely to be decis¬
ively influential. It was predicted therefore that linkec
combinations of the variables discussed below would be
likely to affect fertility in the area. These were as
follows:
2.1 Caste. Although a subsequent chapter will be
devoted to this subject it must be mentioned here as the
chief independent and antecedent variable as well as one
of the central issues of the research project. It is
virtually impossible to discuss rural or small-town
society in India other than in terms of caste.
However else one chooses to define the phenomenon,
caste is undoubtedly an invaluable system of categor¬
isation, and it is certainly employed as such by the
people of Mysore, as well as by those who require an
analytic tool for the study of local hierarchies
from the 'outside'. In the villages of the Chamaraj-
anagar taluk, as in the rest of village India, the
caste of everybody except that of the passing stranger
is known. It is a constant which makes it possible
to 'place' every woman, man and child. The system
still flourishes in the taluk in spite of the tide of
secularisation and modernisation sweeping the country
and the consequent weakening of its ritual connotations,
including the concept of the purity/pollution polarity.
My sojourns in the taluk also disclosed the existence
of values and precepts which I believe to be the clue
to an 'emic' view (briefly, the view of the actor as
opposed to 'etic ' , the view of the observer of a diff¬
erent culture) of the institution: while jati are
certainly groups sharing a common culture this alone
is insufficient as an interpretation of local attitudes
towards jati other than their own. Basically a jati,
or local caste-community, is perceived there as a
natural phenomenon, almost a distinct ethnic stock,
rather than as merely a social or religious category.
As such, the local communities tend to envisage each
other in terms of stereotyped characteristics. This
point will be discussed in more detail in the chapter
on caste.
My survey sample was drawn from the six repre¬
sentative communities of my previous analyses (mentioned
above), namely - in attributive hierarchical order -
Lingayats, Jettis, Banajigas, Sholigas, Upuligas, and
Harijans. With the addition of a few more high caste
groups they were chosen because they represented a
cross-section of society in the taluk, numerically
as well as institutionally.
In the process of collecting data on kinship
during my previous visits to the area I had received
the impression, without having any statistical evid¬
ence to warrant it, that the Sholiga hill tribe, and
possibly the two low caste groups, had fewer children
per couple than had non-Westernised members of the
higher castes. It was also my impression that West¬
ernised higher caste couples had fewer children too.
I had been struck by the huge families I had come
across in some of the higher caste groups among
their more conservatively-orientated members while,
conversely, not only were Sholiga, Upuliga and
Harijan genealogies narrow in spread as well as
brief in depth, but also informants from these jati
appeared to have relatively few siblings and offspring.
My comparison of the kinship and marriage conventions
of the six castes led me to believe that if this imp¬
ression turned out to be well grounded, one of the
explanations for such a state of affairs might lie
in the degree of choice and number of options avail¬
able to the female members of these groups.
2.2 Status of Women In the Chamarajanagar
area, as in other parts of India, there is no sharp
divide between high and low castes, but a gradual,
intensely disputed continuum, a sort of communal
free-for-all, between the Brahmans at the top and
the Untouchables at the bottom. Nevertheless in so
far as the status of women is concerned, a discern¬
ible cleavage ia revealed between 'high' and 'low'
caste ideals. Where there is institutionalised divorce
for both sexes and remarriage after divorce or widowhood
for both sexes, women may also work and earn outside
the household, go out at will and unaccompanied
(except perhaps by female friends), have much more
choice as to marriage partner, and may desert a bad
husband and return to their natal households without
bringing dishonour on their parents or agnatic kin.
In these groups, all at the low end of the caste
continuum, there is no very strong and ritually
prescribed involvement with questions of female
subordination and 'purity', and the birth of girls
is even welcomed. M.N. Srinivas, himself a Mysor-
ean, confirms that the relationship between men and
women in the lower castes is more egalitarian than
it is in the high castes, and that when lower castes,
or individual members of lower castes, try to achieve
upward mobility by what he has called 'sanskritisation'
(i.e., the emulation of Brahmanic customs and values),
one of the consequences is the lowering of the status
and restriction of the liberty of the women in such
castes or households (Srinivas 1962; 1975). This
division between high and low caste ideals in gender
relations echoes a like dichotomy between north and
south India, reflected in demographic performance as
revealed by census figures. Tim Dyson and Mick Moore,
while observing that the normative differences between
North and South are of course a matter of degree, none
the less describe the process of 'sanskritisation' in
terms of the encroachment of north Indian values on
those of south India. The more closely members of
a south Indian high caste adhere to Brahmanic principles
the more their culture resembles that of north Indian
high castes in its denigration and subordination of its
female members (Dyson and Moore, 1963).
In the analysis I made of the kinship and mar¬
riage norms of the six representative castes to deter¬
mine the status of women in these groups, the dichot-
omy was clear-cut. In the case of the three jati
whose claim to be high-caste was undisputed, both
as to attribution and interaction, women were more
or less restricted (according to the degree of ortho¬
doxy or alternatively of modernity practised by the
household head), and had no right to divorce or to
re-marry after widowhood, although the men could
and often did re-marry after a wife's death. According
to the traditional dictates of their culture women in
these three communities are not supposed to work outside
the household or to go out at all unless accompanied by
male or elderly female agnatic relatives, are expected
to treat their husbands 'as gods', to be perpetually
subordinated to them and to have no separate existence
other than as child-bearing and food-preparing adjuncts
to the spouses. In these castes there is, not surpris¬
ingly, a strong perception of female inferiority along
with an equally strong emphasis on and anxiety about
the 'purity' of the females in the family. In the case
of the three lower-caste groups, on the other hand,
divorce for both sexes is traditionally institutional¬
ised, as is remarriage for both sexes. Subsequent mar¬
riages, called kuduvali, although less prestigious than
the first, confer exactly the same rights on children
and to inheritance. In these groups women are expect¬
ed to work and earn, and usually do so, whether the
work is in the family fields or for an employer on the
land or in a factory. Since daughters and wives cont¬
ribute financiall^by their labour to the family income
and daughters' weddings do not cost much (indeed among
the Harijans and Sholigas the groom's family gives thera
or bridewealth, which pays for the feast and the bride's
ornaments and represents compensation to her family for
her loss), it is not surprising either that there is no
very strong perception of female inferiority. Nor is
constant vigilance on behalf of her virginity or married
'purity' easily maintained when a woman goes off every
day to work, which may account for the non-puritan
attitude of both sexes in these groups. One of
our informants told the interviewer without embarr¬
assment that she had become pregnant before her
marria ge.
In view of the inference I drew from the
genealogies collected in the course of my previous
fieldwork that the Sholigas (and perhaps the Upuligas
and narijans as well) seemed to have smaller families
than did the non-Westernised higher castes, it was
postulated that the relative freedom and mobility
of lower-caste women, along with their ability to
support themselves, might enable them to contrive
situations deemed to reduce the periods when they
would be at risk of pregnancy, and possibly also to
use other traditional means of birth control.
2.3 Economic Status The World Fertility
Survey (W.F.S.) and virtually all other demographic
literature stresses an inverse relationship between
economic status and fertility. J.C. Caldwell has
in addition re-stated demographic transition theory
in economic terms, suggesting that fertility behavi¬
our is in general rational; that as long as wealth
flows from children to parents it makes economic
sense to have large families; and that only when
social change operates to reverse the flow will
fertility be restricted (Caldwell 1976;1980).
It seemed likely that among the Chamarajanagar
€lite, who are nearly all members of high caste
communities as well as possessing high incomes and
who are busy educating their children at considerable
expense, the transition was already taking place, but
since this would not account for the apparent low
fertility of the most poverty-stricken (in monetary
terms) of the local jati, the intervening factor of
female status was believed to be operative.
3,
2.k Education. The W.F.S. and other demo¬
graphic literature also places great emphasis on
the salience of education, especially of women, as
a determinant of fertility. J.C. Caldwell maintains
that mass education is the principal cause of demo¬
graphic transition in developing countries (Caldwell 1980).
In common with such authorities as Robert Cassen, (1978),
he concludes that the most profound changes in this
field come about through the granting and acceptance
of equal education for both sexes, leading to the influ¬
ence on family relationships of educated mothers. In
Chamarajanagar this variable is closely linked not only
with caste, (in general it can be stated that while by
no means all members of high castes have completed secon¬
dary education, comparatively few members of low castes
have any education at all), and with female status, but
also with economic status. Higher education in India
is expensive, and the loss of a working member of the
household, plus the necessity for his or her upkeep at
an inevitably higher standard of living than is normal
for the family, is costly to the poor even when a scholar¬
ship has been gained. Education is highly regarded and
greatly desired by members of most, but not all, commun¬
ities in the taluk. A high-caste respondent whom I
asked whether he thought education or the ownership of
property the more desirable attribute in seeking a
bridegroom for his daughter, replied firmly "Education
is the best property". Informants who believed in
female education expressed themselves in the same idiom
whether they had in mind a career for their daughter,
hoped to find an educated husband for her, or simply
approved of educated wives as both companions and good
mothers. Of the few educated women I met in Chamaraja¬
nagar, all had small families and were using modern
contraception. Yet at the same time a respondent from
the community which I suspected of having the fewest
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children replied in answer to the same question,
"Of what use is that kind of education to us
living in the jungle ?". Once more it seems that
the association between education and fertility
is indirect, and my research hypothesis suggested
that only when education brings about a change
in the cultural perceptions of a family or a whole
community on the rftle of women can it affect fertility.
2.5 The Value of Children It seemed on the
whole indisputable that at present every Indian couple
wants children, especially male children, for a number
of obvious reasons: support in old age; help in the
family fields, business or household; to carry on the
line; to fulfil the expectations of affines and neigh¬
bours; to retain the respect of the community; and
above all to love and to cherish. But apart from the
town elite mentioned above in the context of issue 2.3 above,
I had reason to believe that today even impoverished or
orthodox married couples in the taluk did not necessarily
want many children and that many women dreaded the pros¬
pect of further pregnancies, births and responsibilities.
In the past I had been approached repeatedly by inform¬
ants of both sexes complaining of the difficulties, esp¬
ecially those involving poverty and ill-health, caused
by their having produced "too many children". I had
also been approached far too often for comfort by desp¬
erate women begging for "medicine" with which to abort
yet another unwanted pregnancy or to prevent any further
pregnancies. That this evidence of fear and anxiety
at the prospect of "the physical impact of an indefinite
number of pregnancies or births" is not confined to
Chamarajanagar is confirmed by J.C. Caldwell for another
district of Karnataka (Caldwell, 1982)
2.6 Contraceptive Practice and Traditional
Family Planning. It was predicted that while most
of the Westernised (and by corollary well off) high
caste couples would practise modern methods of contra¬
ception, orthodox high caste couples where the wife's
only means of gaining esteem and standing was through
the production of children, especially sons, would use
no form of family planning other than the traditional
ones of post-partura abstinence for the period custom¬
ary in the community, and permanent abstinence when
their own
their eldest children were likely to starufamilies.
It was also expected that such traditional practices
as lengthy lactation, post-partum abstinence and abort¬
ion would be used by the lower-caste women to attempt
to control their own fertility, and indeed by those
of higher castes who, with or without the concurrence
of spouses and/or affines, felt that they had proved
themselves sufficiently in this sphere.
2.7 Wife's Age at Effective Marriage; Duration
of Marriage. In view of the accepted importance of
these factors as determinants of fertility it was
clearly essential that they should be investigated
in the Chamarajanagar case, and provision was made to
deal with them in the questionnaire.
2.8 Early-Age Mortality I have borrowed
the usage of Dyson and Moore (1983) to cover perinatal,
infant, and child mortality. The importance of this
issue has been stressed by most demographic studies
dealing with developing countries, since the tradit¬
ional theory of demographic transition suggests that
the lower the chances are of the survival of their
progeny the more children are needed to compensate
for the risk. As one Indian demographer puts it,
"Most parents would have fewer children if there
were an assurance that the children would survive".
(Chandrasekhar, 1972, p.233). Whether or not cause
and effect are really so neatly articulated (cf.
Balakrishnan, Scrimshaw and Preston, 1978, and Wyon,
1979, mentioned below), the Mysore Population Study
/
the Mysore Population Study shows that in 1951
the infant mortality rate in rural areas of the
State for the families of agricultural labourers
was 159 per 1000 live births. But, where child
mortality is still high it does not follow that
completed family size will be large in spite of
unrestricted fertility for the very reason that
not all the children born survive their childhood}
and as Preston and Scrimshaw point out (see below)
there is no reason to suppose that they are automat¬
ically replaced or that contingency family-size
plans are commonly made allowing for x number of
deaths. Consequently it was postulated that high
early-age mortality might account for the apparently
smaller families of the poor communities (which
generally consist of the low castes) in this area.
That is to say, these communities appeared to have
fewer children than did the orthodox members of
high caste communities, who were as a rule in a
better position to protect their offspring from
disease and to procure the best medical treatment
for them. In the case of the Westernised members
of high caste communities it was assumed that their
apparently smaller families would be due to their
use of modern contraceptive methods.
2.9 Consanguinity. Nearly all castes in
the region (as in most parts of south India), value
cross-cousin and elder sister's daughter marriage,
whether classificatory or uterine. This preference
is associated with the close and enduring ties that
exist between sisters and brothers in these regions.
The ideal is for the links between female and male
siblings to be reinforced by the marriage of their
children or or a girl to her mother's younger brothe
f
In view of R.N. Reid s contention that repeated
consanguineous marriage is associated with lower
effective fertility (Reid, 1971), it was suggested
that this kinship institution might have an effect
on the family size of most castes in the taluk.
2.10 Health and Nutrition. There is
a good deal of covert promiscuity among the lower
caste communities and very little - at least so far
as the wives are concerned - among the high castes.
In view of Moni Nag's claim that sterility due to
venereal disease is a dominant factor affecting
fertility in a number of non-industrial societies
with unstable marriage and lenient attitudes towards
sexual morality, (Nag, 1962), it was predicted that
this might account for the apparently smaller fami¬
lies of the Upuligas and Harijans. It was not sugg¬
ested that the same might be true of the Sholigas
because, though promiscuity is not uncommon in their
society among themselves, they have hitherto always
been cut off from contact with both foreigners in
general and other Indian groups. It was predicted
that child mortality among Harijans and Upuligas
would be due principally to insanitary conditions in their
villages or 'quarters' in the town, and also to infect¬
ious diseases; and among the Sholigas to the cold and
wet climate of the hills during the north-east and
south-west monsoons. Since the question of a direct
relationship, if any, between malnutrition and fert¬
ility is a controversial one, and nutritionists at the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and at
the Community Health Department at St. John's Hospital,
Bangalore, had advised me that malnutrition was unlikely
to have had any direct effect on fertility in Chamaraja-
nagar, this issue was left open. It was accepted, how¬
ever, that impoverished and exhausted mothers without
household help or amenities would, as Ann Sharman points
out, (Sharman, 1970), lack the time,energy and knowledge
to feed their children properly and that child malnutr¬
ition could thus contribute to early-age mortality in
the area.
(3)• The Hypotheses.
3.1 Of the three central hypotheses crucial
to the research as originally proposed, the first assum¬
ed that the various communities comprising the local
model of the caste system in Chamarajanagar taluk would
be differentiated not only by their ritual and economic
status but also by their cultural norms, and that these
norms, in the realm of kinship and marriage, could have
a correspondingly differential effect on fertility.
3.2 The second hypothesis suggested that,
contrary to the findings of most demographic research
in developing countries, it appeared to be the most
impoverished and illiterate group in the taluk which
had the least number of living children per couple. It
was also suggested that this could well be the case among
two other large and in the main poor and uneducated comm¬
unities in the taluk.
3.3 The third hypothesis presumed that in thi;
area, as in others, the status of women would have an
effect on fertility, and further specified that this
status would be governed by the values of members of
the local communities concerned, whether traditional or
as influenced by modern education, especially the higher
education of women.
It seemed a reasonable prediction that these
variables, in combination with those listed above, would
be found to have a major influence on fertility in
Chamarajanagar.
As I hope to demonstrate in the chapters
dealing with data analysis, the original hypotheses
were largely confirmed. (i) Caste, in the sense of
jati or local community, the chief independent and
antecedent variable, was found to have a definitive
effect on fertility in two ways: firstly, in the case
of the Sholiga community their cultural values appear
directly to affect their fertility through the autonomy
of the female members of the community; while secondly,
in the case of the higher caste-groups, the effect is
indirect, operating through a more complex causal chain.
The latter can be summed up as follows. On the whole,
what Anil Bhatt calls 'status summation', i.e., where
the caste, economic class and power stratification sys¬
tems of a given region coincide (Bhatt, 1975 )» still
exists in a modified form in Chamarajanagar. The local
higher caste communities tend to have many more affluent
members, who are thus able to afford the modern education
for their children which so often leads to a liberalis¬
ation of values, which in turn transforms traditional
perceptions of the female role. In addition, educated
husbands and wives, or those whose expectations and hopes
include the achievement of education, desire to invest in
the academic future of their children, and this, as Caldwell
points out, puts an economic brake on fertility (Caldwell
op.cit. 1976,1980). (ii) It turned out that the most
impoverished of the three lower-caste groups, the Sholigas,
did in fact have the smallest families and the lowest
number of children of all the six representative groups
in our sample. (iii) It was also established that the
status of womenin our area, in.so far as it affects their
self determination,appears to have a decisive influence
on their fertility. (cf. Dyson and Moore 1983 , to be
discussed below). On the one hand Sholiga women, the
most independent of all those interviewed in our sample,
turned out to have the smallest families, and on the
other all the well-educated women in our sample also had
small families. Since the Sholiga women were all total¬
ly illiterate, it is clear that education is only influ¬
ential as a factor in the reduction of fertility where
it generates sufficient self-respect and self-sufficiency/
self-respect and self-sufficiency in wives and respect
for or at least tolerance of these attributes in their
husbands to enable the wives to make their own decisions
as to the number of children they wish to have without
fearing the disapproval of relatives, affines, and the
community as a whole. These findings will of course
be discussed circumstantially in the relevant chapters
below.
The part of the second hypothesis which is
not substantiated,namely the suggestion that the other
two lower caste communities (Upuligas and Harijans)
might also have fewer children per couple than did the
un-Westernised higher castes, may have been due to my
having concentrated in the course of my previous fieldwork
on the genealogies of older informants in these groups.
The purpose of this was to obtain details of the marr¬
iage patterns of their children and even their grand¬
children, since their knowledge of ascending generations
seldom extended beyond that of their parents. But famil¬
ies of older lower-caste people in the taluk tended in
the past to have been decimated by diseases such as
smallpox, cholera and bubonic plague, which were endemic
in the villages of the area even twenty years ago, and it
was the informants' accounts of mortality in their own
households as well as the narrow lateral spread of gene¬
alogies, which led to my earlier assumption. This assump¬
tion was sustained, I may add, by some of the huge familie
I came across, with a wide lateral spread in their gene¬
alogies, among the orthodox higher castes. By this I do
not mean that they all lived in joint rather than nucle¬
ated families, though this of course tended to be the
case as well, but simply that people in these groups
tended to have a lot of children or of living siblings.
Certainly far more low-caste (which is still
more or less synonymous with poor), children survive today
than was the case in the fifties, as two population
macro-studies in Karnataka testify, (U.N. 1951 and
Bangalore Population Centre 1975 ) • As already
mentioned, in 1951 the infant mortality rate among
agricultural labourers in rural areas was 159 per
1000 live births, while at the same period those
living under improved conditions had a mortality
rate of only 95 per 1000 live births. In urban
areas where the rate was 100 per 1000 the rate dropped
to 58 when housing was improved. D.M. Heer points
out that economic development accompanied by a rise
in the standard of living raises fertility (Heer,1975)
The average standard of living of the higher castes
still compares favourably with that of the lower, but
the eradication of two of the great killer diseases
and improved medical services have resulted in more
lower caste children surviving, while at the same time
the inroads of modern education on the values of ortho¬
doxy have played their part in reducing the average
family size of higher caste couples. To put it
another way, it is possible that this part of the
hypothesis fell foul of demographic transition.
As a matter of interest the mean current
family size per couple for the whole sample was remark¬
ably low (2.86rthe mode being 3) for a rural region
of India, in view of the fact that in the previous
decade the average fertility rate for the country
as a whole was 6.1 births per woman (Cassen and Dyson,
1976). It does appear, if we are to accept the word
of the very high percentage of those surveyed in the
course of the project under discussion who claimed to
be currently using some form of fertility regulation,
traditional or modern, that the message of the family
planning campaign, supported from an unlooked-for
quarter by rising inflation and unemployment, has had
a noticeable effect over the past decade. (cf. J. Knod
1977, noted below). Concurrently, judging by the numbe
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of respondents and other informants who claimed
to be planning to educate their children of both
sexes, Chamarajanagar seems to be in a late state
both
of demographic transition,/traditional and Caldwellian.
THE LITERATURE
( 1) . Fertility in India
To be precise, this heading simply embraces a
selection of demographic publications on population
and fertility deemed relevant to this thesis. The
volume of writing on Indian population problems is
awesome, and necessitates not only selectivity but
an attempt to trace the changing patterns of themes
and attitudes as new dimensions of the subject have
emerged over time. In brief, there seems to have
been a gradual shift of emphasis since Indian indep¬
endence from conventional 'head-counting' KAP(know-
ledge and practice) studies, through stress on the
urgent intensification of the family planning camp¬
aign (accepting without question the principle of
'population control') to debate on the whole issue.
It seems that early studies were based on those
carried out by and in Western countries and were
thus based on alien parameters and premises. It
was only when the data itself proved unproductive
that social scientists and policy makers started to
wonder what was going on. It was not until the
importance of the cultural context began to be acc¬
epted that the second generation of research got
off the ground.
Around 1975 5 the first year of the 'Emergency',
the conventional wisdom began to be challenged.
Denial and self-doubt led to dispute, and the
literature thereafter falls into roughly two
categories, 'for' and 'against' population
/the
control. Disagreement on both/ethics and the
semantics of 'development' also arose about this
time and continues, along with the family plann¬
ing controversy, to this day. Most recently
new voices have been raised advocating micro-
research, detailed small-scale studies such as
the one under discussion here, concentrating on
the\^ultural connotations of fertility, and the
results of some studies of this type have already
been published. Nor is this likely to be the final
stage in the dialectic of fertility, since there is
no evidence to show that the problem will conveniently
fade away under the influence of a proliferation
of micro-studies into some ideal future sunset.
Rather, the reverse is possible, since the cult¬
ural map of India presents an infinite variety, and
perhaps the solution of the population problems, where
they exist, of each cultural centre can only be arri¬
ved at in its particular context. On the other hand
some very recent analyses, to be discussed below,
point to a consistent cultural dichotomy between
north (or north-west), and south (or south-east),
India, which turns lln gender relations and is reflect¬
ed in differential fertility and demographic perform¬
ance in general.
In the following pages an attempt will be made
to touch upon some of the relevant themes in rough
chronological order.
The earliest publication to be discussed here
is The Mysore Population Study (U.N. 1951). This, the
first major study of its kind to be undertaken in India
is still an impressive and useful document.
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The researchers noted that knowledge and practice of
modern contraception was at the time rare in rural
India and uncommon even in the cities. Two opposing
tendencies emerged: on the one hand a higher age at
marriage among the more educated in the late 19^0s and
early 1950s was reducing fertility in this group, while
on the other hand the reduction of mortality in the
same decade was resulting in less or shorter widowhood
and therefore in higher fertility within those castes
which forbid remarriage to widows. It was reported
that few of the respondents regarded a very large family
as a blessing, and that many of those who already had
children feared that a further growth of their family
would mean a reduced standard of living and fewer oppor¬
tunities for the present children. In general the
authors convey the impression that an extension of the
family planning campaign and increased availability of
modern contraceptives would lead inevitably to a reduct¬
ion of the birth rate.
That this view was over-optimistic was put
forward as early as 1959 by K. Dandekar, who observed
that family planning tended to be used by couples who
already had a number of living children and who in the
past may have resorted to permanent abstinence (Dandekar,
1959)- The authors of The Khanna Study (Wyon and Gordon,
1971), which describes a highly organised American project
which attempted to introduce modern family planning tech¬
niques in an area of the Punjab and to note the results
over time, had to admit failure, although they believed
that attitudes towards family size seemed to be in trans¬
ition as the education of girls as well as boys began to
be regarded as an asset. They concluded that until child
mortality - or at least that of male children - could be
reduced parents would continue to have more than two or
three children so as to ensure the survival of the next
generation.
S.N. Agarwala1s summary of Indian demographic
statistics (Agarwala, 1972), estimated that the average
Indian couple is likely to want no more than four child¬
ren and to accept family planning once they have achieved
that optimum figure. He is in no doubt about the valid¬
ity of the family planning programme, but lays down guid¬
ing principles as to the philosophy which should inform
it. The community must feel the need for it; the parents
alone must decide on the number of children they want;
People should be approached through respected leaders
and media; the service should be a part of the medical
and public health services and be available as near as
possible to the people. In the same year another of
India's leading demographers drew the attention of the
country's planners to the effect of infant mortality on
fertility. Pointing out that high mortality leads to
shorter birth intervals, and that it is the overburdening
arid undernourishment of the mother which so often leads
to infant morbidity and death, he concludes that better
nutrition for both mothers and children "....may prove
in the long run to be the best contraceptive" (Chandra-
sekhar, 1972, p.233). Nevertheless he believes in the
need for "mounting a campaign to qualify the right to
produce", (p.233) and feels that it should be obligatory
for Indian married couples of the future to limit their
family size to two or three children no matter what the
local religious and/or cultural compulsions are to the
contrary.
In the following year M. Mamdani published his
counterblast, (Mamdani, 1973) » in which he singles out
The Khanna Study for attack, although many of the conclu¬
sions of that work are similar to his own. Basically
his argument is that people in rural India have large
families because they are poor. In the Punjab village
he cited as his example poor farmers, he says, claimed
that to survive they must raise a family to provide
the labour to run the farm. If they wished to
expand their acreage or to save they must produce
enough children for one to be spared to work for
wages. To use birth control would thus be to court
economic disaster. Mamdani's position has attracted
a number of adherents whose views endorse his to vary¬
ing degrees. Thus about half the contributors to the
volume, Population in India's Development (Bose,Desai,
Mitra and Sharma feds] , 1974) t published by the Indian
Association for the Study of Population, represent a body
of opinion against family planning, while the other half
are for it. In his contribution P.C. Joshi associates
himself with Mamdani in his claim that the idea of over¬
population is a myth created by the dominant nations.
The use of modern technology to bring about a massive
increase in gainful employment, along with a redistrib¬
ution of assets, would, he submits, absorb the surplus
population. Once these institutional changes have been
brought about, __ - -
"...the poorer classes can be induced...
to prefer small numbers of children when
they are liberated from thejcompulsion of
seeking security through their own family
s tructure (p , 84 ) . '■ • A.R. Desai
also offers a Marxist solution, the implication of which
is that social ownership of the means of production for
meeting the assessed needs of the people would provide
the sense of security at present felt by the poor to
be only achieved through the production of sons. Whether
or not India would really benefit from a communist regime
and the past performance of Kerala gives some indication
that it might - one cannot resist alluding, a little
unkindly, here to the draconian system of compulsory
birth control introduced recently by Communist China,
including the limitation of urban couples to one child
apiece. (cf. The Guardian, July 1st. 1982). It seems
It seems that population problems do not after all
go away as the result of a shift in political power.
Meanwhile, though Joshi and Desai are against popu¬
lation control they do not argue specifically the case
for an increase in population. This perspective is
presented by S. Swamy in his paper in the same coll¬
ection. He stresses the benefits to be accrued from
growth, such as a larger proportion of youthful citi¬
zens, more opportunities for innovation and technolog¬
ical change, a greater demand for products, and alleges
that the cost of providing adequate food and other supp¬
lies for the population would be less than the cost of
trying to control its increase.
Swamy's arguments are countered in the same
volume by those of A. Khosla, who puts forward the eco¬
logical case for population control. Observing that,
among other decrements, the felling of trees has been
proceeding at an accelerating pace in India, he warns
that "....the rate of depletion of our forests is a
particularly sensitive indicator of the direct pressure
of population on our resources," and insists that
"....there are sound ecological and social reasons
which put a limit on the number of people a given
situation (land, area, resources etc.,) can in the
long term support" (Khosla, op. cit. 197^, pp 5^~55)»
Certainly the situation in the area of Chamarajanagar
and the deterioration in the environment perceptible
over the past quarter-century, during which period the
population has nearly doubled, seems to uphold Khosla1s
contention. I will return to this theme later.
In Djurfeldt and Lindberg's Pills Against
Poverty (1975)» the authors claim that the area of
Tamilnadu which they studied was not overpopulated,
since, "If the productive forces of Thaiyur agricul¬
ture was fully developed the village could accommodate
twice its population," and "They starve because they
are exploited and denied their just share of the cake"
(p.203)« The theme of this book is once more that of
the necessity for institutional change: the people will
not improve their health by consuming allopathic (modern
or 'Western') drugs but by improving their economic lot,
and this can only be achieved by "getting rid of the
parasitical system which now oppresses them" (p.101).
The authors also state that the average Thaiyur woman
bears about seven children, including the ones who die,
whom she spaces by long lactation while she continues to
work in the fields and at home. It is important to have
children, say Djurfeldt and Lindberg, so that they supp¬
ort the parents when they grow old. However, while the
plight of childless old people is indeed pitiable, so is
that of women subjected to the stresses of constant child-
bearing, especially in the conditions of rural India. It
is not clear whether the views of the women themselves
were canvassed or whether the authors are simply endorsing
a collective representation. While their intention may
have been to show that a more democratic system would auto¬
matically lead to a reduction in the birth rate, the polem¬
ical jargon in which much of their argument is couched
sometimes tends to obscure their meaning.
In this context the results of a survey under¬
taken by M. 8c C. Vlassoff in a Gujerati village are inter¬
esting. They showed that few people lived long enough to
be completely dependent on their offspring, and provided
evidence to the effect that security in old age was assured
through the possession of economic resources rather than
of sons (Vlassoff 8c Vlassoff, 1980).
In his comprehensive overview of India's popul¬
ation complexities (Mandelbaum, 197^ ) , D.G. Mandelaum reviews
those cultural practices which may affect fertility, from
the age of effective marriage to permanent abstinence when
the children begin to raise their own families.
In the process he reverts several times to the
contradiction between private interest and public
welfare. Observing that one of the dilemmas facing
Government efforts towards fertility reduction is
that "...those babies who are a planner's worry are
the parents' hope and joy" (p.110), he suggests that
one of the most efficacious solutions to this dilemma
would be the education and consequent emancipation of
women.
who supports the view that India's present official
policy of promoting family planning should be abandon¬
ed in favour of institutional change (Demerath 1976).
He advocates what he calls "the societalist approach",
that is,the inculcation of such socio-economic and
cultural changes as raising the age of marriage and
otherwise trying to modify factors which affect fert¬
ility. He insists that this should go hand-in-hand
with "....the transformation of some of India's prim¬
ary institutions". Unless such changes, in the fields
of property, employment, women's rights, the distrib¬
ution of wealth and social justice for the poor and
deprived come about repeated failures of the family
planning programme "...will generate... pressures for
institutional change such that existing elites will be
forced out of power" (pp.8^-85).
Two papers on population which appeared in
India's 'Economic and Political Weekly' in 1976 endorse
the arguments of Mandelbaum and Demerath. One, by R.H.
Cassen, was based on material for his book to be pub¬
lish " later, of which more below. The other
women's emancipation in India. Krishnan concludes tha
the drop in the birth rate in the State of Kerala was




'Demographic Transition in Kerala'
Both are convincing on the need for
principally due to two major factors: the decline
in the infant mortality rate consequent upon Kerala's
having the best health and welfare service in India;
and the rise in the average age at marriage, which he
suggests was due to Kerala's achievements in the field
of female education.
The Bangalore Population Study of 1975 , a
survey undertaken by the Population Centre, Bangalore,
covered the same districts of Karnataka which were sur¬
veyed by the Mysore Study and provided the opportunity
to examine the effects of social change on fertility
in the intervening years. An instructive paper compar¬
ing the results of the two surveys, (Srinavasan, Reddy
and Raju, 1977), was subsequently published by the Pop¬
ulation Centre. The authors discovered that the birth
rate had not declined as much as might have been expect¬
ed in view of substantial reductions in infant mortality
and increases in literacy, combined with an intensive
family planning programme over the period. They suggest¬
ed that this was due partly to th^4bandonment of tradit¬
ional methods of family planning, which resulted in shorter
birth intervals. While age-specific fertility rates of
married women above the age of thirty had been consider¬
ably reduced, those of women below thirty had actually
increased, a situation which had not been envisaged by
the planners.
Reflecting on some of the reasons put forward
to account for the relative failure of India's family
planning programme, (e.g., shortage of trained staff,
adverse psychological effects of some techniques), Darrell
Jackson's views echo those expressed by the doubters in
the early 1970s (Epstein and Jackson, [eds], 1977)* Demo¬
graphic variables, he remarks, tend to derive from the
socio-economic environment. Increased agricultural prod¬
uctivity and the intensification of agricultural reform
"should be cardinal points in any development strategy..
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..which includes an integrated population policy". (p.10 ) .
People are more likely to limit their fertility, he con¬
cludes, "....if they have the opportunity to control and
participate in the processes which govern their lives" (p.l4).
His co-editor, Scarlett Epstein, agrees.
"From our studies it emerged that people
need to be given the opportunity to shape
their own lives as well as those of their
offspring before they are prepared to plan
the number of their children" (p.236) 1
Monica Das Gupta's paper in the same volume
argues that among the chief agents for change resulting in
reduced family size are: contact with urban norms; educat¬
ion for both sexes; and full employment, especially for
women. (cf. Dyson and Moore below). V.K. Jairath's contri¬
bution shows how technological change, bringing increased
prosperity to the villages of his study, was instrumental
in reducing the birth rate. The introduction of tube wells
increased productivity so greatly that small farmers can now
afford to hire rather than to breed labour and therefore do
not want large families any more. This tends to uphold
Mamdani1s theory that farmers have large families because
they are poor.
In 1978 R.H. Cassen's magisterial anatomy of India
appeared. Cassen cites two crucial factors which should go
a long way towards solving India's problems: large-scale,
adequately rewarded, employment and co-operative self-help.
"Even the population question, itself may find its answer in
this context; perhaps only when communities work for the
collective good and take responsibility for their own numbers
will those numbers be sensibly regulated by voluntary means.
As it is, life in the village is not co-operative but comp¬
etitive" (Cassen 1978, p.337)« Although Cassen's conclu¬
sion is that India's difficulties are not likely to be cured
by any solutions short of radical change involving instil
tutional upheaval, he nevertheless points out the defects
in Mamdani's reasoning. For instance, most of Mamdani's
informants referred to the economic benefits accruing from
having sons. But half their children were daughters, and
in north India daughters are economically disadvantageous.
Therefore as some couples had only daughters, surely it would
be courting economic disaster for them to have any child¬
ren at all. Cassen contends that there is a demand for
family limitation in India which is not in fact being met,
and in the light of my Chamarajanagar experience, I cannot
but agree with him. He also deplores the fact that female
education, which is consistently related to fertility red¬
uction in nearly every country in the world, is such a
neglected feature of development in most Indian States.
Shortly before Cassen's book appeared a new arriv¬
al on the demographic scene (although well-known and resp¬
ected in the related field of anthropology), entered the
arena advocating a different approach to the study of the
'population question'. In 1977 M.N. Srinivas produced a
paper for the Family Planning Foundation which deplored the
folly of ignoring the fact that fertility is everywhere
bound up with other aspects of local culture, and "....the
futility of action programmes which set aside the sentiments
and values of the people." The author and his collaborator
call for detailed studies at the micro-level, declaring round¬
ly that, "In sum, fertility has escaped serious
treatment in village studies in spite
of their holism, and demographic research,
in spite of its impressive volume, has
failed to place fertility behaviour in its
proper social and cultural context"
(Srinivas and Ramaswamy, 1977» p.8).
Some micro-studies, including this research, which
do pay attention to the way in which fertility is related to
community norms have in fact been undertaken in relatively
recent years. These include that of R. Anker which comp¬
ared the mores and attitudes of a high and low caste in
Gujerat. He found that although education was an important
determinant of fertility, the really crucial predictor of
family planning acceptance in both his groups was the number
of living sons per couple. He concluded that until Gujeratis
could be dissuaded from the felt need for more than one son
the birth rate was not likely to be greatly reduced (Anker, 1973)
Thomas and Shirley Poffenberger's publications (Poffenberger
1969,1973,1976) were also based on research in rural Gujerat.
tkough-
The authors found that^the 'ideal' family among all
the castes they studied was two sons and a daughter,
the hard facts of early-age mortality required most
couples to have more than three children for the ideal
number to survive to maturity. Nevertheless, the econ¬
omic pressure of having an increasing number of living
children to be fed, clothed and educated was beginning
to alter the attitudes of fathers towards a smaller
family-size norm, and to affect the viewpoints of their
older children. Thus the beginnings of demographic
transition seem to be traceable in the area, both in
the previously accepted sense and in that of J.C.Caldwel
(op.cit. 1976) .
A more recent village study is that of
K. Mahadevan in Tamilnadu (Mahadevan 1977), which, when
compared with the findings to be analysed in this thesis
is a striking example of the way in which reproductive
behaviour in India varies not only from community to
community but within the same communities (jati) in
different localities. For example in Mahadevan1s
Thoppampatti, the most frequent users of modern contra¬
ception were the Harijans, the community at the bottom
of Mahadevan's caste hierarchy, while the least frequent
users were the Gounders, the highest caste in his sample
who also had the smallest number of children per couple.
In Chamarajanagar, by contrast, the least frequent users
of modern contraception were the lowest castes, while
the most frequent users were the Westernised members of
high-caste communities. The reason for this situation
reversal is, it seems, that the Gounder women studied
by Mahadevan still rely on their traditional method of
family limitation, induced abortion by means of various
abortifacients known to the females of the community.
In the same way, as we shall see, the Sholiga community,
who had the fewest children in our Chamarajana gar sample
prefer to rely on their traditional methods of birth
control. But the Sholigas constitute the lowest
economic group in our area while the Gounders are the
highest, or at least the most dominant, of Mahadevan's
area. The inference is clear: a general theory of
fertility in India cannot fail to run aground regularly
on such shoals, and it should not be forgotten by family
planners that "...similarity in demographic behaviour
may not stem from common causes" (Busfield and Paddon,1977)
Another study of the effects of certain cult¬
ural conventions on fertility, but with a dissimilar
slant, is that of R.M. Reid. His research led him to
conclude that consanguineous marriage, widely preferred
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and practised in south India, which can result inbred
offspring who are either sterile or less likely to survive
to marriageable age-, can be regarded as a regulatory
system giving long-term stability to population growth
(Reid,1971). Cross-cousin and elder-sister 1s-daughter
marriages are very common in the Chamarajanagar area, but
whether this has actually contributed to the relatively
small mean family size found in my sample is another
matter. The publications of W. McCormack (1958), A.K.
Ghosh ( 1976)-, Rao and Inbaraj ( 1977)» and Anthony Good (1980)
all attest to the fact that the level of inbreeding is
still high in south Indian States. It is true that
child/woman ratios (CWRs) have been consistently lower
in the South than in north India, the northern States
also exhibiting higher total fertility rates (TFRs) than
in the South, (cf. Dyson and Moore 1983)» but other factors,
to be discussed below, are manifestly involved as well.
Reverting, as we enter the nineteen-eighties, to
procedures and principles, J.E. Kocher's paper (Kocher 1980),
is a curiously conservative document. The author agrees
with the population projection for India of 922 to 970 million
by the end of the century predicted by Cassen and Dyson (1976)
and believes that the Government's target of replacement
level fertility by 1996 to be unattainable, although he
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suggests that several of the more progressive States,
which includes those comprising south India are under¬
going sustained fertility decline. Thereafter he
recommends a number of steps which family planning
organisers could take "without alienating voters".
These appear to be no more than the mixture as before,
including such measures as the reintroduction of family
planning incentives and easier availability of techniques
other than vasectomony. In view of the growing realis¬
ation by demographers, economists, and anthropologists
that the population problem is unlikely to be solved
except in the contexts of both social reform and cogni¬
zance of local and regional cultural values and customs,
it is surprising that there is no mention of broader
issues. At this point the debate seems to have pro¬
gressed in a circle.
However, a further perspective has recently
been opened up by two books and a paper on the same
significant theme, that of a North/South (or northwest/
southeast) variation in Hindu culture and its effect on
fertility. The first of these works, D.E. Sopher's
An Exploration of India (Sopher jedj 1980), comprises
a number of papers dealing with regional differences
in culture encountered in the study of human geography
in India. Of particular relevance to the North/South
dichotomy model is that of M. Libbee, which found that
hypergamy, the rejection of marriage to kin, and village
and territorial exogamy, all northern Hindu characteristics,
contrasted with the southern tendency to prefer marriage to
kin, isogamous marriage in general and village or terri¬
torial endogamy. He reflects that the north Indian
bride, married imto a strange household distanced from
her native place which avoids interaction with her natal
group, is disadvantaged compared to the south Indian bride,
married into a household probably within walking distance
of her natal one and very possibly living among relatives
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she has known all her life. This difference is strik¬
ingly endorsed by my Chamarajanagar data, which showed
that the average marriage distance in my village was
ten miles. The mean distance would have been much
less if it had not been for the presence of some rich
households where the wives came from towns over a hundred
miles away.
In his own paper D.E. Sopher shows that differ¬
ential sex ratios for North and South reveal the same
pattern of gender relations. That is, the status and
the life chances of women is lower in the North, while
fertility in the same northern region is higher "Simply
put, the Indian population exhibits high masculinity
(1072 males per 1000 females in 1971) that is highest
in the northwest and decreases towards the south and
east" (p.296). The weight of evidence, he adds, "...makes
the regional differences in woman's place an aspect of
ancient, fundamental differences in Hindu society" (p.300 ) .
These findings are well supported in the author's paper in
the same volume which shows that the pattern of sex dis¬
parity in Indian literacy fits the sex ration pattern to
a remarkable degree. Female literacy figures are consist¬
ently higher in the South.
Barbara Miller's book, The Endangered Sex (Miller,
1981), confirms the arguments of Sopher et al. Her contention
is that it is the neglect of juvenile females as being of
little worth - a neglect which today has taken the place of
overt female infanticide practised in the not-so-distant
past - which accounts for the pronounced masculinity of sex
ratios in north, or northwest, India. She suggests that
north India is part of a belt stretching from the Mediterr¬
anean through the Islamic Middle East and -Pakistan which
places a low value on the female, and says that this is
partly related to costs, including high marriage and dowry
expenses for daughters and the low work participation of
women who have to be segregated and protected to preserve
the 'honour' of the men. Furthermore in the North
women are excluded from inheritance of property.
Contrasted with this is the situation in the South,
which, she submits, is part of a different culture
belt extending through southeast Asia which includes
high work participation, low, or comparatively low,
marriage expenses and some inheritance of property
for women, along with isogamous marriage and a higher
value placed on female children.
"The important part that culture plays
in affecting male and female r&les in
production and the control of property
cannot be over-emphasised. It is culture
that dictates the great worth of males
as both producers and heirs in much of
India, and... undervalues the vital...
roles that women play (p.27)
Miller goes on to equate the higher fertility figures
in the North with anxiety to produce sons, and obser¬
ves drily that "Obviously daughter neglect does not
completely wipe out the fertility boosting effect of
son preference" (p.l67).
In their paper, Kinship Structure, Female
Autonomy and Demographic Behaviour: Regional Contrasts
within India (Dyson and Moore 1983)? the authors sub¬
stantiate the validity of the arguments used by Sopher,
Miller, et al. Drawing on census data and that of the
Sample Registration System (SRS) they examine sex ratio
child/woman ratios, estimates of total fertility, early
age mortality rates, and regional marriage patterns for
the Indian States, and arrive at the same conclusions.
"...the main States of India tan be
broadly grouped as falling under one
or the other of two basic demographic
regimes. In contrast to the north,
one finds in the south and east:
relatively low overall fertility;
lower fertility within marriage; a
later age of marriage; lower child
mortality; comparatively low ratios
of female to male child mortality;
and, largely as a consequence, relat¬
ively low population sex ratios (P.42)
They then
proceed to link these findings with contrasting
cultural norms in north and south India in the
fields of kinship and marriage, and conclude that,
although the status of women in south India is
not particularly high per se, it is a question of
degree. It is higher than it is in the North.
Behind this estimate of 'worth' lies another concept,
that of personal autonomy. "....the capacity to
manipulate one's personal environment" (p.^5). It
is to this higher degree of independence enjoyed by
women in the South, (to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on region, jati or class), that the authors
attribute the "relatively favourable" demographic
performance of the South. They conclude that, from
a policy point of view, their findings create
»• a strong presumption in favour of
broadly feminist modes of social
action., both as an end in itself
and as a means to facilitate re¬
duced birth and death rates" (p.5M
The central theme of the last four works
reviewed here is that of the effect of female status
on fertility. While a great deal has been written
on the status of women in India and elsewhere during
the past few decades it is only recently that the link
between the sex role system and fertility has been
widely canvassed. And, although it has frequently
been mentioned as an issue by those writing on the
subject of Indian population (cf. Mandelbaum,197^,
Cassen,1978), demographic studies which focus more or
less exclusively on this subject in the Indian context
are still relatively scarce. Among them are those of
Renu Chahil (Chahil, 1977) and of A.K. Jain (Jain,198l).
Chahil's conclusion is rather pessimistic, pointing out
as it does- that the participation of women in the Indian
economy, apart from agricultural labour, declined between
1961 and 1971 with the corresponding decline in household
industry, the main bastion of women's employment in the
face of mechanisation. But Jain suggests that education
for women will bring about reduced fertility even
without increasing opportunities for participation
in the work force, because it increases their expos¬
ure to ideas and information. The same notion, that
of the diffusion of innovation, is implicit as a some¬
what different theory in J. Knodel's paper (Knodel, 1977),
which postulates that demographic transition comes
about as the result of acceptance and adoption of new
behaviour patterns rather than the adaptation of old
ones.
An important contribution to this theme is
the cross-cultural collection of papers entitled Women's
Roles and Population Trends in the Third World prepared
for a conference to discuss an ILO-funded research pro¬
ject, (Anker, Buvinic and Youssef (edsj , 1982). Two of
these papers are specifically concerned with India, and
the themes of many of them concern the re-thinking of
the concept of 'work' to include housework and its relat¬
ionship to the formal labour market. Another voice cons¬
istently urging that attention should be paid to the status
of women and the decline in female labour force partic¬
ipation in the context of fertility is that of Ashok Mitra
(Mitra,1978,1980).
(2) Some Literature on Fertility Outside, but
Relevant to the Indian Case.
Examples of papers which relate the status of
women to fertility outside the Indian context are those
of Kupinsky ( 1971)* Ware ( 1976). Birdsell ( 1976), Ermisch
(1977), and Stinner (1980) and of course the chapters in
Anker et al. (1982) mentioned above which draw their data
from countries in the Third World other than India. Stanley
Kupinsky finds labour-force participation of the wife to be
negatively associated with fertility, and that working wives
of high socio-economic status had fewer children than those
of low status, but suggests that this might apply more to
women in metropolitan than in rural areas. Ware, however,
claims on her Melbourne evidence that "Wives go to work in
order to maintain the children they already have" (p.^6)#
Birdsell's view is one which has been promoted by Cassen,
Caldwell and Boserup; female employment is likely to
lower fertility not only where the economic value of
A
children is low, but also where the status of/employment
is high, thus permitting women concepts of their role in
life over and beyond the role of housewife and mother.
Ernisch examines the Easterlin hypothesis, that a family's
economic status relative to its aspirations is a determinant
of fertility, (which incidentally did seem to be the case
with at least one of the caste groups surveyed in Chama-
rajanagar), and reflects that fertility is reduced in
situations where women's wages and employment options are
rising or have risen. This coincides with the findings
of Birdsell mentioned above. Stinner's Korean study rev¬
ealed that education, urban residence and adherence to
the Christian religion all delayed marriage but where
marriage was delayed shorter birth intervals tended to
preclude fertility reduction. Srinivasan et al., who
compared the Bangalore and Mysore population studies, came
to the same conclusion on the use of modern contraception
along with the abandonment of traditional checks on con¬
ception. Among the papers by contributors to Anker et al.
(1982), Safilios-Rothschild discusses the two main sources
of women's power, that derived from men and that derived
from their own productive activities. The latter, she
concludes, is the true basis of autonomy. Jelin points
out that the availability of women for outside work is
related to their status and responsibilities within the
household, and asks why housework should be excluded from
the social process of production. Papola relates women's
employment in urban India to their domestic responsibil¬
ities. Mueller and Oppong canvass questions of child-care
and time-use, and Youssef suggests that the sexual division
of labour can give women control over their own lives.
Most of these studies include or concentrate
upon the factor of women's work participation as a deter¬
minant of fertility. It seems as if Ester Boserup's
influential book, Women's Role in Economic Development
(Boserup, 1970), although not primarily concerned with
questions of fertility, has sparked off a considerable
volume of deliberation on the subject. She herself
wrote ,
"As public propaganda for family limit¬
ation, .becomes more widespread...we shall
expect to see married women in developing
countries encouraged to seek employment
outside the home as a means of limiting
the number of births" (p.22k)
She also emphasised the need to give girls other ideals
and ways of asserting themselves if the rearing of a
large family were no longer considered a virtue.
The accuracy of this prediction is debated in
a compendiumjThe Fertility of Working Women, edited by
S. Kupinsky (1977)- Here Helen Ware shows that in trop¬
ical Africa, where the idea that 'Woman's place is in the
home' is not part of the cultural furniture, the high par¬
ticipation of women in the labour force does not result
in reduced fertility. V.Hull draws our attention to the
effect of class differentiation in Java on the relationshi]
between women's work and fertility. M. Ahdab Yehia does
the same for rural areas of the Arab Middle East, pointing
out that peasant women work there because they have to,
that their pay is less than that of the males and does
not bring them independence, and that their work has no
effect on their high fertility. The study by J.Salaff
and A. Wong of Chinese women in Hong Kong, Singapore and
the Chinese People's Republic finds that a strong work
motivation, whether due to job satisfaction, high economic
reward, or ideology, is often the result of social group
pressures on the individual, V. Stolte Heiskanen on
Western Europe seems to support this contention. She says
that women's participation in the labour force is higher
and fertility lower where the society itself is "work-role
oriented". Kupinsky's own paper on working women in the
United States echoes this thesis, as does E.Szabady on
Eastern Europe. Constantina Safilios-Rothschild, in her
closely-argued paper, takes issue with the assumption
that work outside the home is automatically an indi¬
cator of emancipation, thus confirming Ahdab Yehia's
estimate. It is the element of choice, she insists,
which is the true indicator. This corroborates the
testimony of Dyson and Moore (op.cit. 19&3) » that it
is self-determination which is the sign of emancipa¬
tion. Safilios- Rothschild's point is that fertil¬
ity is reduced where the woman experiences a high
degree of work commitment and finds it hard to recon¬
cile the roles of worker and mother. "Women's work
may not tend to depress fertility as long as it does
not provide an alternate and equally important iden¬
tity" (p.259)* Thus as Kupinsky says in his overview,
there is no consistent pattern to the relationship be¬
tween women's work and fertility. "....it is not work
per se that is significantly related to lower fertil¬
ity, but other factors associated with working or not
working". Among the inter-related factors are: the
concept of the modern woman; commitment to and satis¬
faction with the worker role; elimination of the de¬
viant status attached to non-familial work bytnewider
society; and "...the social, psychological and econ¬
omic rewards for working that are perceived (by the
woman) as being greater than the rewards for child-
bearing" (p.377). This in fact is just what Nancy
Birdsell and Ester Boserup have pointed out. But
perhaps the most apt commentary on what Dyson and
Moore and the contributors to this volume have to say
is the remark of a Sholiga woman in Chamarajanagar
taluk. Asked why she had opted for having only one
child, she replied with a shrug, "Well, it's difficult
to work when you're pregnant".
Other papers on fertility which are not direct¬
ly concerned with India but which are relevant to a
study of Indian population dynamics, are those by
Wrigley, (1966), Bouglas, (1966), Birdsell et al.,(1968)
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Turnbull, (1972), and Short, (1976). These all
concern questions of population control in pre-
industrial societies. E. A. Wrigley shows that
there was a purposive decrease and subsequent in¬
crease of fertility under circumstances causing
social and economic stress and their later abate¬
ment in pre-industrial England. Douglas, Turnbull
and Birdsell speculate on methods used in primitive
societies to keep the population in equilibrium
with its environment. These include abortion;
and
post-partum abstinence; lengthy lactation;/infant¬
icide, mainly of females and those suffering from
physical or ritual (e.g. twins) disabilities. They
end up in (implicit) agreement that little is known
about birth control in such societies. R.V. Short,
drawing on anthropological and demographic studies
of societies such as Bushmen tribes, infers that under
primitive conditions in the past fertile women must
have been in a constant state of pregnancy, lactation
or post-partum amenorrhoea, and that a succession of
menstrual cycles, such as women avoiding pregnancy
today have to undergo, is neither natural nor desirable.
Since 'civilisation' and development have removed natur¬
al constraints on population density and artificial con¬
traception seems necessary for the survival of the spe¬
cies, he advocates the production of a non-steroidal
contraceptive that would allow women to return "...to
the reproductive state which was the norm for our prim¬
itive ancestors - amenorrhoea" (p.20).
Some more recent studies, each with considerable
relevance to the issues deliberated above, are those of
Cain (1977), Balakrishnan (1978), Scrimshaw (1978), Preston
(1978), Wyon (1979), and Yu (1979). Mead Cain's paper
reveals that the kind of changes in production which
Jairath (op.cit. 1977) saw as conducive to fertility
depression had not yet reached the Bangladesh village of
his study. There, high fertility and large numbers of
surviving children were still economically rational prop¬
ositions in view of the financial advantages accruing to
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the parents from the economic activities of the village
children. T.R. Balakrishnan's study of the effects of
child mortality on fertility in four Latin-American coun¬
tries led to the conclusion that in populations with high
fertility and low use of contraception the number of
births subsequent to child loss were more a function of
"exposure to risk" than to fear of infant mortality.
I think this was often the case in Chamarajanagar too,
where many informants felt that the coming of children
was "God's will" rather than a state of affairs over which
they had any control. Cases where child loss did seem to
affect subsequent births were usually those in which the
parents had been unable to rear any children of one sex
or the other and where one or both parents badly wanted
a child of that sex. The principal conclusion of the con¬
tributors to Preston's volume was that in no society do
statistics show as many as 50 per cent of child deaths
replaced by an equivalent number of further births. In
his introduction he gives a number of reasons why replace¬
ment may be incomplete, such as that for any' given^ami
size and composition may be totally unplanned and regarded
as "God's will", or the desired number of the preferred
t
sex may survive. Scrimshaw reverses the usual arguments, .She
says
that high fertility may lead to early-age mortality, if not
by direct infanticide, at least by neglect of unwanted
children. These are usually female, but may also be
handicapped, 'difficult', unattractive, or high in the
birth order. Wyon argues that population control pro¬
grammes should emphasise maternal and child health ser¬
vices, for which there is a felt need, rather than contra¬
ception, which may not be a felt need. Y.C. Yu's paper
on methods of population control in modern China is ger¬
mane to some of the principal topics which have arisen in
this stocktaking of the literature on fertility as rele¬
vant to this thesis. Besides revolutionary changes in
production, employment and the status of women, and along
with the development of the public health services, China's
intensive family planning programme includes the postpone¬
ment of marriage, advocation of wide birth intervals, and
the restriction of family size to two children. (And
as we have seen, this has been reduced to one child in
urban areas, on pain of economic sanctions, according
to The Guardian of May 29th and July 1st 19&2)
Finally, we come to some studies or papers of
general demographic importance which seem to have a
particular bearing on the Chamarajanagar research. To
deal with these in an order which has more to do with a
notional imputation of their salience in the sphere of this
study than with chronology, the first is Moni Nag's
Factors Affecting Human Fertility (Nag 1962), in which
the author examines the way cultural traditions may deter¬
mine fertility in non-industrial societies. Although Nag's
findings had some influence on the hypotheses set out at
the start of this chapter they were not all borne out by
the results of my data analyses, except in the case of
the Sholiga tribe, where long lactation and post-partum
abstinence coincided with comparatively low fertility.
This may have been because they were the only truly
'non-industrial' grou^Ln my sample. But even so Nag's
theory that venereal disease is the single most important
factor in reducing fertility in such societies is not supp¬
orted by my data. The group in my sample which had the
most potential for VD had the second highest number of
children per couple, (i.e. the estate labourers in Group V).
An important, if somewhat reductionist, internation¬
ally comparative approach is that of Arnold and Fawcett (1975)»
on the value of children. Their findings are fairly predict¬
able. For instance sons are preferred in the expectation of
support in old age; upper classes see the benefits of children
more in emotional and in psychological terms, while lower
classes tend to see them more in economic terms; daughters,
when wanted, are wanted more for emotional reasons. A cont¬
rary standpoint is that of Busfield and Paddon ( 1977) • Joan
Busfield writes of her English informants in the same vein
as that of Srinivas for India (op.cit. 1977). She finds
utilitarian attempts to link economic factors to fertility
unsatisfactory because they pay insufficient attention to
personal and individual reactions to the social/cultural/
biological situations in which they find themselves.
Cost/benefit analyses, she implies, are at once too
general and too simplistic to be an adequate base for
fertility theories.
Nevertheless, J.C. Caldwell's restatement of
demographic transition theory in socio-economic terms
(op.cit. 1976)» is a document of striking credibility.
While conceding that family sizes in differing societies
at different times may be determined by personal, socio¬
logical, or physiological reasons, he says that the theory
of transition proposed by Notestein in 19^5 is incorrect
in its assumption of irrationality on the part of couples
in poor traditional societies. That argument runs thus:
in the first or original stage of developing countries
high mortality necessitates high fertility for survival
of the society. In the second, transitional, stage mortal¬
ity decreases with improved medical services and techno¬
logy but fertility remains high because couples are still
insuring, so to speak, against child loss. In the third
stage conviction of the rationality of reducing fertility
in view of low mortality has reached all classes of the
population and transition has been achieved. Caldwell's
theory is that in every society fertility behaviour is
rational, but in traditional societies the inter-generat¬
ion flow of wealth runs from younger to older generations
through the economic contributions of children to the
household, while in developed ones adjustment to 'Western'
values and conditions, such as modern education and nucle-
ation of households, leads to a reversal of the flow and
thus to restriction of fertility. Caldwell's re-statement
of the springs of demographic transition was buttressed by
a subsequent paper (Caldwell 1980), which showed that there
are five mechanisms by which mass education has an impact
on fertility: (1) School work reduces the child's poten¬
tial as a family worker. (2) School expenses and the
child's increased expectations increases the cost of child¬
ren (3) Schooling prolongs dependency. (^&5) Schooling
speeds up cultural change, introduces Western middle-class
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values and reduces sex differentiation.
Turning finally to the literature concerning
the effect of caste on fertility, we are confronted
with a surprisingly meagre assortment. The bibliography
of caste is immense, and this is not the place - or indeed
the area of research - in which to embark on a lengthy
dissection of its intricacies, though some of its aspects
will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. But compara¬
tively little interest seems to have been taken in the
tr
bearing of this ubiquious Indian institution on reproduct-
A
ive behaviour, at least until recently. Many of the ana¬
lysts and researchers already referred to mention caste -
it is difficult not to do so when commenting on Indian
society - but only en passant. Of those who have taken
caste as an important variable and compared the effects
of local community cultures on fertility, the following
are the only ones who spring to mind. They have all
been mentioned already in this chapter. The Poffenbergers
(op.cit. 1969, 1973, 1976), and Richard Anker ( 1973), compar¬
ed the observances of selected high and low castes in Guj-
erat, relating this behaviour to their socio-economic back¬
grounds. Some of the contributors to Epstein and Jackson's
symposium (op.cit. 1977), notably Jairath and Das Gupta,
also discussed comparatively the local jati in their regions
of field work. A.K. Ghosh (op.cit. 1976) , and R.M. Reid
(op . cit. 1971) 1 confine themselves to a single caste. K. Maha-
devan compares the reproductive behavour of three caste-
groups in Tamilnadu; and Barbara Miller, Tim Dyson and Mick
Moore (op.cit. 1981, 1983 ), compare north Indian high and
low caste fertility figures and behaviour with those of
south Indian high and low castes. Lastly, the research
dealt with in this thesis compares six caste-groups, invol¬
ving a selection of jati from the local model of the system.
Both Anker and the Poffenbergers found that the desire for
sons was the chief obstacle to reduction of family size
in their areas. Since these authors carried out their
research in Gujerat, one of the States firmly placed in
the category of the 'North' posited by Sopher,(op.cit.1980),
Miller, (1981) and Dyson and Moore, (1983), this is to be
expected. According to D.F. Pocock the Patidar
jati, a high-caste community of the State, were
deeply involved in hypergamous marriage relation¬
ships which meant that the girls at the top of the
•ladder' were surplus. This had led in the past
to infanticide of high-caste girls. (Pocock,1972).
Their findings therefore tend to confirm the theories
of those presenting the North/South hypothesis. Reid
and Ghosh in their south Indian studies, both find en
dogaray leading to fertility depression. Mahadevan
found that his low caste jati had more children than
aid the other two groups in his survey because of
their fear of early-age mortality and their need for
support in old age. Miller, Dyson and Moore, as we
have seen, relate thedifferential fertility figures
to the status of women. My own research results
also showed that the group with the lowest fertility
did in fact accord the highest status to women. I
found too, that women in the high caste group who
were well-educated and 'Westernised', and whose hus¬
bands had the same values, enjoyed the personal auton¬
omy and control over their own reproductivity that in
most cases led to their having small families. The
fact that Miller, Dyson and Moore found that south
Indian high castes had somewhat lower fertility than
south Indian low castes is partly explained by the
increasing spread of education and by corollary of
'Western middle-class values' among these groups, and
partly by the south Indian kinship system, with its
stress on territorial endogamy, marriage to kin and
close ties between affines. Women in orthodox high
caste households in south India may be restricted,
subordinated and disregarded as wives, but they are
loved and valued as sisters and daughters. As a rule
they always have recourse to their natal km, and when
a girl marries her mother's brother's son, or hb*"
Qnoth er ' s
mother's younger brother, she returns to her/natal
home. In any case she is often married to someone
she has played with from childhood. Advice and help
over family limitation is thus easily available,
and, if my experience in Chamarajana gar is anything
to go on, even wives in orthodox joint families
thus have access to modern contraceptive techniques
and make use of them.
It is to be hoped that the contents of the
following chapters will provide confirmation of the
major part of the hypotheses presented at the beginning
of this introduction, and that they will prove to be of
some value in their endorsement or (occasionally) refut
ation of the arguments set forth in at least a portion
of the literature cited herein.
KarrvoCfakcLj sHovou-vc^ cuimimstro-t"i ve. ciisfncfs
^Ccx-le. CLppybK■ I 5;OOOt OjCl-Q
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SECTION ONE: THE CONTEXT
CHAPTER I. Ecological Background
The State of Karnataka, which was formed under
the States Reorganisation Act of 1956, covers the south¬
western end of the Deccan Plateau of peninsular India,
and is an extension of the erstwhile princely State of
Mysore. It is the eighth largest in area of the twenty-
two Indian States, (192,000 square kilometres, of which
48% is cultivated), and has the eighth largest population
(about 37 million according to the 198l census). A rela¬
tively rich region, Karnataka currently produces 85% of
India's gold; 85% of the country's silk; and 85% of its
coffee. (cf 'Commerce', July 1980) • Only 24% of the
population is urban, and only 32% literate (1971 census
figures).
The first historical - or semi-historical -
mention of Mysore in Indian literature occurs in Jain
accounts and inscriptions, and states that the great emp¬
eror Chandragupta, who drove the Macedonians out of India
and founded the Mauriyan Empire, eventually abdicated in
accordance with Jain obligations and retreated to Mysore
to die, in circa 298 B.C. The Mauriyan Empire extended
to Mysore at that time (cf Romilla Thapar, 1966), and
certainly some of the rock-edicts of Chandragupta's ill¬
ustrious grandson Ashoka are located in the State.
Of the early dynasties which subsequently ruled
Mysore as part of their territories, the Kadambas, Hoysalas
and Gangas were essentially native to the State. The Hoy¬
salas, patrons of the architects and master-builders who
designed and constructed the fine temples of Belur, Halebid
and Somnathpur, ruled the whole State from the 12th century
A.D. to the l4th, when they were defeated by the Muslims,
and Mysore became part of the famous kingdom of Vijayanagar.
In l6l0 a local chieftain of the line of Wodeyar ousted the
Vijayanagar viceroy at Seringapatna on the Kaveri river a
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few miles from the present city of Mysore. There are
no annals of the dynasty before the time of Charaaraja
Wodeyar III, 1515-1552, (though they claim the line
goes back to the 12th century), but it henceforth be¬
came the dominant power in that part of India. The
dynasty ruled from l6l0 until the final withdrawal of
the privileges and privy purses of the Indian princes
in 1972. There was an interregnum during which the
incumbents were puppets of the Muslim usurper Haider
Ali (1761-1782), and his son Tipu Sultan, killed by
the British at the siege of Seringapatna in 1799, but
the Wodeyars were reinstated by the British after the
death of Tipu.
The town of Mysore, which lies at the foot
of a hill called Chamundi, after the tutelary deity
of the Wodeyar line, became the capital of the restored
dynasty. The present State capital is however the
growing industrial city of Bangalore, and Mysore, its
romantic palaces converted into museums and tourist
hotels, is now merely the centre of a district, the
major unit of local administration in India. Every
administrative district is further subdivided into a
number of taluks, each comprising some hundreds of
villages. Mysore district is composed of 11 taluks,
including Chamarajanagar, the locus of the field work
on which this thesis is based.
The Countryside. Chamarajanagar taluk lies
at an altitude of about 2000 feet (709 metres), in the
southeast corner of Karnataka, 6l km. from the city of
Mysore and 198 km. from the capital, Bangalore. The
taluk covers an area of around 1,236 sq. km. and has
a population of 227,576 (1971 census figures), 31,000 odd
of whom live in the town which constitutes the taluk ad¬
ministrative Headquarters and market-place, and the rest
in nearly 200 scattered villages and hamlets. Topograph¬
ically it consists for the most part of a plain, pimpled
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with small rocky hills and plentifully sprinkled
with kere, irrigation reservoirs. This plain, partly
watered by a relatively small river, the Honnuhole,
which becomes a torrent after heavy rain and feeds a
number of irrigation canals, is fairly fertile in
years of good rainfall, (mean annual rainfall 667*59 mm.)
It stretches to the foot of the Billigirirangan hills, a
range rising to 6,000 feet, still mainly jungle-clad and
constituting a considerable area of wilderness which has
been designated as a wild life sanctuary. Part of this
area comprises the Chamarajanagar State Forest. The
rest extends into the adjoining taluks of Yelandur and
Kollegal, but for the purpose of this study the range
has been regarded as an integral unit, forming as it
does the eastern boundary of the taluk. Between the
range and the heavily cultivated plain is a region of
scrub-covered foothills, nominally part of the Hadaran-
halli and Yelandur State Forests, but now deeply eroded
by creeping cultivation, due to the pressure of increasing
population on the land. The forests of the main range,
deciduous on the lower slopes and composed of evergreen
rain forest above an altitude of about 4,000 feet, contain
a good deal of valuable timber such as rosewood, teak, san¬
dalwood and bamboo; while in the two high valleys of the
hills lie five coffee plantations or testates'. These are
approached by a ghat or mountain road which turns off
the Mysore-Coimbatore trunk road 15 miles beyond Chamaraja-
nagar town at the forest hamlet of Punjur and winds upwards
on a precipitous and stony course where herds of occasion¬
ally aggressive elephants are included in the normal hazards.
The economy of the plain is almost entirely agri¬
cultural, with the exception of silkworm rearing. The chief
subsistence crops are the millets ragi (eleusthine corocana)
and jowar (sorghum viilgare), while rice is grown on the
valuable 'wet lands' irrigated directly from river, canal
or reservoir. The principal cash crops are sugar-cane and
pulses. Coconuts are becoming an increasingly popular
fall-back crop, and the same is true of ground-nuts,
mulberries for feeding silkworms, and haldi or turmeric,
used as a dyestuff as well as a condiment. There are
a few factories in the vicinity of Chamarajanagar town
which process local products, the largest of these being
the Government silk factory, which buys the cocoons raised
as a cottage industry in the surrounding villages and pro¬
duces silk yarn to be sent to the weaving mills of Mysore,
Bangalore and Chennapatna. The rest are mainly small
ground-nut oil, rice husking and saw mills, and a factory
producing unrefined sugar has recently been started out¬
side the town. The chief exports of the taluk are timber
from the hills, silk yarn, raw sugar and pulses. Most farms
(totes), have their own crushers, boilers and wooden moulds
for making the local unrefined block sugar known as bella.
Sugar cane and rice are the two main 'wet' crops.
The two millets, the pulses, castor oil and gingelly oil
plants, mulberries and turmeric are grown on the 'dry' lands,
irrigated from wells or simply watered by rainfall. Paddy
or batta (growing, unharvested rice) can also be grown on
dry lands if the wells provide sufficient water for irri¬
gation. Like the millets, this is a half-yearly crop,
that is, two crops can be grown a year, the paddy being
transplanted about August, during the southwest monsoon.
In Chamarajanagar subsistence farming is the first prior¬
ity among the small cultivators who are the majority. They
never grow cash crops to the exclusion of food for the house¬
hold. Sugar cane is, however, an extremely useful all-round
crop if the working capital and the labour can be raised to
prepare the larger levelled plots (compared to the small
paddy terraces). Apart from the acquisition of cash, the
household is provided with sugar for the heavily-sweetened
tea and coffee preferred in south India, the leaves stripped
off the cane before crushing provide fodder for livestock,
and the crushed fibres make excellent firing or bedding
for cattle. Other crops which supplement the diet of
the smallholder and may provide a surplus which can be
sold in village or town are, aubergine, okra , radish,
chillies, tomatoes and other vegetables. Onions are
grown for cash as well as household use. A mango or
tamarind tree is a valued possession and provides in¬
come, while richer landowners with fertile land can
afford a grove of bananas or of the graceful areca
palms for betel nuts, the chief ingredient of the pan
package. There are also flower crops, jasmine and
kannakamba, for garlands and for adorning the hair of
women and girls. The breeding of cattle, buffaloes,
sheep, goats and pigs is only carried out in this area
on a small scale, mostly incidental to the main business
of agriculture, though a number of women are engaged in
the sale of cows' or goats' milk, and the Government is
trying to encourage chicken farming on a commercial scale.
The technology used for working the land is fair¬
ly simple. Few landowners have tractors, which are exp¬
ensive to run and liable to go wrong. It is easier to
stick to labour-intensive methods. Tube-wells with elec¬
tric pumps are on the increase, it is true, and every dry¬
land farmer aspires to own one. But only the villages
nearer the town are supplied with electricity, and even
then it costs a lot to sink the pipe (even into an exist¬
ing well )j have it connected, buy a pump and build a solid,
thief-proof pump-house in which to install it. A few
farmers have expensive rubber-tyred bullock carts. But
most people, if they possess a cart at all, or indeed the
bullocks to pull it, manage with the traditional wooden-
wheeled cart. The plough still has a wooden share, and a
high proportion of small farmers do not own one, prefer¬
ring to hire a ploughman with his bullocks and plough
when fallow land has to be turned over or a change of crop
is planned. The ubiquitous utensils are the broad hoe or
mamati and the sickle or kathi. Threshing is still mostly
carried out by hand flails or trampling oxen on the earth¬
en floors, although an ingenious new method making use of
modern transport is to spread the harvested sheaves on the
main road to be threshed by the wheels of passing
buses and lorries - a practice causing monumental
skids and occasional accidents. In 197^-75 the
local Government demonstration farm, virtually
barren and surrounded embarrassingly by flourishing
examples of private enterprise, did have a ragi-
threshing machine, fees for the use of which kept
the farm going.
Landholdings vary in size from fractions of
an acre to 25 acres and more. Successive attempts to
implement land-ceiling legislation over the past quarter
century has resulted (theoretically) in the limitation
of a holding by any one individual to forty acres of
dry land, irrigated, if at alljby well, and ten acres
of wet land, irrigated from kere, river or canal, on
which water-tax is paid. This means in theory that
there are no large landowners. In practice it often
means that joint.family estates once held in the name
of the lineage head are now nominally parcelled out in
the names of kin, that tax is paid by the alleged own¬
ers on their individual plots, but that profits are
still pooled by the co-parceners to pay for joint family
running costs, weddings etc. Thus decisions may still
be made by the lineage head, unless fission of joint
family or lineage has occurred at the time of the nom¬
inal fragmentation of the property. This situation
can lead to unseemly squabbles among the co-parceners
with the increasing segmentation of the lineages. There
is, however, nothing very new about such behaviour.
Dyadagulu in Kannada means the agnates of a lineage,
hence dyad, an opprobrious term meaning one who quarrels.
A point of considerable significance in the
context of possible fertility decline in the area is
that the average landholding, which was 8 acres in 1951,
has now shrunk to two acres according to the Chamaraja-
nagar taluk office. Clearly the poorest cultivator fam¬
ily does not need many children to work a very small plot.
In the past landowners let land to tenants under three
different types of tenancy contract, but recen^t legis¬
lation granting the land in perpetuity to tenants on
payment of fifteen years land revenue tax has resulted
in owners either moving on to the farms themselves or of
employing a resident salaried worker. A Chamarajanagar
merchant of my acquaintance who did not live on his land
but had employed a contract servant as caretaker of it
for a number of years was in danger of losing it when I
was last there as the caretaker had laid claim to the
plot before the Land Tribunal. Absentee landlordism
is nowadays recognised in the area to be a risky busif
ness and town property is regarded by many of the taluk's
more affluent citizens to be a safer investment, though
landlord/tenant relations are not very happy there either.
Until the fairly recent past, Chamarajanagar
worthies aver, there were local conventions as to custom¬
ary payments and rewards for services. I use this rather
clumsy circumlocution in preference to the word 'system'
because it does not seem to have been very systematic and
possibly varied from household to household. If there
were regularities they certainly do not exist today, al¬
though Scarlett Epstein describes a system of customary
rewards for the Mandya district of Karnataka (Epstein 1967).
Anthony Good describes three types of prestation or reward-
giving indigenous to his area of fieldwork in Tamilnadu, in
which the first approximates to a straight fee or wage, the
second has to do with the socially accepted rights and obli¬
gations, and the third is a sort of politesse - slightly
more than enough, as in a tip. (Good 1982). He argues
that the so-called 'Jajmani system' as first proposed by
Wiser (1936) and subsequently dissected by Pocock (1957),
Kolenda (19 63) » and others, is not an all-India syndrome
and was probably never even seen as a 'system* by the actors
concerned. Concepts approximating to those described by
Good also exist in Chamarajanagar, but their interpre¬
tation differs from one individual to another.
Each -well-to-do family in Chamarajanagar,
merchants and professionals as well as cultivators,
has its own priest, washerman or woman, sweeper and
(if landed), farm labourers, whose relationship with
the family has tended to be an hereditary one and who
used to be paid at least partly in grain. These trans¬
actions in grain are largely moribund today, but Gowdas
(landowning peasants) often still pay partly in grain
instead of cash. However, the increase in cash crops
has brought about a market situation today, with bargain¬
ing and disputes over pay and hours. The fact that farm¬
ers have diversified so that a variety of crops require
harvesting at different times of year has enabled employer
and employees to play their opposite number off against
each other. Besides this^ 'dynamic' caste relations as
well as antagonistic 'class' feeling centering on land
ownership are showing a marked tendency to disrupt tra¬
ditional relationships. Having said this it is necess-
to add that structures of a traditional sort survive for
practical reasons. As Epstein puts it:
"In order to maximise his total product
the peasant farmer needed helpers; he
needed them even more in good years
than in bad. To make certain that his
helpers were on the spot when required
he in turn was prepared to maintain hered¬
itary relationships with them and to give
them fixed annual rewards".
(Epstein 1967: p.2^2-3)
Looked at this way such patron/client struct¬
ures might be regarded as the product of expectations as
to the performance of roles. In retrospect I see how
my parents, ostensibly engaged in a 'cash' relationship
with their employees, were pressured by the expectations
of these people to accept the position of the traditional
Indian landowner. Living in a place where no Western or
colonial 'system' already operated because there were no
foreigners on the hills apart from the family, they found
themselves employing the descendants of retired or deceas¬
ed employees from one generation to the next and involved
in prestatory transactions in which their roles as
both donor and recipient of appropriate gifts had
become prescriptive. The idiom was that of kinship:
"You are my father and my mother" was a phrase frequently
used by employees preparatory to claiming support in dis¬
putes; requesting loans, clothing, medical help, employ¬
ment of their relatives; and advice in dealing with offi¬
cialdom. Relationships were enduring in a large propor¬
tion of cases, extending to at least three generations.
Payment was in kind as well as cash. Permanent labourers -
those who had settled on the estate or with whom there was
a hereditary relationship, and service families (washerman,
sweeper, carpenter etc.), were given produce such as grain
and coffee and also clothing. At the main Hindu festivals,
as well as at Christmas, gifts were expected by these emp¬
loyees and the house servants (who also operated on a hered¬
itary basis), as a right. On my parents' side the expect¬
ation, was of trustworthiness on the part of the employee.
These mutual expectations were on the whole fulfilled becaus
they were reciprocatory. In the words of H.C. Kelman:
"A reciprocal role relationship can be
maintained only if the participants have
mutually shared expectations of one an¬
other's behaviour. Thus, if an individ¬
ual finds a particular relationship satis¬
factory, he will tend to....behave in line
with the requirements of this particular
relationship". (Kelman, 1966: P.15^)
The requirements of my family's relationships with their
employees were those of paternalism, a role which was in
any case congruent with the value system of their time and
of the people among whom they lived.
A case which interested me in this context was
that of my landlord tan absentee smallholder whose arrange¬
ment with his contract servant, the farm caretaker, was by
no means paternalistic. The caretaker received no free
grain at harvest or any other time with which to augment
his fixed wage, although he was allowed to buy it at cost
price. But his household had a right to all the vegetables
they needed among those he chose to grow on the land, and a
part of the area was always devoted to vegetables in
their season, the bulk of which of course went to the
landlord's household. He also had a number of other
perquisites which helped to enhance his meagre monthly
retainer. Both parties to these unwritten agreements
seemed fairly satisfied, though both grumbled vocifer¬
ously about the shortcomings of the other. In contrast
to this relatively amicable relationship those of the
landlord with the hired day labourers he employed when¬
ever they were needed were highly antagonistic and en¬
tailed a good deal of abusive shouting on one side and
passive resistance on the other.
In 1976 the Government at last introduced a
basic minimum wage, (Five rupees per day in 1979-80),
for agricultural labourers. At the time my fieldwork
ended in 1980 nobody was taking much notice of this leg¬
islation, though employers were well aware of it, and
women in particular were still being ruthlessly exploit¬
ed, being paid (in 1980) Rs.2.50 to Rs.3.00 per day for
the same working hours and indeed the same sort of tasks
for which the men were being paid Rs.^.00 and more per
day. The fact that unemployment in Karnataka is run¬
ning at about 10% (1977-78), and that farm labourers in
the taluk have no union organisation tends to counteract
their bargaining power. On the other hand women working
in gumpu or teams rather than singly can be tough bargai¬
ners, pressing home their collective advantage by failing
to turn up on vital harvest days unless their claims are
met. Today in the taluk women perform all the dry land
tasks that men do with the exception of ploughing. They
also do most of the transplanting of rice in the wet lands
Unlike many other parts of India the south-west
monsoon rains (June to September), though valuable, are
not vitally important to the agriculture of this part of
the State. It is the heavy storms of the north-east mon¬
soon (October to December), and the pre-monsoon storms
from March to May which fill the shallow kere and the well
and water the dry lands
dry lands. The hills themselves attract heavy rainfall
on the higher slopes during the north-east monsoon and
continuous mist and drizzle during the south-west, and
it sometimes happens that near-famine conditions brought
about by lack of rain may prevail on the taluk plain
while the hills receive an adequate rainfall.
The Billigirirangan range, which runs north-
south for about sixty miles, is still mostly clad in
evergreen and deciduous forest or long grass, a jungle
still supporting a fair amount of wild life, including
tiger, panther, bear, bison and elephant, deer and ante¬
lope, administered by the Ministry of Forests. There are
63>798 acres of forest land in the Chamarajanagar taluk
section of this wilderness alone, and it extends into two
other taluks. The only indigenous inhabitants of the
hills are members of the Sholiga tribe, the Kad Sholigaveru
or Forest People, as they call themselves. But in the
past almost the entire labour force employed on the five
coffee estates on the hills, which vary in size from 200
to 500 acres, were drawn from villages in the taluk, and
though a proportion of the labourers now come from the
Kollegal taluk some Chamarajanagar villages still supply
estate workers there for generation after generation. The
migration may be seasonal or semi-permanent, although even
those who have settled in the labour villages on the estates
often travel to and from their native villages where many
of them still own fields. In the past the journey was made
on foot over several days, but there is now a daily bus to
Chamarajanagar town, owned by the son of one of the estate
overseers, which islinked to the villages by other bus ■
routes. The main ragi harvest occurs in June, when the
coffee requires little attention, so much of the labour
force return to their home villages in the south-west
monsoon.
Estate workers are engaged by maistries (who
are co-villagers) and receive advance payments from them.
A maistry's gang may consist of some ten to twenty people
of both sexes and more than one caste. He gets a com¬
mission of about 20 paisa (l/5th of a rupee) per head
per day. He is then responsible for the standard of
work and behaviour of his group of recruits and acts
as overseer.
Sixty per cent of India's coffee is exported
through the Coffee Marketing Board, today mainly to
Britain, the U.S.A. and Germany. After the failure
of the Brazilian coffee crop in 1976 the price of the
high altitude Arabica coffee grown on the hills rose
from Rs.8,000 a tonne to Rs.10,000 a tonne. An average
crop on Honnametti, the estatejformerly owned by my parents,
which covers about 500 acres, is about 150 tonnes. But
costs have risen proportionately, not only wages and the
cost of foodgrains but essential raw materials have soared.
For instance, the price of copper sulphate, 10 tons of
which are required yearly by Honnamettij the largest estate,
for spraying against leaf-disease, which twenty years ago
sold at Rs.80.00 a cwt., is now Rs.500.00 a cwt. Furthermore
profits are now very highly taxed.
In 1976 the daily wages on the estates were
Rs. 4.80 for a man and Rs.4.00 for a woman. In 1979 the
two sexes received equal pay (Rs.7.00 a day) for the first
time. Apart from higher wages, job security, subsidised
ragi, gratuities, bonuses, overtime and severance payments,
plus - in theory - free schooling and medical treatment, are
all perquisites which counteract the pull of the home vil¬
lages and encourage migration to the estates. Although
labour/management relations tend to be potentially explo¬
sive in many plantation areas in south India they are still
fairly placid, if hardly cordial, on the Billigirirangans.
The labour force there is almost unique in the plantation
scene in modern India in that there is no union. This may
be because the hills constitute an isolated and jungly area
boasting of no urban centre or travellers' lodging from
which union officials could set about organising the labour¬
ers. However the labour force did go on strike in 1980 on
the grounds that the management of the estates were
failing in their obligation to provide the services
of a doctor. In fact the management had been trying
for some time to find a doctor prepared to serve in
such an isolated place. They finally found one in
Chamarajanagar who agreed to hold two surgeries a
week on the hills. He was reluctant to spend the
night, confiding to me that there was "nothing to do"
there when his working hours were over. One of India's
great problems is the attraction of urban bright lights
for the newly qualified in most professions.
Apart from the coffee estates, certain other
activities unite in symbiosis the worlds of hill-range
and rural plain within the taluk. Cattle grazing, often
accompanied by the poaching of allegedly 'protected' wild
life on the hills, is carried on by villagers living in
hamlets in the foothills. Timber contractors extract
hardwood under licence from the Forest authorities from
those parts of the hills accessible by road; and the Billi-
girirangan Temple in the Western foothills of the range,
perched on the high white cliff from which the hills take
their name, (the White Hills of Rangan), has become a pop¬
ular place of pilgrimage in the district.
Th e Town Chamarajana gar town, headquarters of
the taluk, lies 36 miles south-east of Mysore and is the
terminus of a narrow-gauge branch railway from that city.
It was known as Arakathera until the year l8l8, when the
maharaja Krishnaraja Wodeyar (1799-1888), whose unfortunate
father Chamaraja Wodeyar IX, puppet prisoner-prince under
Tipu Sultan, was born there, resolved to dedicate the town
to his memory. In 1825 the Maharaja founded there a large
temple in honour of the now deified Chamarajasvara. Within
the central court he directed three shrines to be built, the
centre one dedicated to Chamarajasvara; the one to the right
of the entrance gate to Shiva, possibly in deference to the
fact that the area is a stronghold of the monotheist Lingayat
sect who worship Shiva and his consort Parvati as aspects
of the Supreme Being; and the one to the left to Chamundi,
family goddess of the princely lineage.
The town, which has an area of 11 square kilo¬
metres, has a population of approximately 31,000, of which
about 25,000 are Hindus, including Lingayats and Jains,
about 5,000 are Muslims and about 1,000 are Christians of
various denominations. (1971 census). Its chief manufact¬
ures are raw sugar, ground-nut oil and silk yarn. Its chief
exports are raw sugar, silk yarn, timber from the hills, and
pulses. As an administrative centre its Government offices
include the police HQ for the taluk; the Magistrates' Court;
the Municipal office; the Taluk Office, which deals with land
and crop records and taxation, the Divisional Office of the
Public Works Department; the^Taluk Veterinary Surgery; a Pri¬
mary Health Centre (2^-bed hospital), with a staff of one fe¬
male and four male doctors, six nurses and four midwives;
nine public primary schools of different denominations•and
for different languages; seven middle schools, again cater¬
ing for Kannada, Tamil and Urdu speakers; and two public sec¬
ondary schools, one for girls and one for boys. There are
no fire or ambulance services. In the private sector the
town boasts of six banks; three cinemas showing films in
Kannada, Tamil, Hindi, and occasionally English; ten private
doctors running their own clinics, all well patronised by
anyone who can afford the fairly modest fees; a private pri¬
mary school run by Catholic nuns; a co-educational fee-paying
a.
high school, and a co-educational college, both Lingyat foun-
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dations. All education in the college, which offers Mysore
University degrees, is in English. These private establish¬
ments are favoured by those members of the affluent class who
aspire to a modern life-style, although the college is con¬
sidered to be a less prestigious place of higher education
than Mysore University. Parents who decide to educate their
daughters to graduate level tend to send their girls to the
college, where they can keep an eye on them, and their boys
to the University, unless they are very unorthodox, the girls
are outstandingly successful at school, the required degree i
higher than those offered by the college, or the family
has relatives in Mysore where the girls can board. There
is also a secretarial college, mostly patronised by grad¬
uates wishing to collect some practical as well as acad¬
emic qualifications.
Chamarajanagar, known to the cognoscenti as
'Nagar or 'Nagara, is a fairly typical south Indian
rural-based market town, and because it possesses neither
large focal industries, notable ancient monuments, inter¬
esting architecture, or natural scenic charm, very few
foreigners have had occasion to visit it in the past, and
even fewer do so now. In fact the visit of a foreigner
is still an event which draws a crowd and is discussed all
over town. There is no hotel in the town, only a travellers'
bungalow and a lodging house in a back street. Lying on
a main road connecting the manufacturing centres of the
Tamilnadu plains with the chief cities of the Karnataka
plateau, Mysore and Bangalore, it is well served by diesel
buses, the ceaseless blast of whose wind—horns renders day
and night hideous in the vicinity of the road. Our town
has become articulated with the outside world both econo-
nomically and through the movements of an increasingly mobile
population. As a railhead, Chamarajanagar, even under Brit¬
ish rule, had been a local centre of commerce and adminis¬
tration. The villager came slowly to town on foot or by
bullock cart to sell produce and buy consumer goods, while
it took three hours to travel by train the thirty-six miles
from Chamarajanagar to Mysore. Today, although it is still
a three-hour journey by train to Mysore, many villagers still
travel on foot, and laden carts still plod slowly along the
crown of the road, frequent and cheap bus services link up
the villages with the town and the town with the city.
The cinema comprises another powerful medium for
social change in the area. Here, as in the buses and the
train, considerations of caste are abandoned. Anyone who
has the money for a seat may sit anywhere he or she chooses.
For the promulgation of Government policies in a still large¬
ly illiterate country the cinema (like the ubiquitous transistor
radio), is a useful and influential medium, showing, for
instance, documentaries encouraging family planning or
chicken farming, or discouraging tax evasion and black
marketeering. For women the cinema provides a new means
of recreation, better than radio, since it involves more
human contacts. The more emancipated, whether tradition¬
ally or through Westernisation, may visit it with female
friends and relations, with or without escorting male
relations. The more restricted may visit it escorted by
husbands, fathers or brothers.
The language medium of many advertisements and
Government documentaries is English. In south India, from
the early 19th century onward English became increasingly
the second language, a great convenience as there was no
lingua franca connecting the four 'Dravidian' languages
in the way that Hindustani (a mixture of Hindi and Urdu
originally used by the Indian Army under British rule) did,
and still does, serve as a common tongue in the North. But
after Independence the Indian Government tried, and is indee
still trying, to introduce the use of Hindi as a second and
official language for the whole country. The first result
of this policy in south India was a series of fierce lang¬
uage riots, coupled with the tearing down of Hindi signs and
notices in public places. A more long-term reaction has
been a great and conscious increase in the use of English
in south India, in defiance of what is spoken of in the
south as 'Hindi imperialism'. College and University
teaching as in most parts of India is in English, which
requires intensive teaching of the language at secondary-
school level. In Mysore District an enormous number of
English nouns and verbs, supplied with the relevant Kannada
suffix,have been absorbed into the language. For instance
in Chamrajana gar town the word br ea du is far more commonly
used for bread than the indigenous word roti. English
phrases intersperse the conversation of the more educated.
Watching a game of tennis, I was intrigued to hear, when
the ball went out of court, interrogative cries of "outa ?"
receive affirmative replies of "outu". Even peasants,
labourers and the tribesmen of the hills have a few words
and phrases of the language. My father noticing that
the Sholiga tribe spoke of the land on each side of the
Karnataka-Tamilnadu border as "Mysuru" and "Kuppani",
was puzzled by the etymology of "Kuppani". Eventually
he traced it to the English word 'Company*. Tamilnadu,
as opposed to Mysore, was of course once East India Com¬
pany territory. The English which provides such a conven¬
ient lingua franca is not, for the semi-educated majority
of those who make use of it, the English of the Westernised
but a kind of 'pidgin', a mixture of formal (non-colloquial)
phraseology, direct translation from the Kannada and basic
usage. One does not, for instance, ask if a person is
about to set off on foot, the phrase is to "go by walk".
The cinema has merely augmented and not replaced
traditonal forms of recreation. Story-tellers, musicians,
drama, dance and song groups, both live and in the form of
puppet shows, still recount and interpret local variations
of stories from the epics and the puranas. Travelling circu¬
ses, jugglers and 'magicians' still visit towns and villages.
Each village has its own experts in drama and dance, and, as
we shall see below, one local jati makes a secondary special¬
ity of the more energetic folk forms, such as sword and stick
dances. In the town children and young people engage in am¬
ateur dramatics, encouraged in the schools. Middle class
people visit each other's houses to sing bhajanas, devotion¬
al songs, to listen to the girls playing the sitar or vina,
or to watch them perform in the traditional bharatnatya dance.
Young people among the Westernised elite visit each other's
houses to play 'pop* records. Young men of other classes
meet to gamble with cards, dice or fighting quail, sometimes
with disastrous consequences. Men from some communities con¬
gregate in the Government liquor shops, though drunkenness is
not a serious problem, except among the Hellava community of
itinerant Beggar-Bards, who concoct their own brews. Football
and cricket are enjoyed even by the poorest and least sophis¬
ticated of town schoolboys, while in the villages indigenous
games with sticks and stones on the lines of marbles,
hop-scotch or jacks are more usually played. Handball
and badminton are popular among middle-class youths.
There was a tennis club with one court for the elite
of the town,but a split has occurred within this group
which has resulted in the forming of a separate club by
one of the factions. The cause of this split was the
increasing tension between the local business community
and the officials, who are regarded by the locals with
a modicum of suspicion)reserved by most Indians for Gov¬
ernment servants) (the while they try to get themselves
and their offspring into Government service), and who
also tend to be newcomers to the town. The officials
wished the court to be reserved for themselves alone at
certain times of day on the grounds that they had less
freedom to choose at which time to play.
It is noteworthy that the cinema has had a
considerable effect in modernising entertainment. The
plays acted by travelling theatre companies or amateur
dramatic groups today sometimes have a modern social
content rather than a mythological one, and these plays
often derive from film stories. Coffee-shops and eating-
houses and stalls have installed radios which blare film
music at all hours of the day and night. Night watchmen
guarding crops in the fields do so in the company of their
transistors at full blast, which appears to disturb nobody
but the unfortunate foreign participant observer, from whose
1 etic 1 point of view this innovation does little to pro¬
mote nocturnal ease. Even the Beggar-Bards have abandoned
their traditional folk songs for songs from films and pool
their resources to send their young men to the cinema to
learn words and music.
In the countryside the yearly jatre or fair,
along with the weekly shanti or market held in some of the
larger villages, combine the properties of recreation and
business (and, in the case of the jatre , of religious ob¬
servance). In Chamarajanagar town the fortnight-long feast
of Ganesh Gauri, the elephant-headed son of Shiva, is
celebrated as a festival of drama, music, and dance in
which local talent, both male and female, plays a major
part. The Chamarajasvara devastana (temple) still pro¬
vides a focal point, as the Church did traditionally in
the West, for participation in recreation as well as in
religious observance for the whole society. The growing
tide of secularism engulfing India today has brought
about a shift in emphasis in the religious life of Chama-
rajanagar towards a tendency to settle for communal toler¬
ance. On the night of Mahashivaratri members of all com¬
munities go in family groups, dressed in their best, to
mingle in the courtyard of the devastana as they lay their
tributes of fruit and flowers at the various shrines devo¬
ted to aspects of Shiva. At the time of the annual deva¬
stana jatre people of all communities come in from the
villa gesjand are paid a measure of grain to haul on the
ropes of the heavy wooden temple chariot on its circum-
navigation of the edifice. In the same way, though com¬
munal riots do still occasionally take place as the result
of deliberate provocation (such as taking a Hindu procession
past the mosque in the Muslim quarter), the local Hindus
tend to view the local Muslims as yet another jati in the
cultural and 'ethnic' sense, albeit one which has gained
itself a territory, Pakistan, from which it projects a
vague political menace. As for the Christians, once re¬
garded with contempt as a heterogenous group recruited
from members of untouchable jati trying to improve their
status by adopting the religion of the British rulers, they
too are now regarded as a rule with tolerance, even respect,
as yet another culture-group. The Anglo-Indians, who of
course are all Christians, mostly Roman Catholics, have also
succeeded in establishing themselves as a most respectable
category within the wider society, and Christmas Day is an
official public holiday enjoyed by most groups in the town.
The devastana jatre itself is an interesting
piece of syncretism. It takes place in the month of
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Sravanna (July-August), in honour of the god Shiva, and
compares in these and many other details with the Lingyat
fairs described by William McCormack in his appendix to
Ramanujan's 'Speaking of Shiva' ( 1973) « hut the offici¬
ating priests are Madhwa Brahmans and the leaders of the
procession are Banajigas, who are followers of Vishnu
rather than of Shiva. The images of Shiva and his con¬
sort Parvati, moreover, are first presented at the shrine
of Chamundi, an aspect of the mother-goddess, familiarly
styled Amma (madam, lady or mother) or by the honorific
plural Ammaniaveru, the universal object of village wor¬
ship in south India c*s the uru devi or village goddess.
(Although she has many sisters, of whom Chamundi is one,
the most frequent manifestation of Amma is that of Mari-
amma, uru devi of Somavarapet, the large village on the
fringe of which I lived, off and on, for some years).
Chamundi is also an aspect of Durga, one of the three
chief deities of the Hindu pantheon today, and is said
in Mysore to have performed the same exploits, such as
slaying the buffalo-demon. In a sense, therefore, this
festival represents the 'total religious field', as postu¬
lated by S.J. Tambiah (Tambiah 1971).
One important facet of Chamrajanagar society
which is difficult to classify, since its various ele¬
ments may come under the heading of recreation, business,
social welfare, religion or even crime, is the unofficial
specialist. These may belong to any community and either
sex. They may specialise in healing physical illness
through the use of folk medicines or the repeating of
mantras (words of power). They may cast out spirits, or
they may, as sorcerers (mata), be involved in black magic,
invoking demons (bhuta or dya) , or ghosts (preta). They
may specialise in one particular treatment, often highly
effective, such as the cure of scorpion stings or, as in
the case of the Kanniyar community, earn their living by
travelling as itinerant quacks with a mixture of traditional
and modern powders, pills and liquids for hypodermic injection.
They may also specialise in spirit possession and/or
divination, hold seances and give advice to a clientele
drawn from aiycommunities. They may practise in their
spare time or sporadically, or they may be full-time prac¬
titioners. Witchcraft in particular may be practised
either as a 'one-off' affair by amateurs or regularly
by a specialist, and is widely believed in by Chamraja-
nagar denizens of all social levels.
On the whole the town has not been much aff¬
ected, physically, by modernisation. The cinema, hospi¬
tal, banks, some of the larger and newer shops, and the
houses and places of work of the officials and the richer
citizens are supplied with electricity, but out of 5»3l6
households in the town only some 964 have electricity laid
on. (1971 census figures). The tubewells on the surround-
tote (farms) belonging to the more substantial cultivators
have electric pumps. But most houses, shops and food-stalls
are still lit by kerosene lanterns or pressure lamps. The
outlying villages have no electricity. The town's water
supply, which comes from the Honnuhole river, is only laid
on to the most modern houses, though it supplies stand-pipes
in the town and nearby villages. In the past the men of
Somavarpet village had great difficulty in finding wives, as
the nearest source of water was the kere a mile away and
parents did not care to subject their daughters to a life¬
time of hard labour in the way of water-transportation. Now
there are several stand-pipes in the village and brides are
more easily obtainable. Very few buildings in the taluk have
running water laid on and I do not know of any that have run¬
ning hot water, with the possible exception of a rich and
enterprising doctor who keeps cows to supply a cow-dung-gas
plant for his suburban house.
Only the richer houses and larger institutions hav
any kind of water-closet plumbing (183 households out of the
5,316 which make up the town ),and sewage disposal in their
case is by cesspit or septic tank. For the rest, open sew¬
ers line the streets throughout the town and are crossed by
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stone slabs to reach shops, offices and dwellings. Food
shops hang over these drains, while myriads of flies div¬
ide their attention between the uncovered wares and the
drains, vying with the cockroaches for a share of the
goods. The general public relieves itself directly into
these sewers or in the back alleys of the town, except for
those who live near enough to the outskirts to use the mar¬
gins of the main road and neighbouring fields. The streets
are unpaved and pot-holed, the shops are open-fronted, many
of them wooden stalls, and pedestrians, bicycles, bullock
carts, buses, lorries, cows, goats, starving dogs with
ghastly skin diseases, and the occasional car jostle for
priority and right of way, keeping firmly to the crown of
the road. Vehicles avoid the roadside in town and country
because the deep dust causes skidding and conceals^razor-edged
cast bullock shoes which cause so many punctures. Pedestrians
do so to avoid trudging through human ordure. As dusk falls
the legions of flies give way to those of mosquitoes, while
rats, cockroaches and scorpions come out to go about their
business. But in the midst of these uninviting features
the most striking characteristic of the place is the liveli¬
ness, jocundity and generosity of the majority of its inhab¬
itants, and the personal cleanliness achieved in the face of
so many impediments. Nor is 'Nagar ever dull; on the con¬
trary it overflows with life, variety and colour.
Employment, Housing and Family Structure, Education
The first question that arises in this section may
be expressec^simply enough: who does what ? But it cannot
be answered without a preliminary excursion into the subject
of caste as represented by the local jati , more circumstant¬
ially to be dealt with in the next chapter. If we take the
'emic' view of jati as a category with both ethnic and occu¬
pational connotations it is possible to associate certain
groups with specific activities, but only on the understanding
that there are countless exceptions to the rule, where a 'rule'
exists. By this I do not merely mean that, for instance, not
all members of the Oil-Presser jati are oil-pressers by trade,
but that a great many people are engaged in traditionally
•casteless' employment such as agriculture, or in new,
i.e. Modern, trades and professions which are also caste-free.
To begin with agriculture, the occupation which
employs and supports kk% of the population of the taluk,
those involved fall into two divisions, cultivators or land¬
holders, and landless labourers. The two overlap somewhat,
as very small landholders will usually augment their income
by labour on the land of others. There are in all 38,558
landowning cultivators in the taluk, of which about are
women. (1971 census figures). The great majority of these
are Lingayat Gowdas. There are three jati of Gowdas (Culti¬
vators or Peasant Farmers), in Karnataka: Okkaliga, Kuruba
and Lingayat. In many parts of the State Ckkaligas, the
Peasants in Scarlett Epstein's monographs on the economy of
villages in the Mandya District} (Epstein 1962, 19675 1973)t
fill the Gowda niche. They are the second largest caste
in Karnataka after the Lingayats. In Chamarajanagar taluk
their place is taken by the Lingayats. Lingayat Gowdas are
one of the two lay subcastes of the Lingayat jati (as opposed
to the Lingayat priest and monk subcastes). The other lay
subcaste is that of the Lingayat Shettis or merchants. Today
many Lingayat Shettis also own land, though generally near
the town where they can combine agriculture with trade. Many
other jati also own land. Kuruba Gowdas, a generally poor but
respected community, usually have small plots and often combine
agriculture with goat-herding. Round the town a number of
Jettis, migrant members of a caste native to Andhra Pradesh
who settled in Mysore in the past, have large holdings, Anoth¬
er group of migrants, Naidus from Tamilnadu, have also settled
in the taluk as highly successful cultivators, much admired for
their diligence and technical skill. Naikars are another local
group largely associated with cultivation. Kumbar Shettis and
Ganigar Shettis, the Potter and Oil-Presser castes, also farm
around the large villages near the town. A few members of the
local Brahman sub-castes own land which members of other castes
work for them since they are prohibited from doing so for fear
of taking life. This restriction is even more forceful
for the Jain community, and I do not know of any Jain land¬
owners in the area. Among the lower and poorer castes,
Upuligas and Harijans predominate among the smallholders.
Further afield in the hinterland of the taluk most of the
land is cultivated by the four groups of Lingayat Gowdas
(the majority), Naikars, Harijans and Upuligas, although
near the borders of Yelandur and Kollegal taluks Okkaligas
are once more in evidence. Besides all these, of course,
other categories of people may farm. There are a few very
rich Muslim landowners. There are a few Christians. Members
of any group, with the possible exception of Jains, may own
and cultivate, or get others to cultivate, the land.
But 38% of the 62,222 persons engaged, in one
way or another, in agriculture do not own land, or if they
do, own so little that they have to augment their earnings
by labouring for others. The fact that they do manual work
restricts the categories which are thus employed. Although
agricultural work is theoretically caste-free, Brahmans (and
of course Jains) will not undertake the work because of the
possibility of taking life, and members of other high castes
who are able to choose will not do so either because they ho
to emulate the Brahmans or because manual work in India is
regarded as socially degrading, a concept which is divorced
from the ideology of ritual purity and pollution and might
therefore be regarded as part of a 'class' rather than a
caste ideology. I once called on a high-caste smallholder
acquaintance whose tote adjoined 'my' village of Somavarapet
to find him in a state of agitation. He had arranged for
a gumpu of women to come that morning to remove the flowers
from his onion crop and they had not turned up, no doubt
because of a subsequent, more profitable engagement. His
anxiety about the possibility of getting a very reduced crop
if the flowers were not speedily eliminated was such that I
offered to help, pointing out that he and I could easily com
plete the job that morning if we set to forthwith. "But I
can't do that" he said, horrified, "It would be beneath my
dignity". In that case, I told him, I would carry on alone
to help him out. "No," he replied, "Ifliatever you may
do in your own country, it would affect my reputation
if I were seen to allow you to do such work here". The
people who are agricultural labourers, then, are those
who have to labour because they are poor to begin with,
although they may be of quite high caste, (such as poor
Lingayats), but whose local j a t i culture does not forbid
them to work on ritual grounds. They also include those
whose occupation is traditionally associated with agri¬
culture or other kinds of manual work. In our taluk
these include Kurubas, Naikars, Upuligas, among the
'clean' low castes and the 'untouchable' Harijans. That
the majority of agricultural labourers are Harijans (as
well as a considerable proportion of owner-cultivators),
is not surprising, since working on the land is the trad¬
itional occupation of the caste. The next largest group
of agricultural labourers are the Upuligas, followed by
the Naikars. Compared with the percentage of female land¬
owners that of female agricultural labourers is high: 41%
(1971 census) the majority of them coming' from the Harijan
and Upuliga communities, where it is customary for the
females to work along with the males.
Nearly 4,000 people in the taluk are employed by
the Forest Department or herd livestock. Twenty-two per
cent of these are women, who tend to specialise in rearing
goats. Selling milk is regarded as suitable work for
women and many widows take up this 'dairy' work. Women also
constitute 23% of the 1138 construction workers. Most of
those involved in this industry are Upuligas, one of whose
hereditary occupations this is. As Upuliga women are re¬
nowned for working sturdily beside their menfolk the number
of women engaged in this activity would probably be greater
if those in the Upuliga quarter of the town had not achiev¬
ed a virtual monopoly of the jobs in the silk factory, which
operates nearby.
Although cottage industry used to be a stronghold
of female participation in the labour force, only 29% of the
3,000-odd people now involved in such industries in the
taluk are female. This may be because silkworm
rearing, the principal cottage industry in the
taluk, can be done in any household that can put
up with its inconvenience, and the work done by
the women can be rendered 'invisible' if census-
takers merely note that the head of the silkworm-
rearing household is male. Many cultivator house¬
holds rear silkworms as well, and these are then the
responsibility of the women, though there are cases
of Harijan and Upuliga women working their own lands
while their husbands rear the silkworms. The same
qualification attaches to the enumeration of women
in cultivation. The k% given by the census figures
obviously covers only those households where the land
is in the woman's name alone, whereas the wives of
the majority of Harijan and Upuliga landowners can
and do work on the land with their husbands and child¬
ren. The wives of most Kurubas, Naikars and Lingayat
Gowdas are also quite capable of running the family
tote along with their spouses, in their absence, or
as widows, (although the women of these communities,
unless they are very poor, will only supervise the work
of others. But then the same applies to a lesser ex¬
tent to their husbands). In any case the partici¬
pation of these women as cultivators is also likely to
be invisible to the census taker.
About 2,500 people, 17% of whom are women,
work in other industries; the silk and sugar factories,
family rice husking and silk-spinning works, tailoring,
baking, sweet-making, potting. In this group are inc¬
luded the artisans: the carpenters, blacksmiths and
goldsmiths. The wives of all the workers in this grou
with the exception of the artisans, help in the family
workshops unless the family is affluent. Most middle
to high castes work in these trades, although low caste
too may run spinning, husking or crushing mills.
Another 3)000 or so are engaged in trade and
commerce, a rubric which covers a wide variety of
occupations from flower stalls and the vegetable
sellers in the bazaar, or the little tea and coffee
stalls known as 'hotelu', to the profitable general
stores, drapers, chemist shops, ironmongers, bedding
makers and indeed banks. Only 10% of the recorded
workers in these fields are women, and again the wives
of the better-off are likely to be restricted to the
domestic sphere, and in the case of the high caste,
with the exception of those few who are relatively
Westernised, will have no choice in the matter. The
local communities who are usually to be found in com¬
merce, those whose traditional occupation comes under
a
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this heading, are the Lin^rat Shettis (She tt x= merchant ) ,
the Banajigas, and the Vaisya community, who actually
take their jati name from that of the merchant varna
or category of the four divisions of ancient Hindu
society laid down by scriptural authority. Others
engaged in this type of employment are Brahmans, Ursu
(the royal jati), Jettis, and members of high or medium
caste jati who have migrated temporarily or permanently
from other parts of Karnataka or from the three other
southern States.
Transport and communications employs about
1,000 people in the taluk, from the rich Okkaliga (med¬
ium caste, non vegetarian,non-Brahmanised), who owns a
fleet of lorries to the lorry drivers themselves, the
bus drivers, garage owners and garage mechanics, and
the owners and drivers of hire-cars and 'autos',(scooter
rickshaws). People in these non-traditional occupations
can be, and are, of any community, and the order of aff¬
luence of those who work in them does not in the least
accord with traditional 'status summation'. There are
Brahman bus drivers and mechanics and the Harijan owner
of a private bus and of a hire car. Low caste owners
may employ, if rich enough, high caste underlings.
Hardly any women are employed in these sectors with the
exception of the very low caste sweepers.
Lastly, we have other services, which can include
anything from the well-off members of the professions,
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doctors, lawyers, bankers, engineers employed by the
Government, top Public Works Department and police
officials, all the types represented in the town
Rotary Club, to the washermen and women and the
sweepers. Some 5»200 people are covered by this
census classification, 23% of them being women. A
very few of these women are drawn from the top
echelons, chiefly doctors, health and social workers,
and teachers; the rest serving in lowly and despised
jobs at the bottom, mostly concerned with heavy clean¬
sing. The orthodox high caste view is that women
should not engage in any activity that brings them
into contact with strange men. In buses and trains
non-Westernised high caste women, even though accomp¬
anied by male relatives, always seat themselves next to
other women, even if empty seats affording more space
are available. Basically, high caste women, unless
comparatively Westernised, do not work outside the
household unless forced to do so by poverty. Nevertheless
female work force participation is comparatively high
in the taluk: l8% compared to lk% for all Karnataka and
12% for all India. (1971 census).
We turn now to another fundamental question: who
lives where ? The structure of households in the taluk
depends mainly on two variables, the relative affluence
of the household and its cultural disposition. The foll¬
owing graded list covers most types of dwelling to be
found in the taluk,with inevitable overlaps.
1. The traditional large dwelling of well-off
merchants, often built round a courtyard,
usually found in the town.
2. The concrete, Western-type house or villa
with modern conveniences, usually with a
garden, in the town suburbs.
3. Transitional between 1 and 2.
k. The traditional large tiled village house
of more affluent villagers.
5. Small modern house or flat, generally in
the town.
6. As k above but without piped water or indoor
sanitation, generally found in the countryside.
7. Small house built of local materials,
chenam (mud and plaster) walls, tiled
or thatched roof, cow-dung floor.
8. Rural or urban traditional street dwell¬
ing, usually one or two rooms and a
verandah.
9. Rural or urban basti or slum shanty
10. Sholiga woven forest hut.
The type of dwelling in which a family lives
is quite a good index of its economic status as well as
its composition, but can be misleading because of the
intervention of cultural proclivities. For instance
a family living in one of the new modern villas which
are beginning to proliferate along the roads leading
out of Chamarajanagar town, houses with gardens, Western-
type sanitation and relatively modern kitchens, must be
well off, but may not compare in wealth to a family liv¬
ing in one of the old traditional houses in the town
centre, dark, dirty and dilapidated though the house
may be. The villa households are often nuclear, though
they may also house an extended family of a couple, their
children and the husband's parents. The traditional
houses are built as joint family dwellings and usually
house a joint family. People in the modern houses are
generally quite house-proud and prone to spending money
on decoration and comfortable furniture. Those in the
traditional houses do not trouble themselves about dust,
cobwebs and the state of the paintwork, though the floors
where people sit are regularly swept. Invited into the
kitchen of one such house (a privileged visit to be under¬
taken barefoot and newly washed), I rather tactlessly re¬
marked that a crumbling window—sill could do with a lick
of plaster and paint. My interlocutor shrugged and re¬
plied dismissively, "Oh, we don't live like that". The
corporate property of this family was considerable and
brought them in a comfortable income. They ate well and
educated their children at the town's private schools.
The only pictures in such houses, apart from the odd
example of traditional calendar art, depicting various
deities, are photographs of family members hung well
above eye level on the wall, those of thejdeceased decor¬
ated with garlands. Apart from a few cane and metal
chairs in the front room for visitors and a radio
little attention is paid to the comforts of modernity.
Most of them have dark rooms opening on to a central
courtyard in which is situated the household well and
where the washing hangs. Married couples have a bed¬
room each and unmarried brothers and sisters, along
with the children of the married couples, lay out their
bedrolls at night to sleep communally on the floor in
the central hallway or family meeting room. In another
such household of my acquaintance where there were seldom
less than twenty-four members of the joint family present
at any one time, there was only one bathroom, dirty and
primitive, located in the cowshed. (Although the house
was in the centre of the town cows and buffaloes cater¬
ing for the family milk requirements were stabled there
at night). This house had a particularly large courtyard,
partially roofed and cool, which constituted the hub of
the family activities and the social life of the women.
This family owned a couple of landholdings and
were quite well off as a corporate group, having inherited
useful town property from the deceased father, but they
could not compare in wealth with a distant relative of
the deceased father who, besides other valuable sources
of income, had a large and profitable farm on which he
lived. His house on this land was a typical traditional
big rural house, with a tiled roof dipping to a hole in
the centre, whence rain ran in the monsoon into a square
plastered pit or tank in the middle of the inner hall off
which all the rooms opened. Originally an attractive
building with a fine old carved door, it was in an ad¬
vanced state of decrepitude when I last saw it. I once
attended a midday meal there, to find a swarm of hornets
nesting in a corner of the sitting room ceiling. Noticing
that my co-guest (his cousin) and I kept glancing nervous¬
ly in the direction of this alarming feature, whence great
yellow living missiles zoomed past over our heads, our
host remarked cheerfully, "Live and let live. They don't
bother me".
Visualise in comparison the modern suburban house
of a wealthy and fairly Westernised private physician of
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of the town with its shining paintwork, its pretty
front garden, its sofa and armchairs, its display
shelves of holiday souvenirs and its hi-fi equipment,
pride and joy of the couple's only child^a sixteen-
year-old girl, fluent in English and in the process
of preparation for higher education, and the division
between the 'old elite' and the 'new elite' is manifest.
J.S. and N.G. Duncan in their Residential Landscapes
and Social Worlds (in Sopher ed. 1980), describe
exactly the same situation as that to be observed in
Chamarajana gar as existing in Hyderabad. Of the 'new
elite' they say,"Their tastes and lifestyles are what
they describe as 'modern', a term that is commonly used
in India to describe Westernised ways". (p.293)« Here
too the 'new elite' have moved out of the old city and
they spend money on the appearance of their houses, in
contrast to the equally wealthy 'old elite' who prefer
to restrict their conspicuous consumption to their wives'
saris and jewellry and to huge wedding feasts.
The big traditional houses in large villages
containing members of high caste communities who are
affluent as well - e.g. Lingayat Gowdas - are also
designed for joint family accommodation, but the other
types of dwelling graded above are not, though they may
well house extended families. I should like to apolo¬
gise here for not using the accepted typology of family
structure proposed by Pauline Kolenda in her Region,
Caste ana Family Structure (in Singer and Cohn, jedsj,
1968). My own seems to fit the Chamarajanagar circum¬
stances better. A nuclear family, in my terms, consists
of one couple with their children. (A sub-nuclear family
is one childless couple). A joint family consists of
two or more married brothers with property in common,
with their wives and children and generally with their
parents. If their father is alive he will be the house¬
hold head, and sometimes the widowed mother, if a powerful
enough character, may take his place in that position after
his death. A joint family may also include unmarried bro¬
thers and sisters. An extended family consists of a mar¬
ried couple, their children, if any, and the husband's
parents. A nuclear/famjiy with accretion is one
in which another relative, usually an unmarried
sister or brother of the husband (or occasionally
of the wife, as brides sometimes bring a younger
brother with them for company when they go to their
husband's place on marriage), is living in the house.
The same applies to an extended family with accretion.
Accretions may also take the form of a widowed sister
or other homeless relative. An interesting point
about the wives bringing a younger brother to their
virilocal place of future residence is that if the
brother stays long enough and makes himself useful
enough he may end up marrying his elder sister's
elder daughter. On the other hand the very fact that
he and the girl have played together from her babyhood
may result in a conditioned aversion. A young Ling-
ayat confided in me once to the effect that his family
wanted him to marry his elder sister's daughter and
that he intended to refuse as he had known the girl
all his life and it would be just like having to marry
his own sister.
On the whole, for reasons of space alone, nuc¬
lear families are in the majority. According to the
1971 census figures, nearly ^9% of the population of
Karnataka live in one-room houses, the average house¬
hold consisting of five members. About 31% live in
two-room houses, while 11% live in houses with three or
more rooms. I did not undertake a room count in the
course of my fieldwork, but a door-to-door survey in
Somavarapet , the large mixed-caste village where I
lived, produced the following results: Of a total of
56 households, 26 - almost half- consisted of a nuclear
family. Fourteen households consisted of a joint fam¬
ily in my usage of the term. Seven households consist¬
ed of a three-generation extended family.Four households
were sub-nuclear. There were four a-typical households.
One consisted of two married brothers and their wives, bu
no parents or children (a fairly rare situation). Two
consisted of a widowed mother and her unmarried children,
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and one consisted of a childless couple and two widowed
sisters of the husband's deceased father.
In his The Household Dimension of the Family
in India (Shah 1973) A.M. Shah suggests that the principle
of the residential unity of patrikin in India is much
stronger among the higher, more Brahman-orientated castes,
(who also tend to be wealthier) than among the lower castes,
who tend to be poorer. This certainly true of Chamaraja-
nagar, except where 'class' culture in the form of Western¬
isation at the top provides exceptions to the rule. Shah
also says that small traditional towns in India (as opposed
to the cities where pressure of space and the influence of
modernisation lead to nucleation of families), contain more
members of orthodox high castes, who are normally merchants,
clerks or small business men, than do the rural villages, in
which the lower castes, mainly agricultural workers, predom¬
inate. For this reason, there are more joint or extended
families living in the small towns and far more nuclear
families in the villages. The figures for family type in
the six caste-groups in my sample, which are given in Table
18, Section Two, Chapter V, tend to substantiate Shah's
theory. For the purposes of this chapter they are expressed
as follows:
Caste-group I, Rich Lingayats: 2k nuclear families, 6
nuclear with accretion, 10 joint families and 10 extended
with accretion.
Caste-group II, Poor Lingayats: 30 nuclear families, 1
nuclear with accretion, 7 joint families and 12 extended
families.
Caste-group III, Other High Castes: 29 nuclear families,
0nuclear withaccretion, 9 joint families and 6 extended
families.
Caste-group IV, Town and Around Low Castes: 28 nuclear
families, b nuclear with accretion, 3 joint families and
13 extended families.
Caste-group V, Hinterland Low Castes: 35 nuclear families,
1 nuclear with accretion, 9 extended families and 5 extend¬
ed with accretion.
Caste-group VI, Sholiga tribe: 30 nuclear families, 5
nuclear with accretion, 1 joint family and 14 extended
families.
The noticeable difference between the caste-
groups is not so much the number of nuclear families,
although when Rich Lingayats of Group I are compared
with Poor Low Castes of Group V, the difference _is
quite striking, but in the number of joint families.
The higher caste-groups, I, II and III, including the
Poor Lingayats, all had far more joint families. This
is partly because the majority of Caste-group III live
in the town, but it also confirms Shah's dictum, that
the residential unity of patrikin tends to be a high
caste norm. Most of all, I suggest, it is because more
people.in Groups I and III, and even in II, could afford
bigger houses with more rooms. The fact that the Sholigas
had more extended families than the other two impoverished
and lower caste groups, and even one joint family of modest
proportions, is, I believe, due to the space available to
them in their forest settlements, throughout which the huts
are widely dispersed. Not only is there plenty of space
to build a second woven hut for additions to the household,
but vertical space is sometimes utilised by expanding the
watchman's shelters they build in trees into sleeping quar¬
ters. Furthermore the Sholigas tend to cook and to sleep
outside except during heavy rains, using their huts mainly
for storage, but if a household is defined as 'those sharing
a common hearth' the problem of classification is simplified
in their case.
Although the Hinterland Low Castes appear to have
more nuclear families than any other group • I suspect that
this is a function of sharing accommodation. The further
away from the town the more one-caste villages there seem
to be. The Harijans and Upuligas in the town or the big
'satellite' villages surrounding it tend to live in crowded
'quarters' or one-caste streets in which the dwellings con¬
sist of one or two-room houses. Further away, in their
one-caste villages, many of the traditional village houses
are quite spacious, and these tend to be occupied by more
than one household, each with its own cooking hearth, rather
than by a single joint family. In one case what might have
opW£1 .
been an accretion in different circumstances had
perforce to become a household. Two old childless
widowed sisters had lived together, working on their
inherited fields, in their own mud and plaster house
until it collapsed after heavy rain. They were re¬
luctantly taken in by distant relatives, their only
surviving kin, who firmly gave them a separate room
with its own cooking place and its own entrance from
the street. The two old ladies felt that this con¬
stituted inhospitality and lack of kin solidarity, but
as one of them was an inveterate cadger and bossy with
it, no doubt the kin had their reasons. It should be
remembered that the number and composition of a family
or household depends on the stage of the domestic group's
developmental cycle. a nuclear family may become
extended in the course of time and subsequently revert
to nuclear as its component personnel grow up, move out
and/or die. In the same way fission in a joint family
may fragment the group into a number of nuclear units.
According to the 1971 census there were over
118,000 people in the State of Karnataka with no houses
at all. While a proportion of these could be poverty-
stricken pavement dwellers migrating from villages to
the big cities, (I neither saw nor heard of any home¬
less people in Chamarajanagar town), a large number
of them are probably members of itinerant tribes who
carry their own shelters with them. Among these are
the Brinjaris or Shukkaligas, true Gipsies, though
attempts, some of them successful, have been made to
settle them in new villages. There are also the
Hakkipikkiaveru (literally 1birds-and-that-sort-of-thing-
people'), who wander in bands about the countryside
netting birds and small animals for a living; they could
be described as a Poacher Caste. There are also the
male Hellevas, the Beggar Bards, who wander from village
to village while their wives keep the home fires burning
by cutting and selling grass and gathering sappu, wild
salad greens^ to hawk in the streets.
According to the figures given in the 1971
census handbook for the Mysore District, only ^2,796
people, or about 19% of the population of the taluk
are literate i.e. about 25.6% of the males and 11.6%
of the females. This does not compare very well with
the figures (1971 census) for Karnataka as a whole or
indeed with the all-India figures:
Total Males Females
. nn/ 25.6% 11. 6%Chamarajanagar 19# 4 6y 2Q 9%Karnataka 31.5% ,o 7./
All-India 29.2% 39*°/o l6'7/°
It must be remembered that Chamarajanagar taluk is still
a fairly traditional and out-of-the-way backwater. The
figures for the town itself look better: 40 . 6% of the
population are literate, of whom 61% are male and 39%
female. Considering the number of schools in the vicin¬
ity, however, it still fails to impress, and is in fact
surprising in view of the respect with which education
is held in the taluk. One suspects that children are
entered into primary school for a year or so, and then
taken away when the household cannot spare their labour.
This is especially true of girls, judging from the number
of female respondents who said they had been to primary
school for a time but wer^taken away,still illiterate,
because their parents needed them - usually to look after
younger children when the mother went back to work. Other
respondents claimed that they had left school after a year
or two because they did not like it: "The teacher beat me",
or "The children were rough", and their parents had acceded
to their wish to withdraw. Education is not, of course,
compulsory in India. To many it remains an unattainable
good because of the whole syndrome of incidental expenses
to be met even when the State schools are free. My illi¬
terate low-caste neighbour, a very intelligent man who spoke
Tamil and Urdu as; well as his native Kannada, had high hopes
of his son, a bright boy who gained a scholarship to secondary
school. The parents worked hard and long to keep
the boy in books and clothing. But his peer-group
at secondary school consisted of lads who came from
families with more cash to spare than his own parents
were able to give him. To find the wherewithal to
join them at the cinema and at coffee houses he began
to steal and to demand money with menaces from his
mother. He was soon in trouble with the police,and
his father, a formidably upright man. removed him from
school forthwith and put him to work. The disappoint¬
ment to the parents was so great that no attempt was
made to educate any of the other four children in
the family.
Sex and Dependency Ratios, Age Distribution. The
sex ratio in Chamarajanagar taluk for 1971 was 104 males
per 100 females. The 1981 figures for Karnataka and
all-India are respectively 104 and 107. (cf. Dyson and
Moore, 1983 )• The 1981 Karnataka ratio compares well with
the rest of India, although the three other south Indian
States, Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu and, of course, Kerala,
are better still. In contrast with Uttar Pradesh (113)*
Punjab (113) and Haryana (ll4), Karnataka appears to confirm
the North/South hypothesis of Dyson and Moore. But the fig¬
ures for 1901 also confirm the view of these authors that
creeping 'masculinist' ideals stemming from the North are
affecting south Indian ideology concerning female status.
In 1901 the Karnataka (or Mysore) figure was 102, while in
Tamilnadu and Kerala there was a preponderance of females.
But it looks as if influences are working both ways, as in
1901 the sex ratio in the Punjab, for instance, was 120 males
to 100 females.
Unfortunately further figures from either the 1981
or the 1971 census for Chamarajana gar are not yet available.
We have, however, dependency ratio and age distribution fig¬
ures for Mysore District of Karnataka, which includes
Chamarajanagar among its eleven taluks. The Depen¬
dency ratio for the District is 9^i as compared to the
all-India ratio of 92. Life expectation in the dis¬
trict is approximately the same as for all-India: (1971)
Males 53.2, Females 51^9« The age distribution, which




To wind up this chapter a few exegetic obser¬
vations are called for. At first sight the taluk coun¬
tryside compares very favourably with the squalor of the
town, especially after a year of good rainfall, when it
presents an appearance of pastoral charm. But the lot
of the poor villager is probably not much better than
that of the poor town dweller. The rural slums are
often as bad as the urban, because the women may have
further to go for water where there are no standpipes, and
medical and welfare services are so often locally unavail¬
able. Nor are conditions very much better in the labour
villages on the estates, though the hill range affords a
prospect of outstanding natural beauty. Cold and over¬
crowding there tend to counteract the economic benefits,
and conveniently placed standpipes are no guarantee of
unpolluted water these days. However, this is not to
say that conditions everywhere are worse than they were
twenty-five years ago. Successive Harijan ministers in
the State Government have made much land available to the
low castes, besides better chances of education, which are
taken up when poor families have already achieved a mod¬
icum of upward mobility. A case in point is that of an
elderly overseer on Honriametti Estate. Although he and
his wife began as illiterate landless labourers, achievement
of a higher work status enabled him to give his sons a
technical education. They in turn sought wives with some
education, and in the third generation he has not only
college-educated grandsons but a graduate grand-daughter.
In the political field too the more sophisticated
members of the low castes are beginning to feel their
strength. They demand land and other perquisites in
return for their votes and as landowners are assiduous
in insisting on their rights. Although all this has
aroused some hostility among the higher-caste communities
in the taluk it has not so far led to the acts of violent
reprisal which are regrettably not uncommon today in some
States - perhaps because there has not yet been sufficient
provocation. Furthermore the low caste poor are well aware
today that once they can afford to manipulate Government
protective legislation to their advantage to achieve the
cpweted Government jobs which carry power and prestige,
the stigma of pollution disappears in the eyes of the high¬
er jati. High caste citizens of Chamarajanagar claim that
they will interdine with low caste individuals "if they are
cultured", meaning educated, 'modern', and of course influ¬
ential .
Above all, the lives of the poor are no longer so
constantly haunted by bereavement. In the past two or
three decades, which have seen control over the great epi¬
demic diseases, as well as increasing availability of anti¬
biotic drugs, the death rate has fallen dramatically, espec¬
ially the early-age mortality rates. According to the Bang¬
alore Population Centre the survivorship ratios of number
of childrer^living to number born have increased remarkably
over the past quarter century. (cf. Srinivasan, Reddy and
Raju, 1977)- This is confirmed by my own observation. As I
mentioned in the preceding chapter, genealogies taken from
older labourers in the taluk villages revealed that the major
ity of them lost most of their siblings in childhood. Today
more children are surviving to grow up and produce their own
of f spring.
Tragically, this is a mixed blessing. While the
richer and better-educated in the taluk have recognised
that these changes make it safer for them to restrict the
number of children they bring into the world and also
that the ones they have are going to cost them money if
they are to be brought up to compete in modern India, the
poor and ignorant now find themselves with larger families
than they can afford. As an old villager put it to a
voluntary social worker of my acquaintance: "In the past
we had cholera, smallpox and plague always with us and
half the children died. You people have put a stop to
that, so there are more children. Now you say we have
too many. What did you expect ? Are you never satis¬
fied ? "
It is with this conundrum that the present study
is expressly concerned.
CHAPTER II. Caste
The spectacle of Chamarajanagar citizens en f£te
at the devastana festival conveys a strong sense not
only of communitas but also of homogeneity. Here are
the inhabitants of a linguistic region, subject to the
same national and State laws and to the tyrannies of the
same climatic and other environmental hazards, brought up
in the same general traditions, technological methods and
local lore, living according to the same calendrical cycle,
both agricultural and ritual, using the same idioms, pro¬
pitiating the same local deities and possessing in common
a number of collective representations.
That this impression of homogeneity is an illu¬
sion and that the social body of the taluk population,
more closely perceived, turns out to be heteromorphic is
hardly surprising in view of the fact that this is a caste
society. To say that that great bone of contention, the
caste system, is alive and well and living in Chamarajanagar
is no more than the truth, but it leaves unanswered the deba
table and much debated question: What is caste ?
The classical writers on the subject, from Senart
through Bougie, Blunt and Hocart to Hutton, all agree that
the institution of caste is sanctioned - indeed prescribed -
by^dharmasastras; that it is hierarchical in structure, with
the Brahmans at the top and the 'untouchables' at the bottom
and innumerable local hierarchies jostling for position in
between; that it is ascriptive, in that one's caste is de¬
termined by birth; that it has comparatively rigid bound¬
aries, exemplified by the stress laid on caste commensality
and endogamy; that it has economic aspects, exemplified by
thejassociation of caste with traditional occupations and the
traditional interdependence of castes in the total social
structure of a given locality; that the high castes can be
polluted by contact with the low castes, especially in the
fields of food and sex; and finally that it is encompassed
by the division of the whole society into the four orders
or varnas (Brahman, Ksatrya, Vaisya and Sudra) referred
to in the post-Rig-Vedic hymn, the Purasasukta.
The literature on caste is voluminous and
fraught with controversy. Any attempt to deal with
it faithfully in this thesis would lead us into realms
where the open issues have little relevance to the
field of fertility. Moreover, to make the attempt
would entail trespassing on territory which a master
of the subject, Louis Dumont, has made his own. Dumont's
Homo Hierarchicus (1970) is the most comprehensive
overview of the literature on caste ever undertaken,
to my knowledge, and whatever one may think of his
personal opinions, his analysis of the premises of other
writers on the subject is thorough and searching. It is
true that in the past decade new voices have been raised,
but the themes remain the same. Perhaps the most useful
approach, therefore, would be to review the standpoints
of the leading modern protagonists in a brief resume of
those aspects of caste on which Indianists have failed
to agree.
Writers on the subject of caste or the components
thereof tend to fall into three main groups or categories:
those who find the system integrative; those who find it
exploitive; and those who are more concerned with its
elements as a structure of transactions, or the way the
institution survives by adaptation to social change, than
with the moral principles concerned. For the purposes of
this exegesis I shall characterise these schools of thought
as the Integrative, the Exploitive and the Manipulative.
The four leading exponents, as I see it, of the
Integrative school among modern writers on the subject
are Edmund Leach, Louis Dumont, McKim Marriott and Michael
Moffat. The model which Leach proposes is a functional
one. For him the caste system is organic, in Durkheim's
sense of the word. He sees it as an entity,
"...with each particular caste and subcaste
filling a distinct functional role". (Leach,i960 p
Moreover this view is by implication a eufunctional one
"In a ' class' society the 'people at the bottom'
are those who have been forced there by the
"..ruthless processes of economic comp¬
etition. Their counterparts in a caste
society are members of some closely knitted
kinship group who regard it as their privil¬
eged right to carry out a task from which all
other members of the total society are rigour-
ously excluded" (Leach op.cit. p.6).
It is not irrelevant to mention here that
Leach undertook his fieldwork in Sri Lanka, where the
landowning Goyigama caste comprises the major part of
the population, and where this huge elite may well
compete for the service of barbers, washermen and
other serving castes. But, with due respect, one is
bound to point out that, judging from the comments of
respondents in Chamarajanagar taluk, the lowest caste
do not regard such jobs as the removal of faeces as a
privilege but as the only job available to them outside
the agricultural free-for-all.
Dumont1s model is less partisan, but he seems
to subscribe to a view of the system that might be
expected of a high-caste person:
"...the execution of impure tasks by some
is necessary to the maintenance of purity
for others. The two poles are equally
necessary...."(Dumont 1970, p.55)«
The implication is that the society is a totality made
up of two opposing but complementary and equally ess¬
ential groups. But at this point a question arises
which Dumont neither directly asks nor explicitly an¬
swers. It is evident that the untouchable is necess¬
ary to the Brahman on the ritual plane. But in what way
are the high castes ritually necessary to the untouchable
Here the argument seems to have shifted to the economic
plane, for the untouchables need the higher castes for
their livelihood. It has been suggested (by Anthony
Good, personal communication), that Brahman priests, at
least, are ritually necessary to the low castes because
only they can perform the worship which alone maintains
the cosmos. I will return to this point later. Its
relevance to the present context lies in the fact that
for Dumont the institution of caste is above all a
religious phenomenon, and moreover one that thus
unifies the diversity of all India. Taking as his
starting point Bougie's three main principles of caste,
hereditary specialisation, hierarchical organisation
and reciprocal repulsion, Dumont transforms them into
an idiom of his own, confirming and developing Bougie's
claim that
"...in Hindu civilisation it is religious
beliefs above all rather than economic ten¬
dencies, that fix the rank of each group"
(Bougie,1908: p.39).
Dumont distinguishes the ranking of status,
which for him is essentially religious and which he
calls hierarchy in its true etymological sense, from
that of economic and political power, which, though
important in practice, is always subordinated to
hierarchy, that is; to ritual status. He reduces
Bougie's three principles to one fundamental principle,
the structural opposition of purity and pollution.
"This opposition underlies hierarchy, which
is the superiority of the pure to the impure,
underlies separation, because the pure and
the impure must be kept apart, and underlies
the division of labour because pure and im¬
pure occupations likewise must be kept sep¬
arate. The whole is founded on the necess¬
ary and hierarchical co-existence of the two
opposites (Dumont , 1970: p.^3)«
Marriott has a foot in two of the camps, the
Integrative and the Manipulative. In his Caste Rank¬
ing and Food Transactions (Marriott 1968), his matrix
analysis considers manipulative behaviour, but the model
implicit in his work as a whole is one of all-India unity
in diversity. Everyone accepts the caste system while
at the same time struggling to retain or to achieve high¬
er status within it.
The latest adherent to the Integrative school of
thought is Michael Moffat, whose study of/an untouchable
community in Tamilnadu convinced him that "there is
"..a pervasive and continuous social hierarchy marked
by relative purity and pollution" (Moffat,1979; P»29)
He takes issue with such exponents of the Exploitive
school as Gough, Mencher and Berreman, describing their
models as 'disjunctive' and dismissing their arguments
in a somewhat cavalier manner. Before returning to
discuss his position in more detail it may therefore be
helpful if we move on at this point to take a look at
the reasoning of the opposition.
The four leading modern advocates of the exploit¬
ive school are perhaps Kathleen Gough, G.D. Berreman, Andre
Beteille and Joan Mencher. At the beginning of the sixties
Gough had this to say:
"The inequalities of the system were justified...
by the doctrine of rebirth....It seems doubtful
whether the lower castes even traditionally sub¬
scribed to these beliefs. They appear chiefly
to have provided the higher castes with a rationale
for their privileges. The Pallans did not appear
to have heard of them, and when questioned denied
them with merriment" (Gough, I960: p.5^)«
Berreman's position is opposed to that of Leach:
"India is frequently cited as an example of a
society in which people of deprived and subject
status are content with their lot. On the basis
of my research and the literature I maintain that
this is not accurate" (Berreman,1966 p.121).
There is a tendency among some writers on caste, he claims,
to see the system as operating in the past as a golden age
of consensus, which fails to account for the attempts re¬
current through Indian history to reject the system
(cf. F. Fuchs,1950,1965; Nilakanta Sastri, 1958,1963), nor
for the chronic and readily expressed resentment against
the system on the part of the low castes. Berreman's ar¬
guments are rather extreme: caste is unequivocally equated
with class and with racism.
B^teU-le's by contrast is cooler and less partisan:
"There is evidence to show that hierarchy and
social inequality - as both behaviour and value -
is not a mystic quality of the Hindus but can be
studied systematically on a comparative basis".
(Beteille,1969: P«29)
The implication here is that the difference between
the Hindu model of social inequality and those of other,
Western, societies, is not one of kind but of degree.
Whether or not this is so is a controversial question,
but the research of such writers as Fuchs, Sastri and
the contributors to M. Mahar's The Untouchables in
Contemporary India (Mahar, £ed.J,1972), endorses the
position of the exploitive school.
Joan Mencher, described by Moffat as a sceptic
and demystifier of caste, is forthright on the subject:
"Looked at from the bottom up, the system
has two striking features. First, for the
people at the lowest end of the scale, caste
has functioned...as a very effective system
of exploitation. Second, one of the functions
of the system has been to prevent the form¬
ation of social classes with any commonality
of interest and unity of purpose" (Mencher,197^; p.^69)
Moffat rather unkindly implies that Mencher et al.
are trying to be different: "Ethnography that discovers
something new is rewarding" (Moffat op.cit. p.23) The
untouchables he studied, he says, behaved in a manner
similar to caste Hindus, even to worshipping personal,
family, lineage and territorial deities, both all-India
and local.
"Those persons who are, in egalitarian
terms, the most oppressed members of
Indian society are also among the truest
believers in the system that oppresses
them" (Moffat op.cit.p.40 3).
Djurfelt and Lindberg would not agree. Their
study, also undertaken in Tamilnadu, about three years
before that of Moffat, left them with a different impress-
i on:
"The incomplete spread of the upper
caste world points to the importance
of clearly distinguishing between the
caste system as an ideology and as a <
social...or ritual practice rooted in
the relations of production."
(Djurfelt and Lindberg, op.cit. 197^: p.211)
In the dichotoraous impressions presented by these anthro¬
pologists their values are revealed. Moffat, wedded to
the concept of the unity of Indian culture, sees his lowr
caste villagers as embracing the caste system, while the
Marxist co-authors have a different perception of the be¬
haviour of villagers in the same region. It is inter¬
esting to note that the exploitive school tends to discuss
caste and class as different in degree while the integra¬
tive school sees them as different in kind. Djurfelt
and Lindberg find "A strong but not perfect correlation
between caste and class" in their area, (op.cit.p.2 l6) .
Where class is at variance with caste one can expect, they
claim, to see changes in the ideological universe.
The viewpoints of selected writers on the Mani¬
pulative aspects of caste will be touched on shortly.
My principal concern at this juncture is to attempt to
reconcile the opposing opinions of the two schools dis¬
cussed above in the light of Chamarajanagar attitudes
to caste. To begin with, 'system' is not the word
I would choose to describe the state of affairs in the
taluk, although the fact that caste is all-pervading
there is undeniable. Neither is 'structure' a suitable
alternative, except perhaps in the sense of Levi-Strauss-
ian structuralism: a structured way of perceiving. The
term jati is used for caste, but it can also be trans¬
lated as 'type', 'kind' or 'sort' . Informants agree
that it can mean either 'culture-group' or 'ethnic group',
giving rise to stereotypes such as "this caste is aggress¬
ive" or "that caste is puritanical". In other words a
caste in Chamarajanagar is equivalent to a nationality,
a miniature human 'race' in the popular sense of the word.
R.L. Stirrat writes of a community of Sri Lanka Catholics
who recognise caste but do not entertain the idea of rit¬
ual pollution as conceiving of caste as a natural phenom¬
enon rather than as a social or ritual category (Stirrat
1975 ) • This is precisely the impression 1Nagar people
give when members of one community discuss another.
For instance, when the question of intercaste marr¬
iage came up, in general discussion or private
interview, someone always mentioned a case where
an Indian had married a Briton or another foreigner,
thus equating intercaste marriage with inter-nation¬
ality or inter-race marriage. Claude Levi-Strauss
maintains that '...Castes picture themselves as
natural species...'(Levi-Strauss 1966: p.127)-
Leach, too, writes of caste ideology as envisaging
castes as different species (Leach op.cit.,i960:P•7)
But these interpretations fail to take cognizW;e of
the practice of hypergamy, where it occurs, orythe
objection to hypogamy. I would maintain that in
Chamarajanagar castes see each other as ethnic groups.
Thus to Dumont's definition: 'Caste is a state of
mind' (1966: p.27), we might add, 'Caste is a state
of nature'. But it is not as simple as that. Caste
is also a state of culture, or at least of sub-culturej
a local group of individuals adhering to particular
cultural norms. Perhaps this is why the idea of inter
caste, or inter-race marriage is acceptable, even admir
able, to 'Nagar people when it occurs among the big-
city elite, but delightfully scandalous when it occurs
among the non-Westernised inhabitants of the taluk and
truly shocking within their own kutumba or bilateral
family group.
In Mysore District caste is more often than
not referred to as 'community', and to the observer
as well as the actor 'Nagar society appears to be a
loosely structured aggregate of communities, each poss¬
essing its own collective representations while shar¬
ing with all the others a number of universal, though
frequently conflicting, collective representations.
Given these twin bases to the local ideology
of caste, the ethnic and the sub-cultural, in what way
does the ernic view of caste in the taluk reflect
on the etic controversy discussed above ? It
depends, of course on which emic view one has in
mind. When I discussed caste with Harijans out
of hearing of other castes they were unanimous in
their opinion that the caste system had originally
been the invention of "the rich" to make sure that
they always had people to do the heavy and dirty
work for them. They certainly did not give the
impression that they thought Brahman priests nec¬
essary for the maintenance of the cosmos, although
in the context of the big devastana it is possible
that they could not envisage approaching the deities
enshrined there except through the Brahman priests.
But then Lingayat priests are also needed as offic¬
iants at some shrines. It is difficult to deny
that seen from the bottom caste does appear to bear
a close resemblance to class, apart from its ethnic
component. (cf. Joan Mencher,The Caste System Upside
Down, 197^.) It is clear that Chamarajanagar untouch¬
ables perceive themselves as oppressed by the system
and they deny its rationale in just the same way as
those studied by Gough, Berreman and Mencher did. The
fact that Moffat's untouchable villagers emulated the
higher castes in their worship of various deities and
in other types of behaviour fails to refute this
weight of evidence. In any case the worship of the
only deities they know of in the only way they know
is hardly proof of approval of the whole social system
It simply shows that when human beings are stuck in a
specific role system they will try to manipulate it to
their own advantage in one way or another.
An example of this is Scarlett Epstein's
account of the way Harijans refused to allow a party
of almost destitute immigrant Voddas to use their
well. Voddas are stonemasons and caste Hindus, but
the fact that in this situation they were less
powerful than the Harijans enabled the latter
to taste power for once in the only way available
to them (Epstein, 1973 ) • To my mind Moffat is
confusing faute de mieux conformity to a given
social system because it is there with acceptance
of the philosophic rationale by which the system
places the actor at the bottom of the heap. It
also seems that every group everywhere needs some
other group to look down upon. Asked which jati
he would allow his daughter to marry into, a member
of the Jarutnallai community, the lowest untouchable
group in 1Nagar} replied with a laugh, "Well, any
of them naturally, except of course the Right Hand
ones." The ancient system of Right and Left Hand
caste dichotomy of south India described by Brenda
Beck (Beck, 1972) is now more or less moribund in
Chamarajanagar except among the untouchables. I
suspect they need to keep it going so as to have a
community to reject.
The central theme of the manipulative school
in the literature of caste is that of the crucial imp¬
ortance of economic status for the achievement of up¬
ward mobility in the system. F-G- Bailey's Caste and
the Economic Frontier and Caste, Tribe and Nation
(Bailey, 1957,1960), O.M. Lynch 's The Politics of Untou-
chability (Lynch, 1970 ) , and W.L. Rowe's studies of achi¬
evement of upward mobility by low castes, (Rowe,1968),
all emphasise the necessity for the accruement of wealth
prior to take-off. Once the financial boost has been
secured it can be deployed in the acquisition of status-
bearing attainments. If historians are correct this
process has been going on throughout much of India's
history, providing its mite of substantiation for Marx's
theory of Economic Determinancy.
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So what do Chamarajanagar people - or those
among them with sufficient education - mean when they
say, as they often do, that caste (jati or matha) is
turning into class (rangada or classu)? We are pre¬
sented here with a semantic problem. As S. Ossowski puts
it, 'The ambiguity of the term 'class' makes it diff¬
icult to find one's bearings among the divergencies of
the different viewpoints involved.' (Ossowski,1963:
p. 121). I believe they are referring to the same phen¬
omenon as that characterised by Bailey et al., trans¬
ferred to the individual plane. Today, with the imm¬
ense respect with which education is held in India,
especially Western education, ('modern' or 'English'
are the synonyms used in south India), and the convic¬
tion, despite white-collar unemployment, that it is the
sole path to success, education is equated with prestige.
High status may be acquired expeditiously through educa¬
tion combined with Westernised good manners. As mention¬
ed earlier, in 'Nagar people say they will entertain or
be entertained by Harijans "If they are cultured", mean¬
ing if they are sufficiently well off and Westernised.
Conversely, a newly wealthy young Brahman of my acquain¬
tance was turned down when he applied for admittance to
an elite club because, I was told by a member, he was
"not cultured", in spite of the fact that he had built
himself a smart modern villa with a flush pedestal w.c.
The truth was that he lacked education. So wealth in
'Nagar is a necessary but not the sole determinant of
high status and upward mobility. In the past wealth
with the trappings of a pure and therefore prestigious
life style was required: vegetarianism, teetotalism,
celibacy or extreme continence, and the avoidance of
polluting activities. Today, the route to social acc¬
eptability is a university degree, preferably combined
with inherited wealth, a thriving self-made business
or secure financial status arrived at through a Govern¬
ment post or a job in one of the nationalised industries.
Education has always been greatly valued in India.
The prestige of the Brahmans derived as much from their
association with scholarship in the past as their purity.
Today it is agreed in Chamarajanagar that the concept of
Brahman purity is mainly a theoretical one. Most Brahmans
in the area have adopted Western ideals or those of
Bhakti (devotional) sects which seek salvation through
the love of God rather than through cleaving to a poll¬
ution-free regimen. The others are the focus of cyni¬
cal commentary on their assumption of ritual superior¬
ity. But there is a general belief - a collective rep¬
resentation in fact - that they are by definition intel¬
ligent. For instance local gossip had it that the twin
children of a certain couple of a merchant caste were so
successful at university because they were not the off¬
spring of the putative father but of a Brahman elect¬
rician engaged to wire the house in his absence on duty.
"And that," alleged the scandalmongers^'is why Ashok and
Prema are so intelligent".
Observing that 'India has shown a strong propensity
to transform rather than to supersede traditional....
structures' L.I. and S.H. Rudolph argue that the tradi¬
tional unit of association, caste, is still the unit of
association today, but has changed its character, in that
it is now politically self-conscious. Caste associations
now press for places in administration and education and
for political representation instead of demanding temple
entry and shared wells. The hold of ritual rank on soc¬
ial standing has declined, they say, as twice-born norms
and symbols have become at once more accessible and less
relevant. (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1967). Anil Bhatt con¬
curs, pointing out that the low castes which in the past
claimed higher ritual status now work for recognition as
low or backward castes to obtain the benefits of Govern¬
ment protective legislation. Asked for his definition
of caste a 'Nagar Gowda gave it as his considered opin¬
ion that, whatever they had been in the past, castes
were now political groups. "Nearly all the communit¬
ies have sabhas" (associations) he said "and they are
all trying to get themselves classified as backward".
On the face of it this situation presents a bizarre
reversal of the traditional picture of caste, but if
castes are regarded as aggregates of individuals seek-
to manipulate their social environment and to maximise
such assets as they may possess, I suggest that all
that has happened is that the means to power and pres¬
tige have changed or are in the process of changing.
In Chamarajana gar the higher castes tend to have
a paternalistic attitude, towards the untouchables, strong
ly tinged nowadays with bitterness and anxiety because of
the present Government policy of favouring the Scheduled
Castes to the detriment of the higher communities. My
untouchable labourer is a good honest man and a faithful
servant. Those Harijan neighbours have become impossib-..
ly uppity and uncooperative since they got their own land
Djurfeldt and Lindberg claim that 'an ongoing change in
caste relations is evident .... The heterogenous effects
of the new production relations make Harijan emancipation
a class privilege', (op.cit.: p.226-7)- When a rich
cultivator and an agricultural labourer confront each
other, they remind us,
'two men of different jati also frequently
meet. The participants tend to conceive
of the class relation as an inter-caste re¬
lation. The power vested in the dominant
party by the production relations also allows
him to impose the traditional hierarchical
relation on his subordinate' (op cit: p.251)
So, is caste in 'Nagar "turning into class"
or is it now inextricably confused with class as Djur¬
feldt and Lindberg imply ? I think both these things
are true up to a point, but this does not mean that
caste is disappearing. On the contrary caste as
category and ethnic community is preserved and even
emphasised by politicisation. What does seem to be
happening is (l) that the criteria of caste are
changing and (2) that caste as ritual hierarchy
is weakening because (3) there are other routes
to prestige than that of upward mobility in the
caste system.
While there is still a good deal of
respect in Chamarajanagar for 'purity', in the
sense of asceticism, the idea of 'pollution' has
lost much of its force and it is evident that little
more than lip-service is paid to it. (The question
of the purity of women is a different matter and
will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter). A
Brahman of my acquaintance, asked whether he would
invite an ordinary non-'cultured' Harijan into his
house, replied after consideration that it depend¬
ed on whether or not his mother was there. Old
women are still great arbiters of traditional beha¬
viour, this being one of their few fields of power.
On one occasion when I was dining with an orthodox
high caste joint family while the widowed mother was
away on a visit, one of the sons, seeing me strugg¬
ling to break a tough chapatti with my right hand,
said with a conniving grin, "Go on, use your left
hand. We all do when Amma isn't here". (The left
hand is of course ritually proscribed for use in po¬
lite transactions since it is reserved for ritually
polluting tasks). Likewise the concept of menstru¬
al pollution is diminishing. While attending the
thi-thi (memorial) ceremony for the father of a 'Nagar
friend I was told that his wife could not be present
because she was mane horage, (outside the house) or
menstruating. But this did not prevent her from
walking in and out of the room in which the ceremony
was held, pausing to chat with those engaged in it,
including the Brahman priest.
However, 'pollution' is not the only stigma
which helps to keep the lowly in what the higher ca¬
stes believe to be their proper stations. Poverty
necessitates the undertaking of manual labour, which,
though not officially recognised as a concomitant of
caste, is very much one of class. Manual labour is
something for which the average Indian has a strong
aversion which has nothing to do with laziness, and
much to do with social status. Srinivas mentions
this aversion, the fact that an educated or well-off
person is not expected to carry heavy objects or do
any kind of manual work, and the fact that any Indian
who can afford it employs as many servants as possible,
as indicative of deep-seated attitudes (Srinivas 1962).
Certainly everyone in Chamarajanagar who can afford to
be is a practised delegator, passing work downward from
one level to another until it finally gets done by those
who are often the least capable of carrying it out
successfully by virtue of the fact that they are underedu
cated, underpaid and sometimes undernourished. It will
be remembered that mention was made in a previous chap¬
ter of a smallholder who preferred to lose his onion
crop rather than suffer the indignity of picking off
the flowers himself. I constantlyyfcaused either con¬
sternation or mirth by carrying loads myself, especi¬
ally of firewood when staying in the hills. These
would sometimes be wrested from me by friendly passers-
by who declared that it was "not right" that I should
carry burdens. Once when a group of labourers was
sheltering from a rainstorm on my verandah one of
them introduced himself as a cousin of my landlord.
"But his family pretend not to know us," he said, "Be¬
cause I have to work with my hands". On my tactlessly
referring to this meeting later, the landlord was so
embarrassed that I had to let the matter drop. But,
as in the case of intercaste marriage, if someone al¬
ready in possession of ample prestige has the courage
to flout public opinion the action may be admired. The
same smallholder who so feared to lose face in rescuing
his own crop on another occasion pointed out with admi¬
ration a young man ankle-deep in a paddy field who
turned out to be the son of a rich landowner recently
returned home with a degree in agriculture and appa¬
rently so Westernised that to be seen labouring on his
own land held no terrors for him. My friend was much
impre ss ed.
The ability to hold two conflicting beliefs
and to voice them both, sometimes within a short span
of time, is strikingly noticeable in south India (while
of course by no means confined to any one country), and S
a characteristic which frequently bedevilled the survey
I carried out in 1979-80. S.B Daniels' paper in S.Wad-
ley's (ed.) The Powers of Tamil Women, discusses this
problem of conflicting models in south Indian culture
(Daniels, 1980). The way two contradictory viewpoints
may be held by a single individual and expressed with no
apparent sense of inconsistency^ interesting, if con¬
fusing, to the etic observer,/is clearly the product of
conflicting collective representations within the com¬
munity or within south Indian society as a whole.
Be that as it may, the fact that in Chamaraja-
nagar what Bhatt calls 'status summation' (Bhatt, op.
cit., 1975), between caste and class is on the whole
still evident means that the low castes therefore com¬
prise the majority of manual labourers, and the fact
that they do manual labour is yet another reason for
looking down on them. They therefore have good cause
to believe that the caste system is all about one sec¬
tion of society doing the heavy and dirty work for the
rest .
Another junction point between caste and class
is the question of emulation. As far as it is possible
to ascertain two dichotomous models for emulation (apart
from the Saniyasi or renouncer) existed in traditional
India (cf. Dumont, 1970) , that of the Brahman varna, the
scholarship and purity model, and that of the Ksatriya
varna, the warrior and temporal power model. Today
these two models are represented by the twin processes
described by M.N. Srinivas as 1Sanskritisation and West¬
ernisation' (Srinivas,1962), of which more below. Accord¬
ing to Anil Bhatt the 'sanskritic' model, while by no
means obsolete, is fast losing ground in modern India
to the Western one.
'The important change is that the model
of emulation is no longer provided by
the Brahmans or any other high caste..
..the context of emulation is not san¬
skritic but urban and modern character¬
istics.' (Bhatt op.cit.,1975: p.6)
Referring to the British during their hege¬
mony in India as the 'new Ksatriyas' Srinivas outlines
the process by which the Brahmans, the very group which
formed, one of the old models of emulation, themselves
became the first to emulate the new-Ksatriya Western one.
'In Mysore State the Brahmans led the
other castes in Westernisation. This
was only natural as the Brahmans po¬
ssessed a literary tradition...They
left their natal villages for cities
such as Mysore and Bangalore to ob¬
tain the benefit of an English edu¬
cation, an indispensable passport to
employment under the new dispensation*.
(Srinivas,1962:51-2).
The trend towards emulation of a Western
model has been a central theme of Andr^ Beteille1s
contribution to the literature of caste:
'The reason why the old divisions have
lost their traditional significance is
that new ones have begun to emerge.
These are based on education, occup¬
ation and income, and have their own
status symbols.' (Beteille, 1969: p.231).
Mandelbaum writes of people trying for upward
mobility in the traditional way by emulating the 'ritual
prerogatives and life-styles' of the twice-born castes,
one aspect of which is the strict control of women. But,
he says, this path to higher status is less trodden than
here tofore.
'Competition for status is still a central
feature of village life, but the symbols
of high status and the terms of the com¬
petition have somewhat altered. There are
village men who fought strenuously for the
right to wear the sacred thread...who find
their sons uninterested in that ancient pri¬
vilege, although they are most interested in
acquiring contemporary insignia of high stat¬
us. Modern education has become a require¬
ment for the most desired kinds of livelihood '
(Mandelbaum op.cit. p.58).
In Chamarajanagar the model for class ranking
seems to be that of the 'new Ksatriya', and the new eLite
are anxious to emulate it. They hope to join Western-
type associations such as the Rotary Club and the tennis
club. They build new villas and plant lawns on the out¬
skirts of the town, and furnish them with sofas, dining
tables and chairs, refrigerators and record players.
They aspire to the ownership of a small car (driven by
the husband. So far no 'Nagar wife has learned to drive).
A 'modern' house and its appurtenances is one of the sym¬
bols of having 'arrived'. Scions of traditional joint
family corporate households who have done well on their
own tend to break away after marriage and buy, build or
rent a modern house. At present these values exist al¬
ongside traditional ideas which place a high value on the
purity arising from asceticism, giving the taluk citizens
two separate routes for advancement. Members of the
lower castes do not hesitate to switch from one to the
other as the occasion arises, and are not particularly
disturbed by any inconsistency they may betray in doing
so as they try to move forward and upward on two fronts
simultaneously.
An example of this dual approach is that of a
young Harijan doctor who had achieved his position through
hard work and intelligence, and was busy consolidating it,
on the one hand through membership of 'elite' clubs, and
on the other by restricting his wife and denying that his
jati allowed divorce and remarriage to women. He had
not yet discovered that the relatively Westernised men
to whose peer-group he hoped to belong and who were
happy to accept him on the grounds of his education,
income and job, looked down on him for his adoption of
a 1 sanskritisation' which they were busy putting behind
them. They were, in fact, sorry for his wife. As
Srinivas says,
'In the lower levels of the hierarchy
castes are taking up customs which the
Brahmans are busy discarding. As far
as these castes are concerned it looks
as though sanskritisation is a necess¬
ary prelude to Westernisation' (Srinivas,
1962,p.55).
Srinivas's use of the term 'sanskritisation'
for the emulation of traditional and orthodox patterns
of culture and behaviour has been criticised, but not,
to my mind, very helpfully. J.F. Staal objects to the
term because the connection between 'sanskritisation' and
Sanskrit is not very close.
'Sanskritisation as used by Srinivas
and other anthropologists is a complex
concept...The concept of Sanskrit cult¬
ure, in terms of which we could attempt
to clarify the term sanskritisation is
not without ambiguities.' (Staal, 1963 p.275)«'
Nevertheless, Staal admits that 'the concept
has been fruitful, paving the way for the description
and analysis of numerous phenomena' (Staal, op.cit.
p.275). O.M. Lynch believes the concept to be of
limited utility on the grounds that it is 'culture-
bound'. He suggests 'elite emulation' as a better
term (Lynch, 1968: p. 237). But 'elite emulation'
subsumes Westernisation as well, while Srinivas was seek¬
ing to differentiate opposing types of emulative behaviour.
I have chosen to contiue to use the term 'sanskritisation'
for want of a better one. 'Brahmanisation' might do but
it is a little too specific, perhaps, and 'sanskritisation'
has been understood by Indianists for the past twenty years
107.
Another term adopted by Srinivas to describe
a fairly complex phenomenon is that of the 'Dominant
Caste' in any particular area.
'Numerical strength, economic and
political power, ritual status and
Western education and occupation are
the most important elements of domin¬
ation. ... When a caste enjoys all or
most of the elements of dominance it
may be said to have decisive dominance.'
(Srinivas,1959: PP. ^-5).
Although this concept has proved a useful one for anthro¬
pologists in the course of their fieldwork in divers parts
of India, especially the South, it too has attracted crit¬
ical attention, partly because the situation where a sing¬
le caste dominates any one area is by no means universal.
T.K. Oommen agrees that where a caste combines all the
attributes of dominance there is no problem, but, he sub¬
mits, the assumptions that dominance is always limited to
one caste in an area, that power is an ascriptive attri¬
bute and that village power structure remains stable over
time, all diminish the usefulness of the concept as an
academic tool today (Oommen, 1970: pp7^,77). S.C.
Dube points out that where there are 'pronounced inequal¬
ities' between individuals within a caste described as
dominant, so that the wealthier and more powerful members
exploit the weaker, it is not appropriate to call the
caste dominant (Dube,1968: p.59). While accepting
the validity of these arguments, it seems to me that the
concept of the dominant caste is heuristically useful as
long as departures from the implied principle are noted
and discussed.
Within Chamarajanagar taluk some thirty-odd
local jati, not counting temporary migrant groups from
elsewhere, interact with each other in one way or another.
The account of them given below places them in a very
rough (attributional) hierarchical order arrived at
through a process of informal but persistent question¬
ing of members of most communities in the area. This
is not to say that any two individuals picked at
random would not argue over the grading. For in¬
stance, several informants, and not only Lingayats',
placed Vaisnava Brahmans below Lingayats for no
reason that I could fathom except perhaps that they
are followers of Vishnu in a strongly Saivite area,
possibly due to Lingayat influence. To attempt to
arrive at an interactional (mainly food-acceptance)
matrix on the lines of McKim Harriot's (Harriot,1968),
would have been difficult and possibly misleading as
restrictions on commensality have been so much relaxed
in the past thirty years that various permutations
and combinations of 'clean' jati now tend to inter-
dine if the food is vegetarian, but claim that in the
past if they ate with any other community at all it was
only with sub-castes of their own community. This
claim seems to be at least partly substantiated by the
Hysore Gazetteer of 1897, which states, e.g., that the
Panchala, or the five local artisan jati , would not even
at that date take food even from Brahmans. The same
was true of Lingayats, Jains and Vaisyas.
Because vegetarianism is associated with pur¬
ity the vegetarians have been placed at the top of the
list, but as usual things are not as simple as they
seem. Some Banajigas and Ursu are not vegetarian trad¬
itionally and some Jetti and Naidu are vegetarian. More¬
over,unlike most parts of India}there is no consensus
even at the top, since Lingayats and Jains claim complete
equality with, if not superiority to, Brahmans in this
area. We begin then by bracketing Madhwa and Smarta Brah¬
mans together, equalled - or folkwed closely - by Linga¬
yats and Jains and -hen by Vaisnava Brahmans. There are
comparatively few Brahmans in the taluk and not many of
them own land. They are not a powerful group in the area
and some of them are very poor. Those who are not priests
tend to be teachers, clerks, accountants and small business
men. They are also numbered among drivers, mechanics
and Government servants of various sorts. Lingayats,
the biggest and most ubiquitous community in the area,
will be discussed in more detail below. The Jains,
who belong to a sect as old as Buddhism, with a trad¬
ition of asceticism and extreme adherence to ahisma,
(non-violence), are mostly well-to-do merchants of
the town, where they have their own temple. The Gold¬
smiths, Blacksmiths and Carpenters are members of the
Panchala, the Artisan guilds. They consider themselve
to be dvija, the twice-born of Brahmanic culture. The
Goldsmiths are the recognised heads of this group of
jati. The Vaisyas, an exclusive and wealthy communi¬
ty who have rather confusingly adopted the title of the
third varna for their jati name, are more * Sanskritised
in their culture than is the average Brahman in contem¬
porary 'Nagar. The Detsa Banajigas, of whom more below
are another respectable merchant community of the town.
The Ursu are the jati to which the royal family of My¬
sore belong. The Jettis also wear the sacred thread
and claim twice-born status, but the fact that they are
mostly non-vegetarian tends to demote them in the eyes
of other communities. The Sholigas, to be discussed
below, have managed in the past to make their claim to
relatively high status stick through being exclusive
over food transactions, although they eat meat, inc¬
luding wild (but not domesticated) pig, but of course
not beef. Kurubas are one of the three jati of Gowdas
(cultivators) in Mysore District. They are content to
call themselves members of the Sudra varna - if they
think in those terms at all - like the huge Okkaliga
jati which takes the place of the Lingayats in many
other districts of Karnataka, but as Gowdas they are a
respected, if impoverished, community, placed level
with Jettis by all but the Jettis themselves. Naidus
are a generally prosperous community of cultivators
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originating in Tamilnadu. Naikars and Rajaparavar-
naikars are other, but less esteemed cultivator- eoa-
munities, mostly labourers. The large jati of Upu-
ligas will be further discussed below. Iddagas,
Kumbar Shettis (Potters), Ganigar Shettls (oil press-
ers), Kaniyar (Medicine men), Hellavas (Beggar Bards),
and Shukaligas (Gypsies), are all 'clean' low castes.
Below them come Nayinda (Barbers),and Madiwar Shettis
(Washermen), lower down the scale because of their pro¬
fessional dealing with human detritus, but not so low
as they are in some other parts of India. Handidomba-
veru (Pigherders) are a borderline category only saved
from untouchability by the fact that they do not eat
beef. Beef-eating is the true citerion of untoucha¬
bility. Of the three local untouchable communities,
the Harijans or Holeaveru are traditionally agricultu¬
ral labourers. (More about them shortly). Madigas,
much lower, are associated with the removal and skin¬
ning of dead animals and with shoe-making and other
leather work. Jarumallais, originating in Tamilnadu,
are sweepers. Like Madigas and unlike Harijans, they
are people of the Left Hand.
It should be remembered that the majority of
members of these jati are not engaged in their trad¬
itional occupations but work in agriculture, trade or
service jobs or even occasionally in the professions.
Nevertheless to a considerable extent their tradition¬
al occupations designate their status, unless wealth
and education combine to take them out of the caste
hierarchy and place them well up in that of class.
We now .come to the six communities, or groups
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of communities as mentioned in my introductory chapter,
to be paradigmatic of the social structure of the taluk.
The circumstances governing the choice will be further
expanded upon in the chapter on Methodology, but a brief
explanation seems appropriate at this point. Lingayats
were chosen because of their numerical dominance. Quite
simply there are more Lingayats in the taluk than any
other caste. They are ubiquitous. Upuligas and Har-
ijans are the next two biggest communities. It would
be impossible to discuss the ethnography of the taluk
without paying them especial attention. Banajigas and
Jettis are influential in the town, especially the Dasa
Banajigas, an old-established group. And Sholigas are
the only indigenous ja ti of the hills. These six jati
were originally intended to represent separately the
caste spectrum of Chamarajanagar. But when it came to
planning the survey on the spot (i.e. once I had arri¬
ved in the taluk and settled down to consider the cat¬
egories), it became clear that some of the groups would
have to be sub-divided and others combined, for reasons
given in Chapter V of this section. Thus of the groups
finally decided upon, Lingayats comprise I and II. Bana¬
jigas and Jettis, along with such other high castes as
Brahmans , Jains and llrsu, were amalgamated into a single
'Other High Caste' category, Group ,111. Upuligas and'
category
Harijans wre combined as a low caste/but sub-divided
into Groups IV and V on environmental grounds to be
explained in Chapter V below. Sholigas remained as
Group VI.
The Lingayats. As a sect and a caste the
Lingayats have been chronicled by, among others, N.
Sastri, (1963)1 S. Fuchs, (1965), and W. McCormack,
(1973). Although the true Lingayat stronghold is
north-west Karnataka, pockets exist in other parts
of the State where they, rather than the Okkaligas,
are dominant numerically and influentially. Chama¬
ra janagar taluk is one of these. They are now, as
they were in the past, the principal landowners here,
especially Lingayat Gowdas - as might be expected -
though Lingayat Shettis, or merchants, have also in¬
vested in land around the town. The jati began as
a sect, founded as a revolutionary movement against
Jainism, and indeed against Brahmanism, by Basava,
Prime Minister to King Bijjala Kalechuri, usurper
of the Calukya throne in Kalyan in A.D. The
sect,or caste,as it became is monotheistic, worship¬
ping Siva along with his sakti Parvati as the One
God, rejecting (in theory) the authority of the
Vedas and that of the Brahraans and following its
own sacred texts, notably the Vacana Sastra , the
Lingayat 'Bible*. All Lingayats must wear from the
day of their initiation, (generally tied round the
neck in the case of men and round the upper arm for
women), the Istalinga, a miniature Lingam encased in
a silver container. The lingam is regarded in ortho¬
dox Hinduism as the phallic symbol of Siva, but for
devout Lingayats it represents the macrocosmic Maha-
linga or Universal Soul. Every Lingayat must be initi¬
ated into the faith, though born into the jati, by a
guru, who may be male or female, attached to a local
matha or monastery. All members of the sect/jati are
strict vegetarians and supposed to abstain from alcohol.
They bury rather than burn their dead. The Lingayat
creed rejects the doctrines of caste and pollution and
claims equality for all classes and both sexes.
Stephen Fuchs writes of the sect as originally a move¬
ment for social reform.
'Basava was...a social revolutionary. He
abolished the caste system in his creed
and reformed the social order...by favour¬
ing the lower and underprivileged classes
against the high castes in spite of his
own Brahman origin.' (Fuchs,1965:P.253)•
It must be admitted that on the whole and
with the exception of the neo-reformists, who are mostly
educated and Westernised, little more than lip-service
is paid by the Lingayats in our region today to the egali
tarian principles of the founder. Their puritanism is
close to that of Hindu orthodoxy. They refuse to allow
low castes into their houses, restrict their women to a
greater or lesser extent, demand dowry. As Dumont has
ob served,
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'Indian society and religion on the one
hand have produced a rich growth of move¬
ments considered heretical to a certain
extent, and on the other hand they have
tended to absorb formerly heretical inven¬
tions.' (Dumont,1970: p.36).
Lingayat influence in the region has been strong
in the past, (Lingayatism was the State religion under
the Vodeyar Maharajas from the 11th to the 17th cent¬
uries), and it remains so today. Traditionally they
were a proselytising sect, and although missionary fer¬
vour has waned in the process of 'routinisation of
charisma', a strong element of it remains in the pro¬
pensity for promoting education by endowing scholastic
establishments. We have seen that the private secondary
school and the college in Chamarajanagar town are both
Lingayat foundations. The annual jatre or festival of
the town devastana occurs in the month of Shravanna, the
time of the Lingayat festival, and its core ceremony is
the honouring of Siva and Parvati. It seems as though
the Lingayats can truly be said to have decisive domin¬
ance in the area, although it is equally true that this
huge community is internally stratified economically
and that there are many poor Lingayats.
Reverting now to the other high castes, two
groups of some importance in the town attracted my atten¬
tion in the course of my earlier fieldwork. These were
the Dasa Banajigas and the Jettis, the first because it
was the largest merchant jati of the town, the second
because, although a small jati , they have been influen¬
tial in Mysore District for the past century.
The Dasa Banajigas. Banajigas or Vanajigas,
are a large merchant/group of Mysore, divided into a
number of sub-castes. (Dasa Banajigas were originally
bangle sellers). A.L. Basham writes of guilds of mer¬
chants mentioned in early Indian literature and inscrip¬
tions, some of which became important in the Deccan in
mediaeval times. 'One such was the Viravalanjiga, freelyy'
freely translated as the company of gentleman mer¬
chants which.... was controlled by a central council
in Mysore.' (Basham, 1967: p.225). The Chamaraja-
nagar Banajigas are a highly respected group (in spite
of the fact that some of them are very poor), held
in such high esteem that they customarily lead the
procession when the devastana chariot is pulled round
the streets at the time of the annual jatre. They
say that they are accorded this honour in spite of
their being Vaisnavites at a Saivite festival, for
the following reason: in the past a kind of local
Justice of the Peace, who was also supposed to be a
moral arbiter, would be appointed by the king to ser¬
ve a given area. He was known as the Desiya Shetti,
(literally Merchant of the Province). In the 19th
century a member of the Chamarajana gar Banajiga com¬
munity was appointed Desiya Shetti, and won the res¬
pect and affection of all the people, laying up a st¬
ore of goodwill from which his descendants still bene
fit over a hundred years later. Today 'Nagar Bana¬
jigas are an adaptable group who will turn to culti¬
vation, milling or manufacturing if these seem pro¬
fitable occupations, who combine conservative ele¬
ments with others who are briskly Westernised, whose
women are on the whole less restricted than those of
communities such as the Jettis or Vaisyas, and who
can boast of a community member who in 1980 was Presi
dent of the Rotary Club.
Th e Jettis. This is a j a ti whose original
occupation was professional wrestling and gymnastics.
They wear the sacred thread of the 'twice-born' and,
in Thurston's words 'consider themselves to be of su¬
perior caste, never descending to any degrading work.
(Thurston, 1909 ) . According to the Mysore Gazetteer
nearly half the Jettis who originally migrated South
from Andhra Pradesh settled in Mysore District under
the protection of the Maharajas. This state of af¬
fairs lasted until the deposition of the princes in
1972, and some Jettis still benefit from the palace
connection through pensions or houses which were once
royal property. The father-in-law of a Chamaraja-
nagar Jetti was superintendent of the Mysore zoo, and
his father's duty was to tie the turbans of Krishna-
raja Wodeyar IV. The Jetti community belongs to the
large Rachevar group of castes, who may be cultivators,
artisans, performers or members of the professional
classes. Today Jettis are mostly farmers or busi¬
ness men-. Though they consider themselves to be a
dvija caste they are traditionally non-vegetarian and
drink alcohol. This?combined with their association
with a martial art, supports their claim (in their eyes,
that is), to belong to the Ksatriya or warrior varna.
However, they are having some trouble in self-defin¬
ition today, some of them turning to Westernisation
while others, modelling themselves on the Lingayats
or traditional Brahmans, have eschewed meat and alco—_
hoi. Jetti women, in Chamarajanagar at least, are
restricted to the house unless accompanied, on fairly
rare occasions, by mother or mother-in-law or close
male relatives.
Turning now to the lower castes, two groups
were selected as representative, principally on the
grounds of their ubiquity, second only to that of the
Lingayats. These are the Upuligas and the Harijans,
comprising the second and third largest communities
in the area, who make up the majority of the agric¬
ultural labourers in the taluk, though by no means all
of them are landless, a large proportion of them hav¬
ing a share in family fields.
The Upuligas. This jati takes its name from
its traditional occupation, the manufacture of earth-
salt and of saltpetre. Uppu means salt in the Dravid-
ian languages. This occupation was combined with the
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digging of irrigation tanks (kere) and wells, brick¬
laying^ building and road works. While the salt
trade has more or less vanished the other kinds of
heavy labour with which Upu.ligas are associated still
employ the majority of the community. In Chamaraja-
nagar they specialise in heavy stevedore work, dri¬
ving heavy vehicles, house-building, and in work on
the Billigirirangan coffee estates. The women are
as hard-working as the men and it is customary that
women work alongside the men at manual work. They
call themselves Upuliga Shettis, and are often refer¬
red to as shettis or traders by other j ati, a refer¬
ence to their past trade in salt. Their villages in
the taluk are situated in proximity to kere and are
called mollai which may be roughly translated as a
place adjacent to water (essential for the production
of earth-salt). Because of their location, many mo-
llai-dwelling Upuligas are professional fishermen,
(or fisherwomen). Most Upuligas are illiterate and
poor. In 'Nagar town the only sizeable factory, the
Government silk-yarn mill, is situated at the end of
the Upuliga street, and virtually all those employed
are Upuliga women. Many of them earn more than do
their husbands and are extremely independent. In fact
most Upuliga women tend to be tough and independent.
In the town the whole community has a fearsome repu¬
tation for quarrelling and general aggressiveness,
and one informant, speaking of the Upuliga women, re¬
marked with something like awe, "They don't even
fear the police." One of their ejmans or leaders
complained that his position was no sinecure since it
involved the arbitration of disputes, in the course of
which he was in danger of being beaten up by both
sides. On the coffee estates, however, they are re¬
garded as reliable and hardworking employees, confi¬
ning their aggression to their domestic affairs.
In contrast to their predisposition to conflict,
Upuligas tend to be devout, with a strong attachmement
to their jati deity Muntaswami, by whom they readily
get possessed at the time of his annual festival. They
also specialise in ritual dancing and fire-walking. As
one Upuliga declared, "We take part in God's work". A
renowned seer of Chamarajana gar town is an Upuliga girl
who is frequently possessed by Adi-Sakti, meaning pri¬
mary female power, but also the name of a local Upuliga
goddess. I attended one of her public seances and was
deeply impressed by her magnetic presence and undoubted
powers of extra-sensory perception.
Upuligas belong to the 'clean' low castes and
do not suffer as many disabilities as falls to the lot
of the Harijans. Nevertheless poverty and illiteracy
has marked them as a group in spite of their sturdy
self-reliance, until, in recent years, awareness of the
political aspect of their numerical strength in the area
has percolated through to them. In 1975 they forced
through, by a complicated process of vote-bargaining,
the election to the Presidency of the municipality of
the only Upuliga in the taluk with higher education.
Curiously enough he is the brother of the young seer.
Between them this pair of siblings demonstrate the two
sides of Upuliga culture, down-to-earth pragmatism and
ecstatic religion.
The Harijans. This large community of tra¬
ditionally landless labourers, described by the Mysore
Gazetteer of 1931 as 'the backbone of cultivation in
the area', used to be known, up to twenty-odd years ago,
as the Holeyas or Holeaveru. They were in the past
the hereditary serfs of the dominant cultivators of
Mysore State. According to Thurston their specialis¬
ation in agriculture was given recognition by the fact
that a Holeya was always called in to settle a land
dispute. (Thurston,1909)• This.custom has fallen
into disuse today, possibly since the introduction of
official land tribunals. The Holejvaru are striving
for upward mobility today while doing their best to
make use of Government protective policies for the
Scheduled Castes. Having annexed Gandhi's term
Harijan (child of God) for their jati appellation
they have succeeded in getting it accepted, at least
in Mysore District. As Harper notes, they are stri¬
ving to substitute criteria of achievement, an aspect
of class, rather than that of ascription, an aspect
of caste, which is a radical change. He suggests
that their desire to better themselves is aimed at a
kind of ideal and general vision of middle-class Indi¬
an culture (Harper,1968). A number of Mysore Hari-
jans have succeeded in availing themselves of the Gov¬
ernment legislation on behalf of the Scheduled Castes
to obtain for themselves reserved places in schools,
colleges, Government service and the State legislat¬
ure, and some have become Ministers in the State Gov¬
ernment. One of these, a recent Minister for Forests,
gave a huge acreage of Reserved Forest, land in the Yel-
andur taluk adjoining Chamarajana gar Reserved Forest
land to landless labourers of his jati to cultivate.
Moreover, where Harijan tenants held land from 'feudal'
patrons in return for hereditary service the 19^7 Tena¬
ncy Act gave them permanent rights to the land at limit¬
ed rent, and some have achieved outright ownership of
their holdings. A steadily increasing number of them
enrol in the State schools in the taluk, and there is
a large hostel in the town which provides accommodation
for Scheduled Caste students.
According to Scarlett Epstein, population growth
and the introduction of a cash economy have upset the
traditional balance between supply and demand for labour
in Mysore and thus introduced an element of instability
in labour relations. This has improved the position of
rich employers,who can draw on cheap migrant labour,and
caused a deterioration in that of poor resident labour¬
ers (Epstein,1973 ) • While migrant labour had not yet
had much impact in Chamarajanagar while I was there
instability was certainly apparent in labour relations.
Here Harijans are becoming conscious of their numerical
strength and the success of some of their individual
members had made them aware, unlike the two untouch¬
able castes beneath them in the local hierarchy, that
upward mobility is feasible. As Marc Galanter ob¬
serves, the higher groups among the untouchable castes
are the greatest beneficiaries of Government legislation
on their behalf, and their disabilities have declined
more than those of the lower groups such as sweepers
(Galanter,1972). The Harijans are occupationally
'clean', their untouchability deriving from their trad¬
itional beef-eating, and that is eschewed by upwardly
mobile members of the jati. Among the fifty low caste
couples from villages adjacent to the town covered by my
1979-80 survey were three or four who had succeeded in
breaking through the barrier, having achieved education,
a reasonable and secure income in a Government job, and
acceptance as 'cultured' middle-class worthies. Never¬
theless as a community they have not taken off. There
is a general feeling among the higher castes that they
are getting above themselves, and Government discrimin¬
ation in their favour has aroused resentment. As ind¬
ividuals they are often subjected to slights and inequi¬
table treatment by the high castes.
The ritual element of caste as embodied in ideas
about purity^vhich in this taluk may derive as much from
Lingayats as from Brahmans, is still tenacious, though
fast diminishing. On the face of it this should pre¬
sent the Harijans with a quandary of the sort described
by Jonathan Parry in the case of the Koli caste of Kan-
gra, (Parry,1970), but in fact the Harijan jati of our
taluk appear to be unaware of any incongruity in trying
to move forward or up along three different, and some¬
times conflicting routes at once, those of Westernis¬
ation, sanskritisation and political power. They demand
land in return for votes and, as landowners, are
assiduous in asserting their rights. An interesting
sidelight on the increasing emphasis their leaders
place on the power of the vote is the recent legis¬
lation brought in by a Harijan Minister for Education
in Karnataka forbidding Christian churches to provide
free schooling any more for Harijan children, the pur¬
pose of which seems to be to prevent their conversion
to Christianity, once a favourite method of attempt¬
ing to escape the caste system.
But the average Harijan family living in the
mixed-caste villages nearer the town or on the main
road, or in the one-caste hamlets of the interior hin¬
terland are not competing with anybody except their
neighbours. They are mostly peaceable but outspoken
people who work for long hours on their own or their
employers' land. Where they have amassed a little
surplus they tend to take time off in which to enjoy
it; apart from festival days these are the only holi¬
days they get. Their gods are local deities such as
Mariamma, Chamundisvari and Ayappa. Their women most¬
ly go out to work (especially in the more rural parts),
do not fear to make their presence felt, and many of
them think nothing of roundly abusing their husbands
in public, using the insulting neuter gender. Children
of both sexes are welcomed, since they both provide assu
ranee for old age, and bridewealth can be asked for
girls if the marriage is not between kin.
The Sholigas. The sixth jati chosen for the
paradigm is the aboriginal hill tribe, the Sholiga.
According to Max Weber a caste is not a tribe, (Weber,
19^8: pp.398-9). But a tribe can be, and normally is,
categorised as a caste by themselves and others. There
are in fact two Sholiga tribes, the Eid Kula (five clans
and the Yerl Kula (seven clans). The latter inhabit the
Plateau territory east of the Billigirirangan hills,
speak a dialect of Tamil and have little connection with
our area. The Eid Kula Sholiga also call themselves
Mallaikadaveru, or Rainforest People. They speak an
archaic form of Kannada and live on the Billigiriran-
gan hills and nowhere else. Traditionally, or until
about 25 years agosthey all lived in podu, small scat¬
tered settlements of mud and grass huts in the forests,
where they practised a primitive slash-and-burn hoe cul¬
tivation of ragi and pulses, moving on every seven years
when the soil was exhausted. They have now been sett¬
led in a number of larger podu by the Forest Department.
They are expert and knowledgeabl^gatherers, and supplement
their diet with a great variety of jungle gleanings, in¬
cluding fruit, fungi, four varieties of tuber, and honey
from the tree and cliff hives of wild bees. They also
trap deer (illegally) or poach them with hammer-fired or
even muzzle—loading guns which are concealed, with equal
ingenuity and illegality)from the prying eyes of forest
officials and conservationists. They trap, or shoot,
wild pig when they can, as well as birds and smaller anim¬
als such as the Malabar squirrel and the Grey Langur mon¬
key. They used to rely on trained observation to inter¬
pret the movements of wild animals in the forests and on
the open hillsides of the range, and were adept at travel¬
ling in darkness. The older Sholigas still have hearing
highly attuned to animal movement and sound. To walk in
the hills with an old Sholiga is to experience new dimen¬
sions in perception. They are also skilful trackers and
tree-climbers. Most of them work from time to time for
the Forest Department at the collection of forest produce
such as lichen, when they are not too busy with their own
gathering or rather slipshod cultivation, and many of them
are employed on the coffee estates, either at such tasks
as thinning shade trees or during the crop-picking season.
They also sell surplus jungle produce at local weekly shan-
tis or markets in hamlets at the foot of the hills. The
women engage in the same activities as do the men except for
tree-climbing for honey or to lop shade on the estates.
The chief Sholiga origin myth (there are
others) claims descent from a supernatural mother-
figure, Niri Sholigayya, whc bore their folk-hero
Karayya. They also claim that Ranga, the god of
the hills, is their brother-in-law, since he married
a Sholiga girl, and this, they say, is what gives
them the right to pull the chariot of the deity at
his festival held in the Billigirirangan devastana
in the Western foothills of the range.
Among the Sholigas are hereditary special¬
ists of both sexes, healers and sorcerors « Sholigas
do not believe in metempsychosis and, asked what hap¬
pens after death, generally reply, "Who knows ?" . One
man added to me, laughing ruefully, "We just bury and
forget." But it seems likely that there was some
traditional belief in life after death, since their
dead are buried with ornaments and sometimes with art¬
efacts. They believe that everyone has two souls,
which are sisters, and that death only occurs when
both souls depart the body together. Hereditary
priests called tammadi who are teachers and diviners
besides doing the normal worik of a lay Sholiga, seek
supernatural counsel in a state of trance or possess¬
ion. There are two main Sholiga festivals in the year,
the Rotihabba or bread festival, and the Hosa Ragi Habba,
festival of the new ragi, or harvest festival. At both
of these the assembled Sholiga men and women sing and
dance all night.
Sholiga fathers treat their daughters with
affection and regard them with esteem. The parents do
not interfere with their daughters' choice of mate and
daughters take care of their parents in old age if the
sons fail them. One Sholiga woman said to me, "It is
better to have a daughter, because daughters will al¬
ways give their parents food, while it is not at all
certain that sons will." On the whole husbands and
wives seem to live and let live except in the case of
infidelity^which can lead to violent quarrels and di¬
vorce. Men are expected to show great respect to
their parents-in-law, but women tend to resent their
mothers-in-law and sometimes refuse to share a house
with them. Of all the communities in the taluk the
status of women among the Sholiga is the highest.
In recent years the State Government has
tried with some success to 'uplift' the Sholigas and
pin them down to a few large reservations by giving
them forest land and encouraging them to become cult¬
ivators, for which they show little talent. In one
settlement brick-and-tile houses were built for them,
but they are only used for the storage of grain. As
one Sholiga explained, "When someone dies we burn down
that house and build a new one. How can you burn down
a brick house ?".
Some Sholigas are not on the whole averse to
the attempts to integrate them, and are beginning to
adopt the values of the wider society, to the extent of
appearing somewhat embarrassed by those of their tradit¬
ional norms, such as marriage by elopement, which they
are learning to regard as uncouth. At the same time
some of the younger ones have lost, or are losing, the
arts of tracking and other techniques essential to the
tribe in the past for hunting and gathering.
There is, moreover, a deep sense of loss of
identity, especially among old Sholiga, expressed in
almost inarticulate bewailing of the loss of their her¬
itage. This may be manifested in sudden decisions to
return to the old ways. In one case a group of Sholiga
some employed on the estate on a permanent basis, and in
eluding one who had become quite well-off and successful
by Sholiga standards, owning lands at the foot of the
hills, decided to return to the site of a remote podu<
in the wildest part of the hills, which had been abandon
ed over thirty years previously, and to settle there.
Asked what had led them to this decision, one old man
replied gravely, "It was in our hearts."
The focus of this chapter must now converge
upon those aspects of caste culture, specifically
those of our six representative communities, salient
in reference to the study of fertility in the taluk.
Ultimately I believe that these can be reduced to three
main considerations: the status of women; expectations
based on jati culture; and predisposition towards West¬
ernisation. Age at effective marriage, length of lac¬
tation, and length of post-partum abstinence, varied
among the groups surveyed, as did the type of fertility
control used by members of these groups, but although it
does appear that these practices had an effect on the dif¬
ferential fertility of these groups, as did such community-
linked variables as economic and educational status, I be-
not
lieve that thejsolution doesAlie in simple multi-cultural
variation alone. Behind these as a rule minor differ¬
ences I suspect that more fundamental causes await
resolution.
The six jati described above, which not only re¬
present a cross-section of society in the taluk but, num¬
erically speaking, the major portion of it, fall into two
well-defined groups. On the one hand are the Lingayats
and the other high castes; on the other hand are the Sho-
ligas and the other two low castes, Upuligas and Harijans.
The first or high-caste group prohibit divorce for both
sexes and remarriage for females, tend to restrict females
on the grounds of preservation of their purity, do not
approve of their wives working and earning outside the
household, and have a ritually justified perception of
female inferiority. (This may be contrary to true Ling-
ayat doctrine, but the average Chamarajanagar Lingayat has
more or less re-embraced Hindu orthodoxy in such matters).
While dowry is not a south Indian tradition except among
Brahmans, the custom is creeping in, although now declared
illegal, and prestations on the bride's side are expected to
be more munificent than on that of the groom's. Altogether,
for this group, daughters' weddings cost a lot more than
those of sons.
The second, or lower-caste group, have institution-
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alised divorce, and re-marriage after divorce or
widowhood for both sexes, do not restrict females,
who on the whole are expected to work and earn, are
not particularly concerned with female purity, and
have no ritually justified sense of female inferiority,
(although among Harijans at least women are still to
a considerable extent second-class citizens). These
groups have a tradition of thera or bridewealth. Among
Harijan^this is the perquisite (supposedly) of the wo¬
men in the bride's natal family. Among Sholigas it
constitutes the groom's family's payment for the wedding
feast and gifts to the bride and her family. It may
also include manual service by the groom for the bride's
parents for a given period.
This dichotomy exemplifies the divide between
'sanskritised' and 'unsanskritised' groups. (I employ
Srinivas's usage since none of his critics have come up
with a more heuristically useful one and I am prepared to
accept his purport myself). Looked at another way it sym¬
bolises the division between north Indian, strongly mascu-
linist culture and south Indian weakly masculinist culture
proposed by Sopher et al., Miller, Dyson and Moore. Now
the crucial point here is that the North has high fertility,
while the South has comparatively low fertility. This has
also been remarked upon by J.Caldwell, who reminds us of
the fact that the births-ate in Karnataka in the early 1980s
is only 28 compared to 33 for all India while in the other
south Indian states the fertility rate is even lower.
(Caldwell, 1982).
In view of all this, low fertility might have
been expected of all the lower-caste or unsanskritised
groups and higher fertility of the higher-caste or sans-
kritised groups. In the event this supposition was only
partially proved correct in the Chamarajanagar context.
The Sholiga, among whom the women are more independent
than is the case in any other of the caste-groups studied
had the lowest fertility of all. But Lingayats and other
high castes had lower fertility than that of the two
low-caste jati This, I believe, is mainly due to the
intervention of Westernisation among these groups.
•Status summation' still exists in the area to the
extent that, on average, those of higher caste are
better off than those of lower caste. Being well
off they can afford to give their children the coveted
education, especially higher education, which makes for
Westernisation, which leads among other things to reduc¬
tion in family size if only because of the cost of educ¬
ation. If this seems like tautology, there i_£ a kind
of spiral of cause and effect involved. Moreover, Brah-
mans and Lingayats have a scholastic tradition, which,
as Srinivas points out, may be a prelude to Westernisation,
and since members of these communities, especially Ling¬
ayats, formed a large proportion of the high-caste groups
surveyed, the intervention of education might be expected
to affect the fertility of these groups. It also appeared
that the expectation of education for the children of the
poorer Lingayats, was an intervening, factor. In Caldwell's
terms, where parents see the education of their children
as a valued asset, so that wealth flows from the older to
the younger generation, a reduction of fertility is to be
expected. I can think of no other reason for the fact
that the more impoverished section of the Lingayat group
surveyed had lower fertility than that of the better-off
section, and the comments of respondents tend to confirm
this theory. This point will be raised again in an ensu¬
ing chapter.
Lastly, it should be mentioned here, though the
matter will be enlarged upon in the chapter on Methodology,
that by the time the survey was finally undertaken the
breakdown of the communities chosen as representative of
the taluk social structure had been slightly modified.
Because the huge and ubiquitous Lingayat group is intern¬
ally stratified on economic grounds, it was decided that
they should be divided into two groups labelled
Richer and Poorer. In the same way the two low
castes were divided into two groups, basically more
urban and less urban. Members of other high castes,
such as Brahmans, Vaisyas and Ursus, were interviewed
along with Banajigas and Jettis. The six groups
which resulted from this taxonomy were thus no longer
single communities, except in the case of the Sholiga,
but categories of communities, although they included
all those which have been discussed at some length in
this chapter.
CHAPTER III
THE STATUS OF WOMEN
In his essay, The Position of Women in Primitive
Societies and Our Own, the anthropologist E.Evans-Pritchard
declared that in all societies men have been, and are, in
the ascendancy. Relations between the sexes being deter¬
mined by 'imponderables', he claimed, it followed that the
issue of the status of women went beyond the scope of soc¬
iological analysis and was 'fundamentally a moral question'
(Evans-Prit chard,1963» p.5^)«
Whether moral, sociological or both the subject
has been a controversial one for a long time. Unconformist
thinkers, from Aristophanes to Mary Wollstonecraft to Simon
de Beauvoir have through the centuries brought it to the
attention of their respective compatriots, albeit without
achieving much alteration in the status quo, at least in
their day. It is only recently that the trickle of debate
and protest has become a flood and made the literate world
aware that the issue(which Evans-Pritchard considered so
unimportant that for years he thought his paper did not
warrant publication) was not going to go away.
Although the evolutionary theories of the earlier
nineteenth-century anthropologists such as Morgan and
McLennan, which envisaged a progression of stages from
Matriarchy to Patriarchy have been largely discredited,
it does seem to have been established that the more techno¬
logically 'primitive' a society is the more egalitarian its
structure tends to be. Why this is so is a matter of opin
ion. According to Engels the inferior status of women is
due to their role in production and is exemplified in the
A
family role, in which the wife plays the proletariat to
the husband's bourgeosie. The emancipation of women, he
wrote, was primarily dependent on the re-introduction of
the whole female sex into the public industries.
'To accomplish this the monogamous family-
must cease to be the industrial unit of
society... .Monogamy rose through the con¬
centration of...wealth in one hand - a
man's hand - and from the endeavour to
bequeath this wealth to the children of
this man to the exclusion of all others.
....With the transformation of the means
of production into collective property
the monogamous family ceases to be the
economic unit of society' (Engels,
1902,pp.90-92) .
Karen Sacks is not convinced by Engel's theory
that male property ownership is the basis for male sup¬
remacy in class societies.
'It seems likely that in class societies
the subordinate position of women derives
notjfrom domestic property relations but
from something outside the household that
denies women adult social status' (Sacks,
1979, p.221)
This 'something', she suggests, was the preference for men
in production by the ruling classes because of their gre¬
ater mobility and freedom from the need of time off in
which to rear children. A system of differential worth
was thus established. 'In return for the loss of econ¬
omic autonomy(the ruling classes) conferred on man exclu¬
sive social adulthood and guardianship of women' (Sacks
op. cit. p. 222). Once women had been established as
domestic wards they were easily exploitable as cheap labour
under industrial capitalism. Thus for Sacks the concept
of social adulthood is the key aspect of the question of
women's status. She believes that this condition can only
be acquired through equal participation in social production
Kathleen Gough argues that women have greater pow¬
er and independence in hunter-gatherer societies because
they are important food providers. She reminds us that
these societies lack the kind of male possessiveness which
leads to the ideas of male honour and female shame concern-
concerning virginity, divorce, remarriage and adultery.
She agrees with Engels that the power of men to exploit
others, especially women, arose with the amassing of
surplus wealth and the rise of the state, but does not
think that there are 'class* divisions between the sexes
in 'primitive* societies, although they do mostly live-
contrary to what Engels believed - in nuclear families
( Gough , 197 1) .
If Marxist theorists are at variance as to the
provenance of Woman's Place, the 'biological differences'
theory which seeks to explain male predominance in terms
of their innate ability to undertake tasks more effici¬
ently than females are able to do, also fails to convince
when it is remembered - as Margaret Meade (1949) and
William Goode (1964) have pointed out-that while what are
regarded as .male and ferna,le tasks vary from culture to
/in any given culture,q
culturejflt is the male tasks which are given the highest
value. Thus where women hoe and men weave weaving is
regarded as the more difficult, demanding and important
task. But where men hoe and women weave women are re¬
garded as only fit for weaving since hoeing is 'man's work'.
Paula England suggests that in the modern sector the pres¬
tige of an occupation remains the same whether men or wo¬
men are mostly in it, (e.g. teaching, surgery),but where
men and women are in face»torface work-contact equality
seldom exists. Doctors and pilots are predominantly male,
nurses and air-hostesses predominantly female. This is
of course a question of the continuity and survival of cus¬
tomary behaviour rooted in the past the effect of which can
be seen in what Colette Dowling calls women's 'hidden fear
of independence* (Dowling 19^1), so that they tend to
choose, or let their parents choose for them, to be trained
for the less responsible jobs or what are regarded as such
in their own societies.
Veronica Beechey suggests that the theory of bio¬
logical differences is less significant than the different
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forms of social construction of gender and the forms of
social institution in which patriarchy exists in differ¬
ent societies. 'Different forms of domination can be
expected to be experienced by women in different social
institutions' (Beechey, 1979). While this appears to
be true enough it is hardly explanatory, except in terms
of a plea for accuracy on the part of Marxist feminists.
Maureen Mcintosh's historical exposition fails likewise
as a satisfactory exegesis when she writes,
'It is not the 'domestic community' which
has existed from pre-history, but female
subordination. Control of women's fer¬
tility and sexuality, labour and progeny
has always been sought by dominant groups
and classes as one means of control of
reproduction of the social system.*
(Mcintosh, 1977,ppl26-127)
The trouble with this rendering is that we really don't
know what went on in pre-history, and when it comes to
seeking parallels in present or recent 'primitive* so¬
cieties we frequently find more sex egalitarianism
among these people than is found in any of the more com¬
plex societies. Evidence for the subordination of females
is also lacking for the first civilisations. Perhaps it
was associated with the rise of the nation state, although
this theory is hardly a definitive one either. Judith
Brown, among others, postulates their responsibility for
child care as the limiting factor for women. They are
capable of doing any work that men can do as long as there
is someone else around to look after the children (Brown,
1970). This is a common-sense proposal and one which Sri-
nivas also implied when he said that professional women in
India with children were in a better position to carry on
with their careers than Western women because they had joint
families or servants to care for their children (Srinivas,
1975). But the ethnographic facts, in Chamarajanagar at
least, do not support it. There the women in the best
position to leave their children in the care of others are
the high caste wives living in orthodox joint families
where the children all play and are fed together, cared
for by affines and servants, yet these tend to be also
the most restricted of all Chamarajanagar women. Clearly
intervening factors have to be distinguished to clarify
Brown's submission.
Sherry Ortner sees women's generally inferior
status as due to a world-wide assumption (among men at
least) that women are more closely associated with'nature'
because of their reproductive functions, while men are
associated with 'culture' . Since 'culture ' seems to have
been universally regarded, at least in the past, as trans¬
cending 'nature' this accounts for women's lower position
perceptually (Ortner, 197^)« Ortner's position re¬
sembles,up to a point, that of Edwin Ardener, who also
sees the problem in terms of the nature/culture dichotomy.
However he regards the dichotomy as a matter of the per¬
ceptions of both sexes. Parts of female experience may
seem 'wild' and threatening to men just as parts of male
experience (e.g., war) may seem 'wild' and threatening to
women. He suggests that the one-sided view of the male
as representing 'culture' is simply due to the fact that
anthropologists have been, at least until recently, either
men or women trained to think like men (Ardener,1972).
This way of looking at the question as one of two co-exist
ent conceptual systems, the oft-stated male and the until
recently unstated female, is an interesting exercise in
lateral thinking which is upheld by the way some Chamaraja
nagar women, not restricted to any one community, seem to
envisage the relationship between the sexes. As they saw
it men were permanently prone to fall into evil ways unles
guided or controlled by good women. I will come back to
these attitudes later. Their relevance here is the way
they confirm Ardener's view that the nature/culture arche
type is not the sole prerogative of the male sex.
from
Turning perception to practicalities, a United
Nations report published in 1980 sums up well enough the
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situation as it still exists today in spite of a growing
chorus of protest. Women, it seems, still constitute
half the world's population and perform nearly two-thirds
of its work hours, while receiving one-tenth of its in¬
come and owning less than one hundredth of its property.
The situation in India epitomises this state of affairs,
contrary to what might be supposed of a nation led by a
powerful female prime minister. Robert Cassen observes
that the prominence of women in professional and public
life may mislead foreigners into thinking that India is
unusually liberal in its treatment of women, whereas on
the contrary women, apart from the emancipated few, are
as oppressed as anywhere in the world (Cassen, 1978).
While it seems that Islam may have been partly
instrumental in promoting the institution of purdah **
i.e. veiling and total restriction amounting to immure¬
ment in north India, and the role of women in orthodox
Muslim communities is probably even more subservient than
that of high caste Hindu women, at least in south India,
the majority of Indian women are Hindus and, according to
A.N. Altekar, it is largely the doctrines of post-Upani-
shadic Hindu orthodoxy which is responsible for the dis¬
abilities endured by them. Historically, he says, the
position of Indian women has deteriorated steadily since
the virtual equality they enjoyed in the Vedic age, and
has only begun to improve with the advent of modernisa¬
tion in the past century (Altekar, 1956). Certainly,
whatever their position was earlier, the laws of the
Brahman Manu, who lived sometime between 200 B.C. and
200 A.D., not only forbade to women the study of the
Vedas but condemned them to perpetual tutelage, first
under the father, then the husbandj then the son.
* * But see D. Jacob son in Jacob son 8c Wadley,1977,
who suggests that the institution of purdah in
India has ancient Hindu as well as Islamic origins.
The attitudes exemplified by these laws persist even
today. The high caste wife in an orthodox household
is more or less immured, depending on the orthodoxy of
the household head, and, even in south India, is expect-
to regard her husband as a god, cannot address him by
name, uses the honorific plural in speech to him (while
he addresses her in the singular reserved for inferiors),
and cannot eat before he does so that if he comes home
late she must remain hungry. In the past her position
as an inauspicious widow, shaven-headed and shunned,
could only be avoided by pre-deceasing her spouse, for
which every pious woman was supposed to pray, or being
burned alive on his funeral pyre. (Among the low caster,
by contrast, widows may and often do remarry).
This scripture-ordained harshness has been echo¬
ed by the status accorded to women in kinship and marri¬
age regulations, especially in north India and among the
high castes, through the idea that they pass as append¬
ages from their father's lineage to that of their husband
so that women's names are not preserved in traditional
genealogies. This has affected their right to inherit¬
ance. In customary Hindu law women had almost no pro¬
prietary rights and where property was left to them by
compassionate fathers, husbands or brothers (as happens
quite often in the South), it was only for their support
in their lifetime. The Hindu Succession Act of 1956 was
intended to redress these inequities but in most parts of
India it is still ignored by the orthodox unless it be¬
comes expedient to pass property to a wife or daughter
for fiscal reasons or to get round land-ceiling laws.
All this being said^ two riders should be added.
Firstly even in north India the position of low caste
women, within their own castes, is less restricted,
partly at least because they have always had to under¬
take extra-mural work for wages for the family to survive
As M.N. Srinivas reminds us, the relationship between men
and women in the low castes is more egalitarian than in
the high castes, and when lower castes try to achieve
upward mobility by ' sanskritisation' one of the con¬
sequences is the lowering of the status of women in
that caste (Srinivas, 1975). And secondly the
situation in the four States of south India appears
to have been, and is still, traditionally better for
women except in the case of a few high castes. It
will be recalled from the introduction to this thesis
that Barbara Miller (1981), Tim Dyson and Mick Moore
(1983), and the contributors to D.E. Sopher's An Explor¬
ation of India (1980) all concluded that the status of
women in south India was a good deal better than it is
in the North. Among the suggested reasons for this
situation was that women may inherit property in the
South. Land ownership by either sex is of course a
world-wide index of high, prestige. See S. Salamon and
M. Klein (1979)» J« Goody (1976) and E. Boserup (1970).
80th Goody and Boserup relate the status of women in dif¬
ferent societies to patterns of agricultural development:
Animal husbandry and plough cultivation are associated
more
with male dominance, hoe cultivation with less male dom-
A
inance. Likewise dry-land and wheat cultivation are
associated with 'higher masculinity', while rice and
wet-land cultivation go with 'lower masculinity' It
is significant that the Sholiga tribe, who traditionally
own no cattle and cultivate by hoe, which both sexes use,
enjoys a fairly high degree of sex equality. A few high
caste women of my acquaintance in Chamarajnagar had in¬
herited property from their fathers or been given some by
a brother for their support if and when widowed, but most
of the female landowners I came across were low caste
women who had either inherited land from a parent (some¬
times from a mother or grandmother) or had bought it out
of her savings from earned income and was working it her¬
self with the aid of kin or paid employees. In all these
cases the husband had no control over the property, all
decisions concerning which were recognised as the woman's
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personal prerogative. Jack Goody also associates
'diverging devolution', i.e. inheritance by daughters
as well as sons, as in Sri Lanka, with intensive cul¬
tivation. South Indian low caste societies appear to
echo;in varying degrees, the cultural model of Sri
Lanka in both production and inheritance (Goody,1976).
One local Harijan female landowner was so rich and paid
so well that, as a high caste informant told me in awed
tones, "People of any caste will work for her".
Certainly there are many hints of past sex egal-
itarianism in the history and the kinship systems of south
India and Sri Lanka. Basham tells us that women in poli¬
tics were not unusual in the South and there were cases of
queens leading their troops in warfare (cf.Thapar 1966,
Basham 1971» Nilakanta Sastri 1958,1963). Srinivas,
writing on the past history of the Coorgs, Dumont on the
Kallar, and Yalman on Sri Lanka and south India, all con¬
firm that in these communities there is a tradition that
the position of women was much higher and freer in the past
before the spread of *sanskritisation'. It should be no¬
ted here, however, that the>idea that Brahmans came in per¬
son to the South from the North bringing 'sanskritic' ide¬
ology with them has been strongly criticised, (see Burton
Stein,1980). Since modern historians now accept that the
Brahmans have been in south India as long as anyone else,
the depreciation of women in Brahman or 'sanskritic' ortho¬
doxy cannot be said to have originated in the North. The
fact that women are more undervalued there than in the
South seems to derive from different sources, not just the
influence of Islam, which places the North in the 'high
masculinity' belt reaching from the Mediterranean through
the Middle East and Pakistan.
Whatever the situation regarding women's role may
have been in the past a study of the collective represent-
iconcerning women)
ations^as expressed by the males of Chamarajanagar reveals
that they conflict. High caste male attidues towards the
opposite sex are extremely ambivalent, reflecting dual images
in binary opposition: the pure and the impure; the
vulnerable and the potent; the auspicious married mother,
associated with the sacred cow, and the intrinsically dan¬
gerous temptress, threatening a man's ascetic control of
his sexuality and thus undermining his spiritual strength.
Attached to the theme of temptress are such projections as
the notion that women desire sex more than men do and are
less capable of controlling their own desire, thus attest¬
ing to the necessity for keeping them subservient. In
the Sastras, the classical texts, the female is seen on
the one hand as the active aspect of spiritual power and
on the other as a dependent creature requiring constant
supervision to protect her from the consequences of her
frailty, which include the dishonour of her male relatives.
Quoting the Tamil proverb, 'Siva without Sakti is
a corpse', Susan Wadley writes,
•As Sakti, the power or energy of the universe,
the goddess provides the motivating force for
the passive or inactive male: without the sakti
of his goddess no male god can act....The goddess
as Sakti,^ as Devi, as the Amman of south India or
as one of^more concrete manifestations, such as
Durga, Kali, Parvati or Lakshmi, provides a back¬
drop that is fundamental to understanding Hindu
women..... women who like the goddesses are feared,
must....be kept under male control. Through male
control and her own chastity the Hindu woman con¬
trols her dangerous sacred powers and is able to
use them for the benefit of her family. Further
there is strong evidence that the attribution of
sacred powers to women derives from the beliefs
and practices of the indigenous peoples of India
and images of sacred females are prevalent in the
earliest Tamil literature' (Wadley, 1980)
Sheryl Daniel shows how this south Indian perception of the
sacred power of the female leads to problems with conflicting
models in marriage. In the course of the same conversation
a man may refer in different contexts to the superiority of
the husband, to the superiority of the wife, and to the equal¬
ity of the sexes (Daniel, 1980). This plurality of atti¬
tude is a common feature of south Karnataka cultture too and
perhaps accounts for the idea expressed by many Chama-
rajanagar wives that men are naturally immoral (a good
example of Ardener's premise of two coexistent concept¬
ual systems). A common argument against divorce cited
by those high caste women who disapproved of it was that
the husband would inevitably go wrong if abandoned by his
wife to his own devices. "Men don't have any moral sense",
as a Lingayat wife put it. Under the tutelage and good
example of the wife a man may improve even if he starts
off bad, but he can't keep it up on his own. The idea
that it was possible to reform an erring husband was per¬
sistent among all but the Westernised high Castes. Among
the low castes, where divorce is institutionalised, the
principal female argument against it was that the second
husband was likely to be just as bad as the first.
Apart from a general agreement that, mentally and
physically, men are strong and women are weak, the ration¬
alisation of female subordination by Chamarajanagar men
followed two lines of argument, the one ritual and the
other economic. As with those referring to the caste
system, the ritual element stemmed from the higher and
the economic from the lower end of the social order. To
deal with the ritual theory first, this holds, in brief,
that women are more susceptible to pollution than men are.
And once defiled, they are less amenable to purification.
An orthodox Brahman of Chamarajanagar explained it to me
in these terms:
"The female is like an earthenware pot,
which is porous and therefore not easily
cleaned. If contaminated the pot must be
thrown away. The male, on the other hand,
is like a brass pot. If polluted it can
be scrubbed and retained."
The symbolism is based on that used in the dharmsastras.
Furthermore, being at risk of impregnation from
puberty to menopause, the female must be protected whether
or not she wishes to be, and such protection implies control
Nur Yalman insists that beliefs about the transmission
of caste through 'blood' are the chief reasons for the
enormous importance attached by high castes to the
'purity' of women. 'The bond between the genitor and
the child is tenuous; it can always be denied.or... .
repudiated by the father. This cannot be done by the
mother' (Yalman , 196-3 ) . The only way of keeping pure
castes pure, the argument runs, is to control the women's
freedom. As Jane Schneider says, cultural stress on
and ideology of men's 'honour' and women's 'shame' lead¬
ing to a preoccupation with the virginity of daughters
and sisters, 'serves both to define and enhance the patri¬
monies of families and to define the family as a corporate
group' (Schneider, 1971, p.21).
let a1.1
As L. Fruze11i^translate south Indian kinship
ideology, caste purity is situated in a person's blood.
'Blood' in this sense does not express a straightforward
biological quality exactly but combines mythic, symbolic
and organic connotations. Condensed 'blood' can become
semen in a man and breast milk in a woman. The child is
formed from these aspects of condensed 'blood' as well as
from the mother's blood directly transferred from the
womb. Blood purity can be divided into two aspects,
body or matter and spirit or motion, the former being
the male aspect of blood and the latter the female. When
a woman marries the bodily aspect of her blood becomes
identical with that of her husband while the spiritual
aspect remains unchanged.
'Blood purity shared by all caste members
situates a caste in the hierarchy of all
castes. The person is created from a
particular combination of caste blood
purity... .within the smallest hierarchical
sub-division, the kindred. Since a person's
blood purityi alters given the way he acts
in the worldthe kindred emerges as that unit
of action which guarantees a particular code
of conduct .... The kindred bounds a partic¬
ular range of blood purity and provides a
mechanism for passing that range of blood
purity from both parents to children'
(Fruzetti et al., 1976, pp.l63-l65).
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The children of mother's sisters share the spirit or
motion aspect of 'blood' and those of father's brothers
the bodily aspect. For this reason the marriage of
parallel cousins is regarded as incestuous. Cross-
cousin and sister's daughter marriage, the preferred
forms in south India, provide on the other hand the
best possible exchange of blood aspects within the
kindre d.
In north India, according to Henry Orenstein's
interpretation ofthe relevant passages in the dharmasas-
tras, it is also believed that a woman's 'bodily substance!,
which consists of atom-like particles, becomes transmitted
from that of her father's line to that of her husband's in
the course of the wedding ceremony, (Orenstein,1970). Both
Kenneth David and A.T. Carter claim that in their fieldwork
areas this is a recognised concept (David 1973,Orenstein
1973). However, I could not find anybody in Chamaraja-
nagar, from Brahman to scavenger, who had ever heard of it.
On being asked people would usually enquire, after a slight¬
ly stunned silence, "But how can that be ?" Attempts were
made to answer the question helpfully: well, sometimes
women put on weight after marriage. A bride's face glows
after marriage. (Voice from the back of the group: "So
does a bridegroom's"). Most people suggested that the
change, if change there were, must be psychological. "She
knows that henceforth she must follow her husband and his
kin in all things".
Nobody even offered me the south Indian version
by which the wife retains the female aspect of her 'blood'
in marriage. One supposes that^these ideas, embodied as
they are in fairly esoteric texts, are not part of the
common coinage of Chamarajana gar thought, whatever may
be the case with David's Jaffna Tamils or Carter's Maha-
rashtrians. In any case they are subject to differing
interpretations.
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As S. J. Tambiah says,
'
. . . . .the core of the Indian conception
of the joint family, as first embedded
in the classical Dharmasatric law texts,
then later interpreted by modern Hindu
law, focuses on relations between per¬
sons in terms of their interests in
propertyTambiah and Goody,1973iP«75).
Viewed in these terms the following passage, 'A maiden
becomes one with her husband in Pinda and gotra and is
detached from the gotra of her father at the seventh
step', could mean that after the seven steps the bridal
pair take round the holy fire during the marriage rites
the bride is no longer entitled to maintenance by her
father and his agnates since this duty now devolves on
her husband and his agnates. One educated Chamarajanagar
Brahman whose opinion I canvassed on the subject protested
that the change of 'bodily substance' credo was irrecon-
ciliable with the close ties a woman retains with her par¬
ents and siblings in south India. As the widowed father
of four beloved daughters his common—sense objection high¬
lights a conflict of values which, if not explicitly recog¬
nised, is very noticeable among the higher castes in Chama¬
ra janagar . There is a strong sentiment that when the loved
and petted daughters marry their love for members of their
natal household should remain unimpaired, as does the natal
household's love for them. This was often put to me as a
justification for genealogical cross-cousin or avuncular
marriage. At the same time a wife is expected, at least
in theory and by her mother-in-law, to adapt totally to
her husband's family and to transfer her affection to it.
Close cross-cousin and avuncular marriage, where interact¬
ion between the bride's and groom's households is generally
continuous, resolves this paradoxical conflict and provides
a solution to the puzzle.
Among the low castes the economic rationalisation
is paramount. Women are not depreciated for any of the rea¬
sons given above or on account of the fact that they are
forbidden to perform rites ensuring the salvation of
the father. They do perform rites in the context of
the general well-being and productivity of family unit
and village, and in any case sons are not obliged to
speed the deceased father's soul on its transmigratory
way among groups which do not adhere to the doctrine
of reincarnation. Judging by the comments of low caste
informants women in these castes are underrated simply
because they do not earn as much as men do. And the
reason why they do not earn so much is said to be because
they are physically weaker. The fact that they work
much longer hours than do the men because of their domes¬
tic role is regarded as irrelevant. There is also the
fact that after marriage a woman's earning power is lost
to her natal household and the same applies, in theory,
to her ability to support her parents in old age. However,
this disadvantage can be got round in these castes by the
Southern institution of the uxorilocal son-in-law.
Among the higher castes, whose women do not
earn if the household is 'sanskritised•, the economic ar¬
gument is different: the terrifying cost of a daughter's
wedding if the father is to hold up his head in society is
usually cited. There is also the question of dowry, al¬
though this is not very important in Chamarajanagar since
only a few castes apart from the Brahmans practise this
mainly north Indian institution. "vith most of the local
jati it is a case of an almost equal exchange of prestations.
But elsewhere in the country, with the advent in recent years
of increasing numbers of prospective bridegrooms with the kind
of foreign professional qualifications which lead to good
jobs in an era of unemployment it has given rise to gross
misuse of the institution, appallingly cruel exploitation
of young brides, and increasingly stringent Government le¬
gislation against the practice.
In Chamarajanagar the position of women is at
once a function of class and of caste culture. Among the
low castes, and even more so among the Sholigas,
where the division of labour among the sexes is
not clearly distinguished, their relative inde¬
pendence within the family unit is manifest. Their
exploitation comes as much from the castes above
them as from the men of their own castes. It is
low aasie.
true that the^women are frequently overworked or
forced into unwanted pregnancies by uncaring hus¬
bands who may beat them if they do not submit, but
a low caste woman can always divorce her husband or
just go home to her relations as long as she has any.
The eldest daughter of my low caste neighbour was
married to her mother's brother's son. When this
youth and his mother beat her for non-cooperation
she walked out and walked home to Somavarapet. Her
parents took her in and arranged for a divorce. She
subsequently made a love-marriage to an unrelated
man of her own jati and is now happily settled. Oc¬
casionally the beating situation is even reversed.
One respondent divulged that he had divorced his
first wife because she set about his father with a
broom. And it would have to be a sturdy husband
who would risk direct confrontation with a militant
Upuliga wife. As one of the plantation staff re¬
marked to me after describing an Upuliga family
fracas, "They seem to spend all their spare time
beating their husbands".
Nevertheless there is a general assump¬
tion among these unsanskritised jati too (with the
possible exception of the sholiga among whom the ex¬
istence of dual conceptual universes is at once clear,
in that the women tend to have a strong notion of their
importance in the tribal schema, and blurred in that
sex roles are relatively undifferentiated), that women's
affairs, including their work, are less important than
thost of men. An illustration of this occurred many
years ago when my mother changed the order in which
the bags of coffee beans were weighed in the evening
during the crop picking season. Finding that the women
had to wait until all the men's bags were weighed be¬
fore going home and starting to cook the evening meal,
she ruled that the women's should be weighed first.
This nearly brought about a strike of male labourers
until she pointed out that under the new dispensation
they would get their evening meal much earlier. Im¬
pressed by this logic the men complied without more
ado. But when I returned to the estate two decades
after my parents had departed the status quo had been
restored.
Among the vast group of Gowda (farmer) com¬
munities in the middle of the caste hierarchy where
women may work, or at least superintend, on the family
land, though not for wages, they still have a certain
amount of freedom and responsibility within the limits
of the farm. These groups also welcome daughters, as
do those in the jati below them, even though they may
be better pleased by the birth of sons. At the highest
end of the scale there is the small but growing group
of semi-Westernised or 'modernised' new elite, mostly
from high or fairly high castes, who have abandoned
'sanskritic' or orthodox ideals. In general the more
sophisticated a family is, the more the principie -
though not necessarily the practice - of the rights of
women is tacitly recognised. Though the Chamaraja-
nagar new elite are small provincials by the standards
of the top class stratum of Mysore or Bangalore, they
model themselves on the more 'liberal' city 'gentry',
but only up to the point where the activities of their
wives and daughters are limited by Chamarajanagar notions
of respectability.
Apart from the new elite the position of women
among the numerous orthodox and sanskritised high caste
communities in the taluk is manifestly inferior. Here
they are mostly restricted to the house after puberty
unless closely chaperoned by a male relative. They
do not even go shopping. All visits to the bazaar
are undertaken by servants, children or male house¬
hold members. They remain subordinate until - and
unless - the birth of sons eventually brings them
daughters-in-law and grandchildren, when if they are
lucky they may achieve the state of family matriarch
whose word is law. The first love and loyalty of
orthodox Hindu males is to their mothers, who in re¬
turn spoil their sons outrageously when they are
young, although the nature of the bond changes as the
men grow up, the mothers becoming at once more depend¬
ent on them and more demanding. The system of early
marriage helps to sustain the traditional image of the
woman's role, and it seems to be partly responsible for
the low level of education even among women in house¬
holds where the men are comparatively well educated.
The idea that there is no point in educating girls
"because they will only get married" dies hard among
these communities. Where they are educated at all
above secondary school the tendencv is to let them
stay 011 at college while a husband is sought for them,
but once an offer has been made and accepted by the
family match-makers she is committed to domesticity.
"How Can she go on with her studies ?" asked the bro¬
ther of a bright college girl in answer to the sugges¬
tion that she might complete her education after the
marriage arranged for when she was eighteen. "Her
mother-in-law wouldn't like it, and she'll have to do
housework for her husband's family". For another
girl, also high caste and with more or less the same
economic background but coming from and marrying into
families with more 'modern' views, the solution was
the completion of her Mysore University degree by cor¬
respondence course. She had married a young man whose
sister had married one of her elder brothers. These
'exchange' marriages are considered in Chamarajanagar to
redound very much to the advantage of the brides since
each one is in a sense a hostage for the other and can
thus expect a good deal of leniency. A third girl from
the same social background whose father was a liberal
Chamarajanagar Brahman, was able to take a first and
a higher degree in Mysore and to work at a job for two
or three years before marrying. She was the only daugh¬
ter of a widower and ruled him with affectionate firmness
One of the arguments against higher education
cited by Chamarajanagar worthies of the orthodox per¬
suasion is that it raises the age of marriage and thus
extends the dangerous period between puberty and mar¬
riage when the purity of girls is at risk. Although
the segregation of the sexes is not observed in the
South to anything like the lengths to which it is car¬
ried in north India, one of the often reiterated ex¬
cuses advanced in Chamarajaiiagar for not sending girls
to school or college or allowing them to have jobs is
the danger of their coming into social contact with
strange males. As Ursula Sharma points out, the whole
ideology of female purity and female sexual frailty,
necessitating female modesty, makes it difficult for
women, even when they have acquired qualifications, to
get jobs, on account of this prejudice against their
meeting men. Because of this segregation, she says,
it is difficult for women to achieve solidarity
(Sharma, 1978). Female solidarity in Chamarajanagar
is in fact more noticeable among the low castes, where
women get about outside the household and work in gumpu
or gangs, usually organised by a woman.
A further argument put forward against educa¬
ting women is that the higher the education of a woman
the more difficult it is to find a husband whose edu¬
cational status is equal to hers, or preferably higher
still. In the course of conversation an orthodox high
caste man protested to me that if women were educated
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to the same standard as men or allowed too much freedom
the result would be deleterious to the dignity of their
husbands. Asked whether he thought the role of Western
husbands with emancipated wives was an undignified one
he thought it over and replied with a worried expres¬
sion, "No, but you see it is not the same. Our wives
have to worship us as gods. How can they do that if
they have equality ?" A good question which epitom¬
ises what seems to be a deep-seated fear not confined
to Hindu India that the emancipation of women implies in
the loss of masculine superiority a further loss of mas¬
culine identity.
In fact, one of the difficulties encountered by
emancipated working women in India is that many men re¬
sent their independence and tend to look on them as 'fair
game' on the grounds that they have asked for trouble by
rejecting the 'modesty' traditionally expected of respect¬
able high caste females. Urban women travelling to
work alone in crowded buses and trains frequently have to
put up with pinching and pestering which they may not be
eqipp^ed to deal with.
The Education Commission (1964-1966) reported
that one of the most encouraging aspects of life in modern
India has been the development of education for women, in
view of the fact that at the beginning of the 19th century
there was virtually no provision at all in the country for
the formal education of girls. Nevertheless the all-India
literacy rate revealed by the 1971 census was l8.7 for
women compared to 39.5 for men. That there are only 246
female graduates to every 1000 male graduates seems a great
waste of the country's resources. There are still just
about 474 literate women to every 1000 literate men, and
of these so-called lit era t e f emale s about 40% are only
semi-literate in that they have not obtained any further
schooling after achieving basic literacy. Worse still,
the education ratio is declining. The quinquennial growth
rate in enrolment of girls in primary schools dropped from
56% in 1966 to 30.7% in 1971, and in secondary schools from
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70.6% in 1966 to 30.5% in 1971 (1971 census figures).
These statistics have been accompanied by a correspond¬
ing drop in the number of female graduates.
The figures for the economic participation of
women in India tell the same story. Meher Master shows
that the growth of industry and the development of modern
technology, along with the decline in cottage and handi¬
craft industries, has led to a corresponding decline in
the employment of women outside the home, since the new
jobs have become male preserves (Master,1980). Her
findings are confirmed by the report of the Indian Council
for Social Science Research on the status of women in
India (ICSSR 1975). Women's economic participation,
the authors claim, has been declining during the past
half century. For instance, the percentage of women work¬
ers in the total female population decreased from 4l.8
million in 1911 to 31.2 million in 1971, and this decline
is speeding up. Asked whether they approved of educating
women, many of the Chamarajanagar male informants answered
"No" on the grounds that educated and/or technically skil¬
led women would take jobs away from men. As unemployment
grows this attitude seems to be spreading and hardening.
It is true that there are now more service and pro¬
fessional jobs for women than in the past. But Ashok
Mitra reminds us that the participation sex ratio of female
workers per 10,000 males has only improved between 1966 and
1971 in one category, that of artists, writers, nurses,
teachers and technicians, with the great concentrations
remaining in the medical and teaching professions so com¬
monly regarded as 'suitable' for women (Mitra 1980). Work
in offices, banks and shops, where they come into contact
with strange males, is not considered suitable by parents
and hu sbands.
In rural India the great majority of women workers
for wages are agricultural labourers, mostly outrageously
exploited in that they are paid half the male wage for
equal work. Manual work is of course the least presti-
gous for both sexes, but even here there has been a decline
in female labour force participation. The all-India
sex ratio of women per 10,000 men among semi-skilled
and unskilled workers dropped from 3,436 in 1961 to
1,988 in 1971. As for the crafts and cottage indus¬
tries, once the great preserve of women workers, in
ftarnataka alone the ratio of women per 100 men in the
crafts dropped from l4o in 1961 to 63 in 1971 (Mitra,
op cit. , 1980 ) .
'Throughout the underdeveloped world' Mitra reminds us:
'a certain degradation and obsolescence of
skills hitherto wielded by women, accom¬
panied by a decline in overall employment
as of employment in sectors of increasing
productivity in the informal sectors of
economies, goes on apace.'
In the Third World today, he adds, a kind of general
witch-hunt of women is taking place, manifesting it¬
self in declining proportions of women to men, higher
mortality and worse health: 'Slow, unobtrusive, phy¬
sical decimation but rapid, noticeable declines in
work participation and terms and conditions of work'
(Mitra, op.cit., p.45).
This frightening picture is not alleviated by
the fact that the enormous contribution of Indian women
in housework is totally ignored by economists. In the
1971 census 73% of rural women and 75% of urban women
aged 15 to 59 gave housework as their chief activity.
In India, where fuel and water has so often to be
gathered and carried, and where food grains and most
other foodstuffs have to be processed in the home from
their original state, housework is no sinecure.
The sex ratio in Chamarajanagar taluk follows
the general Indian trend, in that there were nearly
6000 more males than females enumerated in 1971. As
elsewhere, more boys than girls are born in India, but
unlike the situation in the West more girls than boys
die. The sex ratio figures for all India rose from
102 in 1901 to 106 in 1961 to 107 in 1971. (In Kar-
nataka it remained unchanged at 104 between 1961 and 1971).
The life-expectancy gap between the sexes is still in¬
creasing, which strongly suggests that the traditional
devaluation of women in India, albeit less evident in
the South, is an enduring phenomenon which new legislation
and changing standards have not succeeded in eradicating.
However, to conclude on a more optimistic note,
M.N. Srinivas was able to point out only six years ago
that'the career woman in India is very visible, and it is
significant that society at large has quietly accepted
women's assumption of new roles.' He rightly adds that
an essential pre-condition to the achievement of these
roles is migration to the cities, although of course
urbanisation must go hand in hand with education.
These prerequisites having been established Indian
women wishing to enter business, professional or
public life have, he reminds us, certain advantages
over their Western sisters on account of their wide
kin networks and the availability of servants. All
that is necessary for them is to make 'a successful
transition from one structural and cognitive frame
of reference to another' (Srinivas, 1977).
But not all women in India want to have jobs.
The necessity for women to work outside the home at
all, unless in a highly prestigious profession^is still
avoided by the majority with traditional values. And at
least, as D. Jacobsen reminds us, Indian women grow in
status as they get older and are not relegated to old
people's homes, even as widows. On the whole, she
believes Indian women are reasonably fulfilled in their
lives (Jacobsen, 1977). Patricia Jeffery too found
that many of the women in purdah she studied were not
unhappy about their condition but felt that they were
safe and protected (Jeffery,1979)• Some restricted
wives in Chamarajanagar said pragmatically that there
were advantages in being subordinated and relegated to
the home. Men, they argued, paid for their claim to
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superiority by having to shoulder the responsibility of
bread-winning. Writing on Western discrimination against
women in the professions, M. Paloma alludes to the fact
that most women are tolerant of domestication and that on
the whole even successful career women prefer to combine
their careers with marriage and at least some housework
(Paloma and Garland, 1971). The trouble is, as Mitra
emphasises, the work women do in the domestic sphere is
so taken for granted by men that it is virtually invisible.
Only if it suddenly stopped, as in some sort of fab¬
ulous general strike, no doubt the stuff of fantasy, would
the contribution of countless woman-hours be painfully
recognised.
Perhaps the sturdy common sense of Gayle Rubin
should be allowed the last word in this chapter.
•Men and women are,of course, different.
But they are not as different as day and
night, earth and sky, yin and yang, life
and death. In fact from the standpoint
of nature, men and women are closer to
each other than either is to anything else..
...Furthermore, although there is an average
difference between males and females in a
variety of traits, the range of variation





The subject of kinship in India is wide, in¬
tricate, and, in the case of south Indian kinship,
chronically controversial. Since the purpose of this
chapter is merely to provide a modicum of theoretical
background to the possible effects of the most commonly
found version of south Indian kinship on fertility and
on the status of women, a greatly simplified precis of
the situation as both terminologically and behavioura1ly
defined is all that will be attempted here.
On the substantive plane the position is this:
though various jati differ somewhat in their interpre¬
tation of the laws of Manu and the mediaeval Mitakshara
marriage law, among north Indian Hindus marriage with
close kin is forbidden and all cousins are classed term¬
inologically with siblings, marriage between them thus
being regarded as incestuous. According to Manu mar¬
riage is prohibited between sapinda category of kin
(those cognatic relatives who share pinda or rice balls
at funerary ceremonies), and between those related within
seven generations on the husband's side and five on the
wife's side. This very wide prohibition is not strictly
adhered to by all communities, but in general in north
Indian systems affines are widely dispersed geographically
as well as genealogically and outsiders are incorporated
as spouses .
Furthermore marriage among the higher castes in
north India is ideally hypergamous (the wife marrying 'up'),
sometimes even across caste or sub-caste boundaries. This
ideology stems from the Hindu principle of kanya dan,
the gift of a virgin. Dan, from the Sanskrit dena to give,
means a gift to a Brahman which can never be repaid as that
which the donor receives in return is merit. The gift of
a virgin girl (along with her dowry, the wedding expenses,
and such hospitality as may at any time in her life be
required by the groom's family) absolves her father of
the sin of begetting her as long as no reciprocity is
involved. Since the bride-takers symbolise Brahmans
they are regarded as perpetually superior to the bride-
givers even when the marriage is between peers. No
bride-taker would ever willingly give a bride to a
group which has previously been its bride-giver, as to
do so would be to reverse their status positions. Al¬
though factual as opposed to notional hypergamy may be
practised, parents are aluays seeking to marry their
daughters into families whose ritual, economic and cul¬
tural status is higher than their own, most marriages
take place within the regional sub-caste, albeit outside
the immediate villages or localities concerned. They
tend to form their own levels or cycles of hypergamy,
A giving to B, B to C and -eventually - C to A. Where
C has to give to A, C is perpetually inferior to A
while superior to B, as B is superior to A.
In south India, by contrast (the chief exception
being the hierarchically ordered Nayar caste of Kerala),
marriage is isogamous. It has to be, since marriage to
bilateral cross-cousins, and commonly the elder sister's
daughter, is terminologically (though in no other way)
prescribed and is in fact very prevalent in the South.
This is the case even among Brahmans. In a patrilineal
system the giving of a bride to a household from which
a bride has been accepted in a previous generation is
inevitable in the case of a man's marriage to his father
sisters' daughter or elder sister's daughter. And in
another popular south Indian marriage arrangement, when
a sister and brother from one household marry a brother
and sister from another, the reciprocal giving and takin
occurs in the same generation.
In the South, then, isogamous marriage and reci¬
procity go hand in hand. When high caste friends in
Chamarajanagar were asked how they reconciled this with
the principle of kanya dan they were puzzled. "We
give a virgin to them and they give a virgin to us.
What's wrong with that ?". The tradition that the
intangibles of merit and prestige are the only pos¬
sible return for a gift to a ritual superior seems to
have no application in this part of the country.
Claude Levi-Strauss has postulated three ele¬
mentary structures of prescriptive kinship and marriage
which he envisages in terms of the exchange of women
between patrilineages: bilateral cross-cousin marriage,
patrilateral cross-cousin marriage (to the father's
sister's daughter), and matrilateral cross-cousin mar¬
riage (to the mother's brother's daughter). Along with
a number of other distinguished commentators on the sub¬
ject he seems at times to confuse the theoretical model
with everyday behaviour (Levi-Strauss 1969)* In fact
it is the terminology alone which is prescriptive. Louis
Dumont, perhaps the best known and most prolific analyst
of the theoretical implications of the Dravidian kinship
system, was the originator of the Alliance theory, which
seeks to identify the structural principle of the system
as that of a diachronic affinal alliance between inter¬
marrying patrilineal groups. He follows Levi-Strauss
in appearing to regard ma tr ilatercwt cross-cousin marriage
as the form most commonly found in south India. This
may have been because the Pramallai Kallar, the jati he
studied in Tamilnadu, have a matrilateral preference so
strong as to be more or less institutionalised (Dumont,
1950,1953a, 1953b 1957a 1957b, 1961,196^). But the sta¬
tistical investigation undertaken by Brenda Beck, based
on the data of four field anthropologists who had studied
south Indian societies, showed that it is not matri-
lateraljcross-cousin marriage but the avuncular form,
marriage to the elder sister's daughter, which, is the
most frequently practised type of kin marriage in south
India (Beck,1972). Beck's data is supported by that
of Anthony Good (Good,1980) and the Chamarajanagar evid¬
ence .
Dumont argues that where unilineal descent groups
are found a strong preference for either matrilateral or
patrilateral marriage is also found. (Dumont,op.cit. 1957)
Beck and William McCormick both state that all castes in
their areas of south India (regions of Tamilnadu and Kar-
nataka respectively), actually marry impartially both types
of cross-cousin and the elder sister's daughter in spite of
alleged preferences. This is also the case in Chamaraja¬
nagar . Here members of 22 important local jati were ques¬
tioned as to marriage preferences. Fifty per cent ex¬
pressed an equal preference for both types of cross-cousin
marriage, followed by avuncular marriage. Eighteen per
cent bracketed equal all the three types of kin marriage
sanctioned by the system. Eighteen per cent preferred the
avuncular form and 9% preferred marriage with the father's
sister's daughter. These figures refer to expressed pre¬
ferences only. The results of a door-to-door census under
taken in the course of my previous fieldwork revealed sta¬
tistical evidence of a substantive bias towards the avun¬
cular form, as found by both Beck and Good. Of a sample
of 385 couples, 59.5% reported bere kade marriages, liter¬
ally to 'outside' or unrelated people, while 40.5% were
married to kin. Of thejwhole sample, 19% of the husbands
had married a sister's daughter, genealogical or classifi-
catory, 12% had married a mother's brother's daughter, ge¬
nealogical or classificatory, and 8% had married father's
sister's daughter, genealogical or class ificatory. The
data appear to reveal that while people are prepared to
admit to a preference for cross-cousin marriage they have
reservations about admitting to one for the avuncular form,
although in practice it turns out to be, as Beck and Good
have shown, the most frequently practised in south India.
Edmund Leach has pointed out that where sister's
daughter marriage is carried out between the same two
groups over three or more generations the sister's child
and the mother's brother's child will be one and the
same person, and avuncular marriage becomes matri-
lateral cross-cousin marriage ( Leach , 19 60 , 197 1) •
Anthony Good found some cases of this situation in
Tamilnadu and genealogies revealed the same phenomena
in Chamarajanagar. But since people in the areas
where sister's daughter marriage is common use the
same term, (Sose in Chamarajanagar) in reference to
either female cross cousin or the elder sister's dau¬
ghter, this poses no problem. Terminologically, the
girl is still 'potential wife' or 'potential daughter-
in-law' .
Various reasons were given by Chamarajanagar
informants for their reservations about avuncular mar¬
riage. Some referred to the possibility of adverse
genetic effects, their doubts often expressed in the
form of anxious questions such as "Do you think this
kind of union produces mad children ?" Others said
that marrying the genealogical sister's daughter was
too much like marrying one's own sister. (Although
the terminology does not differentiate in general be¬
tween genealogical and classificatory kin, people
who wish to clarify the situation do so without dif¬
ficulty by referring to genealogical kin as sothera
or uterine. (Thus akka — elder sister while sothera
akka = one's own or uterine elder sister). One in¬
formant said bitterly that though his community pre¬
ferred kin marriages he personally thought the bride
should come from afar as she might then settle down
in her husband's household and not keep running back
to her parents' home to complain about her treatment.
A Brahman astrologer cited to me the laws of Manu and
the Mitakshara marriage law as proof that marriage to
kin was both sinful and unlucky. He also quoted some
relatively modern genetic theory to prove his point.
However it turned out that he had married his father's
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sister's daughter, his daughter had married her mother's
younger brother and his brother had married his sister's
daught er.
But the majority of Chamarajanagar informants
approved strongly of marriage to kin. One reason was
that both spouses are known to both families, who have
had the opportunity of observing their characters from
babyhood. Another, constantly and rather optimistic¬
ally cited reason was that "the affection is already
there". Others stressed the economic advantages, allow¬
ing family resources to be concentrated within the small
circle of cognatic kin. (Patricia Jeffery discusses
similar rationalisations cited by the Muslim families
of her Delhi study [jeffery 19791)• On the other hand
one informant claimed that marriage to kin served a useful
purpose in keeping families without property together.
And time and time again informants gave as their pri¬
mary reasons for approving of such unions, "We know our
the
daughters will be happy". The girls remain with^cognatic
family and are not lost. The marriages renew the affec¬
tionate ties between sisters and brothers, ties which
are much valued in south India. Furthermore, when a
sister's daughter marries into a joint household the
fact that her mother-in-law is also her maternal grand¬
mother ensures that she will be loved and protected. An¬
other advantage, not mentioned by Chamarajana gar advoc¬
ates of the system but commendable both from the viewpoint
of wives, actual and potential, and of those interested in
the reduction of fertility in India, is that the bride does
not have to 'prove herself' by bearing many children. As
Dyson and Moore point out: '...there is less need to
repress and resocialise females in their affinal home'
(Dyson and Moore, 198j , p.8). Girls married to kin are
surrounded by known people and are seldom either lonely or
isolated, while social interaction with their natal kin
does not cease, since the marriages are so often arranged
to reinforce existing affective ties.
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Apart from the authorities already cited, an¬
alysts of the south Indian kinship system include L.H.
Morgan ( 1871) , A.M. Hocart ( 1927), N. Yalman (1962,1969),
I. Karve ( 1965 ) , D. Maybury-Lewis ( 1965), G. Obeyesekere
(1965), S.J. Tambiah (1965), P.G. Riviere (1966), J.C.
Lave (1966), and A.T. Carter (1973). Much of the dis¬
cussion has turned on whether the system can rightfully
be described as prescriptive or preferential and what
kind of '■exchange* (of women) is involved in the struct¬
ural sense.
A brief exposition of the 'Dravidian' kinship
terminology may be appropriate here, if only to serve
as a basis for the argument that the form most commonly
found in the South is apparently less symmetrical than
that usually dealt with in the literature unless the
system is deemed, as Good suggests (see below), to clas¬
sify cross-relatives in terms of relative age rather
than of generation.
The symmetrical pattern of the terminology is
consistent with the practice of marriage with both kinds
of cross-cousin, the children of the father's sisters and
the mother's brothers, terminologically defined as poten¬
tial spouses for 1 Ego', along with the prohibition of mar¬
riage to parallel cousins, children of mother's sisters
and father's brothers, terminologically defined as siblings
to 'Ego'.
The terminology stresses both the equivalence and
the polarity of male and female siblings. Brothers and
sisters use the same term for each other's scouse's rel¬
atives as they use for their own spouse's relatives. This
equivalence creates a wide lateral classificatory exten¬
sion of the kinship system. For instance, father's sis¬
ter, mother's brother's wife, and mother's brother's wife's
sister are all equated, and the term also implies mother-
in-law. The husbands of these women are equated with the
mother's brother, and his wife with mother. The equivalence
of spouses is also stressed by the terminology. A
■woman calls her husband's kin by the terms she has
already used before marriage, that is,the 'opposite'
to those he uses. Thus affines are equated with
non-lineal cognates and there are no separate terms
for affines.
Iravati Karve has suggested that the single
most important principle of the system is that of re¬
lative age (op.cit. ,I965J . Since brothers, sisters,
and male and female cross-cousins are referred to by
different terms depending on whether they are older
or younger than Ego, there are eight terms used for
members of Ego's own generation. In the first as¬
cending generation, that of Ego's parents, there are
only four terms, although elder and younger same-sex
siblings of mother and father are distinguished by
terms denoting 'big' and 'little'. Thus in Kannada
mother is Amma and father is Appa. Mother's elder
sister is Pod (big) Amma and her younger sister is
Chik (little) Amma, while father's elder brother is
Pod Appa and the younger brother is Chik Appa. The
terms for mother's brother and father's sister are
Mama and Atte respectively, which are also used for
father-in-law and mother-in-law.
This symmetry is partly over- ridden by term¬
inological deviations revealing that the prescription
for cross-cousin marriage includes marriage with the
elder sister's daughter. (Marriage with the younger
sister's daughter is not countenanced). But since
communities in south India which allow sister's daugh¬
ter marriage and incorporate it into their terinin-
olO^7 are far more common than those which do not it
has been proposed by Anthony Good (Good,1980), that
the terminologies of the latter could be a derivative
of the former rather than vice versa as hitherto held
by anthropologists.
The principle of relative age pervades the
whole south Indian kinship universe and is symbolised
by the deference shown not only by children to parents
but also by younger to older siblings. The younger
addresses the elder by the kinship term alone while the
elder addresses the younger by name. Iravati Karve*s
contention that the main principle of kinship organi¬
sation among 'Dravidian1 peoples is the way in which
all relatives are arranged according to whether they
are older or younger than Ego supports Good's argument
that :
'the terminology in local use tends to
classify cross-relatives according to
relative age rather than relative gen¬
eration.' ( Good , 1980 , p . k7I± )
It is also borne out to some extent by the facts in
Chamarajanagar. For instance Karve states that a girl
must marry a person belonging to a group older than her¬
self but younger than her parents; so she can marry a
younger brother of her mother or any older cross-cousins.
This seems to be the way people perceive the system in
our area. In Western terms what it amounts to is that
older siblings constitute a kind of 'mezzanine floor'
between generation levels, which makes structural sense
in the case of avuncular marriage, for a man only marries
his elder sister's daughter, which makes this girl a kind
of categorical cross-cousin. Or, as Good put it: 'From
the male viewpoint, there is symmetric prescriptive mar¬
riage with a junior cross-relative' (Good,1980,p.^9^)•
For example in Chamarajanagar the term Sose is
applied in reference not only to the mother's brother's
daughter, the father's sister's daughter, wife's sister
and brother's wife, but also to the sister's daughter as
potential wife. Referring to the adjacent descending
generation, Sose also means sister's daughter (male speak¬
ing), and son's wife. The question of relative age is
most important when it applies to the correct age differ¬
ential between husband and wife, since if she were older
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than he was he would have to treat her with the respect
due to an elder and could not use her name. In Chama-
rajanagar it is considered desirable that a husband be
no more than ten years and no less than four years older
than his wife. Six to eight years is regarded as abso¬
lutely right. A husband may belong to what in Western
perception constitutes a generation below that of his
wife and nobody will think anything of it as long as their
relative age is categorically correct.
Unless there is actual hostility between the inr
dividuals concerned the preferred usage in Chamarajana gar
is to employ the closest of two possible kinship terms.
Thus, in the case of marriage to the genealogical or clas-
sificatory sister's daughter the wife will call her mother-
in-law Aj ji (grandmother) rather than Atte(father's sister,
mother's brother's wife, or mother-in-law) and her husband
will continue to call his mother-in-law Akka (elder sister)
rather than Atte. He will also call his father-in-law, his
sister's husband, Bhava (brother-in-law) rather than Mama,
(mother's brother, father's sister's husband or father-in-law)
W, McCormack sees one of the major functions served
by cross-cousin and avuncular marriage as a means of pre¬
serving the bonds of co-operation and friendship which are
founded on the affection of brother and sister.
' Brother and sister ties are maintained
by festival visits, gifts and mutual
assistance, and by marriage. Their chil¬
dren....are expected to preserve this
atmosphere of ritual affection among
themselves.... A brother and his sister
participate in the choosing of/spouses
foi/each other's children, so that the
event involves co-operation and reunion
among themselves. The brother-sister
relationship is more particularly re¬
newed and intensified if the brother is
himself marrying his sister's daughter
or if the marriage is between the child¬
ren of brother and sister.' (McCormack
op. cit.. p. 45 ) .
The passage above
value placed on kin marriage
sums up well the emotional
in Chamarajanagar. Further
justifications given of cross-cousin and sister's daugh¬
ter marriage were that family peace, unity and co-oper¬
ation were enhanced, that wedding gifts were not hag¬
gled over, that dowry and bridewealth obligations - in
the jati where they exist - could be waived and that
horoscopes - in the case of the higher castes which use
them - were not usually necessary as the boy and girl
were regarded as "made for each other".
In view of the general approval of marriage
within the cognatic group-by nearly all the jati in this
area it is rather surprising that, according to the in¬
vestigator's earlier survey, only ^0% of the sample had
made such marriages, although Good (personal communication)
as well as Rao and Inbaraj (1977), found far higher per¬
centages in Tamilnadu. If Caldwell is right this kind
of marriage is slowly dying out as an institution in Kar-
nataka. In his study area the percentages had dropped
from 35% to 20% over a generation (Caldwell,1982). If
Reid is correct in his contention that the practice does
tend to reduce fertility (Reid,1971)i this seems to be a
pity. It is also unfortunate, if it really does serve
to improve the lot of the young bride, as Chamarajanagar
people believe, that there is a growing tendency to look
upon the institution as "old-fashioned" among those anxious




To carry out this field research two modes
of procedure were employed: on the one hand the quali¬
tative approach of informal interviews, group discussions,
both planned and unanticipated, and participant observation;
a
and on the other the quantitative one of/^formal question¬
naire survey which yet allowed for a high proportion of
open-ended questions which permitted the respondents to
air their views, explain the process of their decision¬
making and modify or give colour to their replies to struc¬
tured questions.
Most people's lives being an intricate tangle
of choice and chance, the former line of enquiry entailed
the exploration, in the context of fertility, of the way
in which individuals seek to manipulate social norms to
achieve their personal aims within the limits imposed by
nature and culture. In a few instances the extended-case
method was employedjto afford a diachronic analysis of cause-
and-effect linkages between conscious decision-making (if
any) and physiological events over more than one generation
in selected families.
In 1979) the first year of the field research,
the concept of the micro-demographic approach drawing lar¬
gely on anthropological methods as applied to population
research was still something of a novelty, though M.N.
Srinivas had already made a plea for this type of approach
to questions of fertility (Srinivas,1977). Certainly it
was quite unusual for an investigator to set out alone and
unaided by a team to carry out such a study. To be honest,
it would not have occurred to me to attempt it if it had
not been for my prior experience of and long connection
with the area in question. As it turned out the difficul¬
ties entailed were more than had been bargained for and were
often acute.
The curious combination of loneliness with
lack of privacy so familiar to field anthropologists
was exacerbated in the course of this study by the ne¬
cessity of my occupying several roles at once: not only
those of observer and enquirer plus cook and laundress
squatting on the cow-dunged floor to wrestle with kero¬
sene stove and water pot, but those of interviewer,
checker, typist, organiser and employer of interviewers.
A constant stream of visitors to the thatched verandah
which did duty for office, kitchen, dining and sitting
room, interrupted tasks connected with the survey. They
often came out of curiosity, but even more often with
demands for advice and assistance, especially in the treat¬
ment of such ailments as cuts and scabies, coughs and
fevers. On the other hand the necessity of operating an
involuntary clinic while engaged in checking forms or of
(say) the premature termination of a session with the inter¬
viewers to make room for a group of labourers taking shelter
in a rainstorm did mean that at any moment the work in hand
could change its aspect and expand into a lively and infor¬
mative discussion group. In the same way a visit to a
village for the purpose of conducting the survey often be¬
gan or ended with unstructured interviews in informants'
houses - not necessarily the dwellings of the sample sur¬
veyed - or in a group discussion attended by people of all
ages in the street or under the village pipul tree. These
discussions, as well as the unstructured conversations and
transactions which took place in people's houses or in the
course of walks and picnics, shopping trips, visits to in¬
formants' relatives in other villages and to the devastana
or to the local shrine, not only revealed local ideals and
values but also the existence of unexpected perceptions and
attitudes which were plainly instrumental in contributing
to fertility behaviour. Unfortunately, offers of hospit¬
ality from old or newly acquired acquaintances, while they
were accepted with gratitude since they tended to be oc¬
casions for massive exchanges of information, sometimes
led to dire consequences in the form of indisposition.
In fact the conditions of the fieldwork plagued the
researcher with increasingly frequent bouts of illness,
from gastro-enteritis through b.coli, amoebic and bacil-
lary dysentery, finally to an attack of shingles which
felt like, and perhaps was, the outward and visible cul¬
mination of a year's suppressed frustrations.
Briefly then, there was no formal structure of
the time available between talking to people who wished
to chat, gossip or confide and getting on with the survey.
When we were not engaged in formal interviewing or group
discussions, the interviewers and I - or more often I
alone -tended to engage daily in long conversations on
the themes of the project either in other people's houses
or in my thatched dwelling in Somavarapet. Moreover,
participant observation was by no means neglected in the
course of the fieldwork. During the first weeks in the
field I lived with a large joint family in the town, and
when I lived in the village the far end of my dwelling
housed a low caste labourer family whose daily life was
carried on in intimate proximity to my own, many of their
problems being shared with or confided to me. The <
couples - about 10% of the sample - with whom genealogies
or extended case histories were discussed in depth were
nearly all those met with in the course of the previous
fieldwork or those (or their descendants) who knew and
remembered the Morris family in the past. It was easier
to deal in depth with old acquaintances who were not troub¬
led with inhibiting suspicions of official interference.
The Programme
The fieldwork period began with my arrival in
India at the end of May 1979, and my efforts were originally
concentrated on re-establishing myself in the taluk (a) by
renewing old contacts and (b) by organising accommodation
for myself. The latter consisted of a room and a verandah
on a smallholding adjacent to the village of Somavarapet,
about two miles from the town, the same accommodation
which had been rented on previous visits to the area.
As conditions there had deteriorated and repairs and
some modest equipment were required before the place
could be made habitable, hospitality offered by the
landlord's high caste joint family in the town was
accepted for a few weeks. Although this sojourn had
its value and led to fruitful insights, it was a relief
to move out. Unless a single group is being studied
living with members of any one jati has its drawbacks,
whereas the use of a place of one's own, where people
are able to relax, gossip and confide, outweighs the
advantage of living with a family.
During the first four months visits were
made to the Indian Institute of Science, the Centre
for Population Studies, the Indian Institute of Man¬
agement (in search of interviewers) and the Department
of Community Medicine, St. John's Medical College, all
in Bangalore; as well as to the Anthropological Survey
of India and the Institute of Kannada Studies in Mysore.
The questionnaires were revised and re-typed, the inter¬
viewers sought and engaged and accommodation found for
them (not without difficulty) in Chamarajanagar town.
Pre-testing was carried out over a period of about six
weeks and the questionnaires were further modified in
consequence, while an interviewer who had failed to
come up to expectation was replaced. The main survey
started at the beginning of October (pre-testing having
begun in August), and ended in April 1980. We moved
into the hills in November 1979 to interview the Hinter¬
land Low Castes in the labour villages on the coffee
estates. The majority of these people come from rather
inaccessible hamlets at the foot of the range, and it
was easier to reach them on foot from the estates than
to try to reach the hamlets by bus over roads made im¬
passable by the persistent deluge we experienced that
month, which daily soaked us to the skin. Even so our
sojourn there was not unadventurous, what with herds
of elephants, overturned jeeps and a flooded river
precluding access to or departure from the hills for
weeks at a time. At the beginning of December, when
the rain began to ease off, we were able to return to
Somavarapet and make sorties to the interior villages,
as well as continuing to interview other groups. In
January we went up to the hills again to interview mem¬
bers of the Sholiga tribe, a period of strenuous walk¬
ing at the end of which we had all become very fit.
After that the next three months presented trials of
a different sort: dust, dehydration, sweat, mosquitoes,
eye—flies and insomnia, to say nothing of a local cholera
epidemic, as the hot weather approached its zenith and
the survey neared its end. By the last week of May
the survey was completed, the forms packed in metal box¬
es and despatched by air-freight to Edinburgh and the
interviewers paid off with affectionate farewells. The
fieldwork for that year was over. Data preparation
and editing in Edinburgh occupied the next ten months,
and in May 1981 I returned to the area to tie up a num¬
ber of qualitative loose ends and to acquaint myself
with the further development of individual and family
case histories. In the event this entailed the re¬
employment of one of the woman interviewers for two
months as personal assistant in the collection of case
histories and general economic and demographic background
information concerning the taluk.
The Survey
The questionnaires, based on the core ques¬
tionnaire and other modules provided by the World Fert¬
ility Survey, were first formulated in Edinburgh and sub¬
sequently modified and elaborated in Chamarajanagar to
include questions specific to local society and circum¬
stances. Under ideal conditions this survey should per-
haps have included all local communities (jati)/Shave been
carried out in a single multi-jati village. In practice
this was impossible. There are over thirty jati in
the taluk and no one village contains either a full
complement or enough inhabitants to provide adequate
samples of all groups. In view of this and of the
fact that previous fieldwork in the area had estab¬
lished that a pattern existed of ideal and actual kin¬
ship and marriage behaviour involving groups of local
castes and centring on the status of women, it was de¬
cided that four representative groups, drawn either from
one- or two-caste villages °r jati 'quarters' in the
taluk town, rural villages and the hill settlements,
should be compared and that random sampling should not
be attempted.
The Sample
The exact composition of the total sample to
on
be surveyed was finally decided upon^arrival in the field.
The logic of the research suggested a straight comparison
of Lingayats, Harijans and Upuligas, the three largest
castes in the area, comprising the majority of the popu¬
lation, plus a fourth group consisting of ritually high^
influential and culturally allied but numerically less
important castes such as the Dasa Banajigas and Jettis
discussed in Chapter II of this section. But the fact
that education, economic status, landholding and relative
urbanisation all have a bearing on fertility required the
division of the large and internally stratified Lingayat
caste into two groups separated by a putative poverty
line. A further contingency was the common 'unsanskrit-
ised1 tradition shared by Upuligas and Harijans, the two
principal labourer communities of the taluk, whose cult¬
ure and customs are sufficiently alike to allow, for in¬
stance, their being housed together without uproar in the
same low caste 'lines' or labour villages on the coffee
estates, where they constitute the bulk of the work force.
It seemed more appropriate to amalgamate them into a sin¬
gle low caste culture—group (exemplified by their similar
norms concerning marriage and the status of women), as
opposed to the high caste groups, and then to differentiate
» them according to their degree of sophistication, which
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amounted to their geographical position vis a vis Chama-
rajanagar town. This arrangement provided five sub-
samples: Richer Lingayats, Poorer Lingayats, Other
High Castes, Town and Around Low Castes and Hinterland
Low Castes, to which were added the Sholiga hill tribe,
which is also a caste. This choice of representative
groups seemed a fair compromise between the ideal and
the contingent, in that it reflects quite well the caste
situation in the area, numerically as well as culturally.
It was decided then that door-to-door visits
should be made, first in the jati 'quarters' in the town
and satellite villages, then in the one- or two-caste
hinterland villages and settlements in the hills, and
finally to wind up again in the core area of the re¬
searcher's 'own' village of Somavarapet. The optimum
size of the total sample was difficult to estimate in
advance. But bearing in mind that to begin with it had
been supposed that the entire survey would be undertaken
by myself, the solitary field investigator, and two inter¬
viewers, one female and one male, it was agreed that a
sample of three hundred couples would be the maximum with
which we could cope. With our six sub-samples this gave
us a cell size of fifty couples. In the event it became
clear after the pre-testing, which showed that we would
be lucky to achieve more than one interview a day per
pair of interviewers, that another pair of interviewers
would have to be employed if the survey was to be com¬
pleted in time and I was to be at least partially re¬
leased to toil in the qualitative field as well as to
carry out the duties of sole checker, part-time inter¬
viewer and general administrator and secretary.
Instead of sampling from the complete child-
bearing range the couples approached were those wherein
both spouses were living and where the wives belonged to
**
the cohort 29-39 years of age. The argument for picking
on this group was that these women were likely to be just
** Polygamous unions were excluded.
completing their child-bearing or nearing completion
and yet still be able to remember details of such oc¬
curences as miscarriages and neo-natal deaths as well
as the duration of periods of lactation and abstinence.
To avoid collusion, wives and husbands were interviewed
simultaneously but separately. Of those couples we
approached we had 9^ refusals and 178 deferments. We
found 157 ineligible, mostly on account of the wife's
age. We usually took three deferments on the part of
any couple as tantamount to a refusal and did not trouble
them again. The breakdown of refusals by caste-group
is interesting. We had only 12 from Richer Lingayats
as opposed to 21 from poorer Lingayats, and only l4
from Hinterland Low Castes as opposed to 30 from their
more urbanised caste-mates. The higher caste and better-
off people, who tended to feel more secure, were much
more curious as to what we were about and interested
in the project. The Poorer Lingayats and Low Castes
from the more urbanised areas had probably learned enough
of the sterilisation excesses of the mid-seventies to be
wary, while it appeared that the Hinterland Low Castes,
many of whom were interviewed on the plantations in the
hills, welcomed any sort of diversion. (Many of the
women actually complained of being bored and said that it
was only the good pay that kept them there). Only 10
each of the Other High Castes and the Sholigas refused
to be interviewed. This was probably due respectively
to sophisticated curiosity and a desire to be obliging
to a member of the Morris family. But one Sholiga woman
fled in mid-interview, suspecting, her friends told us
laterjthat it might be leading up to forcible sterili¬
sation. We never saw her again.
On the whole, once their fears were allayed
that my interviewers and I might represent some alarming
new prospect of official duress (a world-wide reaction to
forms and formal questions), many of those who agreed to
be interviewed replied so freely and at such length that
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we found ourselves the recipients of confidences
which subsequently proved difficult to classify and
code. This was particularly the case with wives,
who often used the interviews as an occasion for
unburdening themselves of pent-up domestic griev¬
ances .
The Interviewers
These were all postgraduate students of
Mysore and Bangalore Universities, none of whom had
had any previous experience at all of social surveys
and the techniques of interviewing. It is hard to say
whether or not this was a good thing. At least it
meant that they could be taught what to do without
argument. Trained interviewers are hard to come by
in south India and, in spite of looming unemployment,
harder still to persuade to undertake a venture into the
terra incognita of the rustic backwoods. Eventually,
after a false start with a disappointing male candidate
during the pre-testing, a married couple from Bangalore
were engaged, a girl from Chamarajanagar and a young man
from Mysore. The two girls were much quicker to learn,
more conscientious,and spoke much better English than the
men. The chief difficulty with them all was an apparent
inability to recognise inconsistency in recording the re¬
plies of the respondents. That is,they tended, espe¬
cially during the first month or two, to write down con¬
tradictory replies without noticing that they were contra¬
dictory. Or, in view of the plural attitudes so striking¬
ly evident in the area, they may have taken the contradic¬
tions at their face value, accepting the fact that people
are capable of entertaining two conflicting beliefs at
once. In any case, cross-questioning as to the phrasing
of the respondent's replies usually sorted out apparent
anomalies .
To do them justice, all four of the interview¬
ers remained cheerful and willing throughout conditions of
work which were more often than not extremely difficult.
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Since respondents were most likely to be found at home
together in the evenings, interviews (except in the houses
of the wealthier respondents) were usually conducted by
torchlight, squatting on the ground, and involved a run¬
ning battle for privacy which only too often was a lost
cause. Moreover they all endured with admirable stoic¬
ism the months of torrential rain which drenched us from
July 1979 to January 1980, and the months of heat and dust
which followed.
The daily sessions in the course of which the
researcher questioned the interviewers in depth after
checking the forms, about those interviews at which she
had not been present, turned out to be very useful. Not
only did they solve and straighten out apparent gaps and
inconsistencies, but they also resulted in exchanges of
information which were often enlightening to all the par¬
ties concerned, which put flesh on the bare bones of the
respondents' answers to structured questions and placed
these answers in their individual domestic, cultural and
local contexts. These sessions were also social occa¬
sions conducted over coffee or soft drinks,leavened con¬
stantly by mirth, which helped to lighten the burdens of
discomfort, frustration and misunderstanding with which
we all had to contend.
One problem which was never solved was that all
the interviewers, one Lingayat, two Brahmans and one Ursu
(the Mysore royal caste) were from high castes. Attempts
were made to find a low caste couple with sufficient ed¬
ucation to undertake the job, but they were unsuccessful.
This was a pity, as in some sections of the questionnaires,
such as those concerning previous marriages and divorce
among the low castes, as well as in the status of women
section, a certain amount of 'whitewashing' (i.e. of
self-presentation as'sanskritised') was performed to
impress the interviewers which, when checked upon, was
found to be demonstrably untrue and a waste of precious
t ime.
Data Analysis
Data preparation for machine analysis began
at the University of Edinburgh in July 1980. Coding was
completed by the end of that year. I took an SCSS course
early in 1981, and thereafter proceeded with cross—tab¬
ulation, using the facility of the Edinburgh Regional
Computer Centre. After my return to India at the beginning
of May, data analysis was resumed in August, and the first
draft of the report for the Overseas Development Adminis¬
tration was begun in October 1981, the report being com¬
pleted in March 1982. The thesis in question was begun
in October 1982. The object of the qualitative aspect
of the research has been that of illustration, endorsement
and authentication of the numerical data. It also serves
as a reminder that each one of the demographic statistics
discussed in these pages is both a product and a symbol of
an event of profound, indeed literally vital, importance
to the individual concerned, quite apart from its signifi¬
cance for the local collectivity, the nation, and ultimately
the overburdened world.
SECTION TWO ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Preliminary Observations
CHAPTER VI
The dimensions of caste which I believe to
have the most effect on fertility will be canvassed
in the following pages. The coded data referred to
in this section were prepared from replies of respond¬
ents entered in the questionnaires designed at the outset
of the research and many of the quoted verbal comment¬
aries of individuals were culled from the same source.
The rest were recorded in the course of informal inter¬
views and discussions in the field. The analysis begins
with the cross-tabulation of the key dependent variable,
Current Family Size, with the key independent variable,
Caste - or rather Caste Group. Since all the respond¬
ents were born into their caste this remains an anteced¬
ent variable throughout. The term Current Family Size
refers to the number of children living at the time of
the interview, born to each couple in the sample inter¬
viewed, and does not include any children of any previous
union(s) in which either spouse may have engaged. As we
have seen, the sample excluded widows and (recognised) poly
gynous or polyandrous unions.
In table 1 the original Current Family Size
frequencies are given, ranging from no children to eight
children. Apart from this table, where percentage and
mean distributions of Current Family Size are given, they
have been collapsed into three categories, A,(0-1 child)
3,(2-3 children), and C, (k-Q children). The collapse
was made/in this way to obtain a fairly balanced distri¬
bution. There are not, for instance, enough cases in
the zero category to be of significance except among
Caste-Group VI, the Sholigas. This breakdown has had









































































































the perhaps unfortunate effect of under-emphasising
the dichotomy between two ana three children, and it
should be remembered that the B category includes
two-child families, the ideal urged by the official
family planning posters, although they inevitably
depict the composition of this ideal, family as one of
each sex. Few indeed are the Indian couples, espe¬
cially in a provincial backwater like Chamarajana gar,
who would choose to have no children at all, (as people
said repeatedly, "It is natural to want children"), not
only because children, theoretically at least, repres¬
ent insurance for the parents' old age, but because it
is considered highly inauspicious to be childless, and
couples in this condition, especially the unfortunate
wife, suffer loss of face.
Judging by the comments of respondents the
former consideration tends to be felt less deeply nowa¬
days. Many of them said they hoped to remain indepen¬
dent in their old age, mostly on the grounds that sons
could no longer be trusted to be filial, and this im¬
plied the wish to be financially independent (cf. Vlasso
and Vlassof, 1980). On the other hand anxiety about
the social stigma attached to childlessness still seems
to be prevalent. As a rich Lingyat expressed it,
"Without children my wife would not be respected in
society". In view of the need for the esteem of that
powerful and all-pervading moral mentor, 'society' , in
the form of kin and neighbours^ and the desire to 'hold
up one's head in public', childlessness can be fairly
safely assumed to be an involuntary state of affairs,
at least among rural and unsophisticated provincial
people in India. One exception in Chamarajanagar was
an Upuliga wife, mother of three, including a son, who
declared that children were nothing but a burden. Her
ideal family size, she averred, was none, and she added
"In my opinion girls would be well advised not to marry
at all". Upuligas are renowned in the area for speaking
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their mind. Another exception was a Sholiga husband
who said that he was not interested in having children.
On the other hand a surprising number of
couples, 5% of the whole sample, had voluntarily opted
for only one child, in spite of the fact that early-age
mortality figures in South Karnataka are still quite
high, about 100 per thousand in 1975 (cf. Srinivasan,
Reddy and Raju, 1975 ) • Admittedly the majority of
those desiring only one occurred among the Sholigas,
but there were also cases in the other caste-grouns.
Nevertheless, to be satisfied with only one child is
relatively rare in our area, as in other parts of India,
and the importance of the differential between the 3 and C
categories should be recognised, since in Indian terms it
is the difference between small and large families.
At this point it should be noted that mean,
current family size for the whole sample surveyed is 2.9
(the mode being 5). This is not a high figure for a
small-town and rural area by all-India standards, albeit
one which is reduced by the low figures for the Sholigas.
The Sample Registration Survey for rural India as a whole
in 1977 gives a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 4.8 (Sample
Registration Survey Bulletin 1982).
Of course this mean figure for our sample repre¬
sents no more than a stage in the domestic cycle of the
couples concerned. Nevertheless, within a cohort aged
29-39, as ours was, a proportion of the wives will already
be nearing the end of their reproductive years, either in
the course of natural ageing or on account of cultural con¬
straints on those whose children are about to start on
their own reproduction - and a woman aged thirty in this
area may well be a prospective grandmother. When it is
considered that a high percentage of the others had also
taken steps to cease child-bearing, as we shall see in
the next chapter, and that - if they are to be believed -
a further percentage of couples planned to do so in the
near future (mostly on the grounds of the rising cost
of living), it seems legitimate to suspect that figures
for mean completed family size of the sample as a whole
might not be substantially higher. Judging from table
20a, couples in all groups appear to be adopting contra¬
ception at an earlier age than heretofore.
The figures for mean current family size and
the total number of children per caste-group in the sam¬
ple are as follows:
Mean family size No.of children per caste-group
I: 3.0 I: 149
II: 2.3 II: 139
III: 2.9 III: 144
IV: 3. 1 IV: 157
V: 3.1 V: 156
VI: 2.2 VI : 112
Table 1 reveals that the three high caste-groups have
a lower percentage of C (4-8) families and a higher per¬
centage of B (2-3) families, thisteituation being reversed
in the case of the two low castes. But a simple|two-way
dichotomy between higher and lower castes, or 'sanskrit-
ised1 and 'unsanskritised', however convenient it would
have been, is frustrated by the Sholiga figures, which
fail to fit into the pa 11 ern. Althou gh culturaily a
part of the 'unsanskritised1 category, Sholigas had a
very high percentage of A(0-l) families and a low per¬
centage of C, or large families. They also had, be¬
sides the lowest mean family size, the highest percent¬
age of childless couples, 12% of the Sholiga couples
int erviewed.
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CHAPTER VII CONTRACEPTIVE PRACTICE
1: An Overall View
In 1952 India became the first country in
the world to initiate a family planning programme as
part of official Government policy. During the first
decade of its existence its efforts were mainly direct¬
ed to the provision of clinics and the dispensing there¬
in of modern chemical and mechanical contraceptives,
with instruction as to their use, as well as advice
on such traditional methods as 'rhythm1 (safe period),
withdrawal (coitus interruptus) and abstinence. Steril¬
isation could also be performed where the clinics were
run by gynaecologists. After 1961, when the alarming
implications of the 'population explosion' in India as
revealed by the 19bl census had been digested, Government
strategy reflected a much greater financial commitment,
along with a shift from the 'clinical' co the extension
approach, with emphasis on publicity and education through
field workers. In the following decade family planning
became integrated with maternal and child health services,
under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Family
Planning.
Although the main burdens of expense, research
and planning continued - and continues - to be borne by
the Central Government, State Governments were made re¬
sponsible for the implementation, along with health and
family welfare, of the Family Planning Programme, ser¬
vices being provided by a network of hospitals and clinics.
Urban Primary Health Centres (PHC), one per 10,000 pop¬
ulation, have medical staff and undertake sterilisations
and insertions of intrauterine devices (IUD). Rural sub-
centres based on each PKC are staffed by male and female
'multi-purpose' workers, cater to simple health problems
and supply condoms, contraceptive jellies and tablets etc.
In the mid-sevepties, with the declaration of
the 'National Emergency' (June 1975 - January 1977), the
subject of family planning sprang into prominence.
The programme became so aggressive that sterilisation
acceptance figures rose dramatically, largely through
coercion or fear of coercion. (Physical proximity to
Delhi was a considerable factor, however, affecting
high or low family planning achievement in the States
£cf Gwatkin 1979j) - They fell with equal rapidity
after the defeat of the Congress Government in the 1977
elections, in which the question of family planning was
a major issue. For the next two or three years the
matter remained a highly sensitive one, both for the
succeeding Janata party Government and for Mrs.Gandhi 1s
Congress party when it was returned to power in 1980, to
say nothing of the anxiety and suspicion with which it
was regarded by the man and woman in the street and the
villa ge.
That certain other reactions, unconnected with
the excesses of the Emergency 'crash' campaign but still
unlooked for by the planners, had contributed to the
family planning programme's lack of efficiency was re¬
vealed in the survey (mentioned in the Introduction to
this thesis) undertaken by the Population Unit of Kar-
nataka State Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Bangalore, in 1977. The survey disclosed that, while
more couples than ever before were using modern contra¬
ception to cease child-bearing after producing a number
of children, birth intervals were in fact much shorter
than heretofore. This was due to the abandonment, at
least in urban areas, of such traditional methods of
family planning as long post-partum abstinence periods.
In consequence, when figures for 1975 were compared to
those of a generation earlier (1951) they showed a fer¬
tility decline of only ten per cent, although knowledge
of modern contraception and its availability was now as
widespread as ignorance of it had been twenty-odd years
before (Srinivasan, Reddy and Raju,1977). This finding
has been confirmed by Caldwell (1982) for the area he
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studied in Karnataka, and to some extent by my fieldwork
in Chamarajanagar. In the past the birth rate had also
been kept down by permanent abstinence on the part of
parents when their offspring reached the stage of re¬
production; reduced intercourse when the husband reached
his mid-thirties (since coitus was believed to sap a
man's strength); and abstinence at festival times and on
inauspicious or sacred days. Some of these beliefs
still have currency in Chamarajana gar and may well con¬
tribute to lowered fertility there.
However, although the population of India in¬
creased by about 140 million in the decade 1971-1981
(1981 census figures), it looks as if fertility really
has begun to decline at last, at least in the South (see
Caldwell 1982, p.5). According to A.K. Jain and A.L.
Adlakhar, quoting figures arrived at by the Registrar-
General's office, 1980 and 1981, the crude birth rate
was reduced by 9% between 1972 and 1978, the total fer¬
tility rate (TFR) by 21.8% and the total marital fertility
rate (TMFR) by 20.9% (Jain and Adlakhar,1982). Veena
Soni points out that nearly a quarter of all Indian
couples in the reproductive ages are currently practis¬
ing modern contraception. In 1979-80, the year of the
Chamarajana gar survey, 113-9 million, or 22.5% of the pop¬
ulation at risk, were using modern methods. Of these,
19.9% had been sterilised, 1.0% were using an IUD, and
1.4% were employing other methods such as condoms, dia¬
phragms, creams etc. (Soni 1982). In south India, which
had escaped much of the Emergency pressures, fertility has
fallen faster than in the rest of the country. The nation¬
al Sample Registration System (5RS) revealed that this
process was speeding up in the latter part of the nine¬
teen- s event i es , with, by the end of the decade, a birth
rate of 28 in Karnataka compared to one of 33 for all-India,
revealing a fall of about 30% for the State and 17.5% for
the whole country during the past fifteen years or so. In
other south Indian States the fertility levels are even
lower than in Karnataka. In the rural area of Kar-
nataka studied by Caldwell about 31% of couples of
reproductive age were practising modern birth control
in 1980. (Caldwell,ibid. 1982). This compares well
with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare figures
cited by Jain and Adlekhar (1982) which gives an
all-India urban percentage of 35.5 and a rural per-
fura.L
centage of l6.^pbut only 22.8 urban and 20.3^for Kar¬
nataka. The Chamarajana gar survey shows even higher
levels of acceptance than Caldwell's: 38.6% sterilised
and 8.6% using IUD. If we are to believe the wives in
the Sholiga tribe who claimed to have been rendered
sterile by their traditional method of birth control
(8.7% of the total sample), and the wry comments of
their spouses predispose me tc^give them some credence,
over half (55.9%) of those interviewed in the Chama-
rajanagar survey had taken steps to cease child-bearing,
or believed themselves to have done so. Caldwell gives
a figure of one-third for his field area of Karnataka,
88% by tubectomy, but his figure, prudently, only takes
account of modern contraceptive practice (Caldwell op.
cit. 1982).
When Caldwell's team first began their Kar¬
nataka study in 1979 they expected to find that rural
couples still needed large families for the economic
contribution by children of work and wages. If there
had been a fall in fertility they were inclined to sup¬
pose it to be due to the efforts of the family planning
campaign alone. But, though they did find that child¬
ren, especially those of smallholders, still worked ob¬
ediently, "...we increasingly gathered evidence that
there is now a considerable demand for family limitation
and that a major component of this demand is the economic
burden of a large family" (Caldwell, op.cit. 1982, p. 17).
He might have been speaking of Chamarajanagar^ as we shall
see in Chapter VI below. Although far the largest pro¬
portion of Chamarajanagar respondents gave economic rea¬
sons for accepting modern contraception or wanting small
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families, another important set of reasons reflected
the concern of wives, and sometimes of their husbands,
about having more children than they could physically
cope with. Their arguments not only testified to the
effect of too frequent child-bearing and lactation on
the health of the wives,(many of them, already anaemic,
feared for their lives, as we shall see below), but on
their working and earning capacity, if the couple was
poor. Not that there is anything new in these fears.
In my mother's day she was often approached, as I was
a generation later, by desperate women seeking help in
procuring an abortion or begging for "medicine" to
prevent further pregnancies.
It is not only husbands who force women to
go on child-bearing beyond their own desire to do so,
although the refusal of husbands to consider using any
kind of family planning or birth control, modern or
traditional, was a frequent cause of complaint, but
also other relatives, especially affines. For in¬
stance, a poor Lingayat woman who had undergone a
tubectomy after three children said she had wanted
to have the operation after two, but her mother-in-law
had insisted on her having a third. Another said she
had wanted to cease child-bearing after her penultimate
child, but her own grandfather had urged her to have
one more. All the wives who reported that a mother-
in-law or other relative had insisted on her having
another child against her will were members of the
higher castes. The opinion of 'society' , more or less
synonymous with kin and neighbours, was also frequently
referred to in this context, though usually in associa¬
tion with the desirability of having a child of a par¬
ticular sex, not by any means always a rnale, as we shall
/,
see. Many/informants gave the respect of 'society' as
their reason for having any children at all. However,
judging by my data, husbands appear to be the principal
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culprits, not by any means because they always want
larger families, but because they are so often reluc¬
tant to use any form of contraception. Some of the
low caste men surveyed who said that they only wanted
a couple of children ("How can we feed more ?"), were
using no contraception, modern or traditional, and did
not seem to intend to do so. This is an example of
the south Indian capacity to hold two conflicting
opinions or beliefs at the same time, summed up by
Caldwell as 'a pronouncedly plural attitude towards
life', (Caldwell,op.cit., 1982,p. l6) , and referred
to by Sheryl Daniel as 'the problem of conflicting
models' (in Wadley ed. I98O). The judicious em¬
ployment of conflicting collective representations
has its uses to individuals bent on manipulating
social norms to achieve his/her ends, but unconscious
inconsistency of this sort also has its own uses render¬
ing motivation opaque and confusing impertinent re¬
searchers. It occasioned some hair-tearing on my part,
while leaving my Kannadiga interviewers with their com¬
posure undisturbed.
All the same, times must have changed, at
least in the South, in the decade since Mamdani, Joshi,
Djurfeldt and Lindberg et al. protested in the early
seventies that the family planning programme ignored
the needs and desires of the people. In Chamaraja-
nagar taluk, 88.6% of the wives and 85% of the husbands
interviewed in the course of the survey claimed to pre¬
fer a small family, and a high proportion of these had
taken steps in one way or another to avoid further preg-
** nancies. It is also true, of course, that some of those,
especially the wives, who said they preferred small fami¬
lies actually had large ones which they had subsequently
regretted. Othei-s, as Dandekar pointed out as early as
1959 was often the case, and as the Khanna Study discover¬
ed, had not accepted terminal contraception until they
** It is true that many Knowledge and Practice (KAP)
studies have reported such claims while the stat¬
istical evidence has refuted them. In this case,
the figures seem to confirm that they really mean it.
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already had several children. In some cases this
was for them a solution of desperation, the lesser
of two evils. "We had too many children. We had
to do something". Fear of the aftermath of steri¬
lisation is still an important factor in the rate at
which fertility is falling in the State.
'Almost the whole population believes
that prolonged weakness and pain are
the likely consequences of the oper¬
ation and nearly half of all tubectom-
ised women and a similar proportion
of vasectomised men reported that this
had indeed been the consequence.1.
(Caldwell, op. cit. 1982, p.31).
While nothing like such a high proportion of respon¬
dents complained of after-effects in the Chamaraja-
nagar area, some did, and certainly anxiety about the
possibility is widespread.
All in all, inflation, a monetised economy,
unemployment, and what Caldwell calls the 'wealth flow'
** in the family, all seem to have been instrumental in
altering attitudes to family size in Chamarajana gar and
in speeding up the reduction of fertility during the
past decade. In addition a veneration for education
and in particular an admiration of technical skills and
artefacts associated with or stemming from the West, for
which the terms 'modern' or 'English' are often synon¬
ymous, is bringing about changes in the social climate
which render it susceptible to the arguments and tech¬
niques of the family planning campaign.
'The decisive alteration in the society...
has been economic change...and social
change arising largely not as a direct
product of the economic change, but fuelled
from external sources, and waiting to ex¬
ploit the opportunities presented by the
* * The theory being that when wealth flows from children
to parents, there is motivation for high fertility,
while when the flow is reversed, fertility is re¬
duced. (Caldwell 1976, 1979, 1981, 1982).
destabilisation of the old social
and economic order. The fundamental
element was a basic shift in power,
work and conditions within the family.
The family planning programme was able
to exploit the situation and acceler-
erate fertility decline' (Caldwell
on.cit. 1982, p.36).
Another theory related to fertility decline
which is relevant to the situation in Chainar a j ana gar
is that of J. Knodel, previously referred to in my
Intro du ction.
'The evidence indicates that once the
practice of family limitation starts
to spread among the broader strata of
the population, it seems almost inevi¬
tably to increase until it is a wider-
spread behavioural pattern. In this
respect modern fertility transition
appears to result from the spread of
innovative behaviour and cannot be
viewed simply as an adjustment to new
socio-economic circumstances based on
previously established behavioural
mechanisms' (Knodel, 1977)
Once younger married couples start using modern birth
control, he says, there appears to be no turning back
to|earlier forms of fertility behaviour. Of course,
Knodel's theory and that of Caldwell are not mutually
exclusive. In a way A.K. Jain is expressing both their
views when he suggests that education for women will
bring aboulj/decreased fertility even if they do not find
jobs, simply because they will have been exposed to new
ideas. As a Lingayat woman of Chamarajnagar who had had
a tubectomomy put it: "I did it because they say two
or three children are enough". "They" were not only
her neighbours but also members of the local opinion-
forming elite, mostly (in 'Nagar) female doctors or
members of the Rotary Wives' 'Inner Circle', who go
about dispensing advice and encouragement to less for¬
tunate members of their sex in the true Lady Bountiful
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Indeed the part played by the opinion-forming
elite in the growth of family planning and the reduction
of fertility should not be underestimated. As Avabai
Wadia says
'Movements bringing about fundamental
social changes have often had small and
humble beginnings. They havdusuaily
been initiated by individuals or small
groups of people who....have been so
deeply convinced of the vital import¬
ance of xneir ideas and beliefs that
they have been willing to withstand
opposition and misrepresentation in
the promotion of their cause. This
has been the case with the family plan¬
ning movement in India* (Wadia,1982,p.1).
The movement was instigated by private people, (albeit
educated and quite comfortably-off private people),
voluntary workers have always been deeply involved,
and the Government is now working hand-in-hand with
the private sector. At the rural level the precepts
and practices of local elites in touch with 'external
sources' tend to be accepted and followed by those who
look up to them, and lead to a diffusion of innovation
which tends to become customary in the next generation.
We have seen in an earlier chapter how changes in life¬
style have separated the New from the old elites in Cham-
arajanagar. It is the New, younger, elite who represent
the mould of fashion in the area, and this includes fer¬
tility behaviour.
2: Sterilisation.
Since this is by far the most common method
of family planning practised by Chamarajanagar accept¬
ors, amounting to 38% of the total sample surveyed, it
will be the first to be discussed. Table 2 cross-tab¬
ulates with caste the number of couples of whom either
the wife or the husband had been sterilised. It should
be remembered that in all caste-groups except the Hinter¬
land low castes and the Sholigas tubectomies far outnumber
1 ,QQI OO •
vasectomies (i.e. the former constitute 70.6% of those
sterilised), probably because of a deep-seated association
of vasectomy with castration. In the case of group V,
the HLC, the numbers of tubectomies and vasectomies were
equal, 8 of each, partly one suspects, because the fin¬
ancial contribution of wives to the family income was
higher in this group and therefore more likely to be
missed during the longer recovery period necessitated by
the female operation. In the case of group VI, the Sho-
ligas, there were 3 vasectomies and only one tubectomy,
most of the Sholiga women preferring to rely on their
traditional 'oral contraceptive', prepared from the bark
of a jungle tree. Incidentally the Sholiga wife who had
the tubectomy had only two children, both girls. She said
this was her desired family size, irrespective of sex.
It is noticeable that in caste-group III, the
most sophisticated group, as many as 62% of the couples
interviewed had opted for the sterilisation of either hus¬
band or wife. In the other two high caste groups about
half or nearly half of the couples had also decided on
sterilisation. The percentage of those sterilised in
the two low-caste groups are much lower, which is inter¬
esting in view of X. Mahadevan's findings in Tamilnadu,
mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, whre the
highest percentage of sterilisation acceptors were in
the low-caste group. While most of those interviewed
in the Chamarajanagar group IV do have access (albeit
limited to those who have the bus fare or the energy/time
to walk there), to the town Primary Health Centre, which
has 2 'i beds, or to one or other of the sub-centres (of
which fearful tales are told), their attitude to steri¬
lisation is much the same as that of group V, for whom
access is difficult. Doth sexes fear loss of strength
and thus their ability to earn their living as labourers.
A follow-up study of the psychosocial effects
of sterilisation carried out by the Population Centre in
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Bangalore found that over 60% of both female and male
acceptors felt that they were weaker after they had
recovered from the operation (cf Caldwell 1982, p.31),
besides reporting a reduction in sexual enjoyment. The
researchers suspected that to some extent this reported
loss of health and pleasure might be imaginary, or
rather, psychosomatic, since when the acceptors were
divided into two groups, literate and iiliterate,it
was found that more illiterates claimed to suffer
adverse reactions (Reddy and Raju, 1979)- On the other
hand it is also possible that as literacy is a concomitant
of a reasonable economic status the majority of the lit¬
erate acceptors were able to afford better afcer-care and
a longer period of rest.
Nevertheless, ll6 couples (58.6%) out of our
total sample of 300, had accepted sterilisation of one
or the other spouse, and complaints about distressing
after-effects were rare. In fact a number of respon¬
dents specifically volunteered that their connubial life
had improved since the fear of unwanted conception no
longer haunted them. Furthermore 39% of the sterilised
couples had accepted before the wife reached the age of
31, which looks as though younger people are becoming
less afraid of the operation and more prepared to ter¬
minate their fertility early. Some confirmation of
this supposition is provided in table 20a below. The
mean age of Karnataka tubectomy acceptors in 1978-79
was 29.4 years. (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
198l). According to the PHC records in Chamarajanagar
town the annual number of sterilisation acceptors in the
five-year period 1974-75 to 1979-80 rose from 172 (171
tubectomies and 1 vasectomy), in 1974, to 508 (504 tubect-
omies and 4 vasectomies) in 1979-80. These figures,
which appear to show a steady rise in acceptance, conceal
the fact that there has been a sharp falling-off and
gradual recovery from the 'peak' year of '1976, the year
of the 'Emergency', when there were 823 tubectomies and
147 vasectomies in the taluk. Incidentally, according
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to a study made in 1976 by the Population Centre in
Bangalore, about one fifth of male acceptors are at¬
tracted by the incentive money. This is a cash re¬
ward, now amounting to about Rs. 125.00 ("to include all
expenses) offered to acceptors, whether the operation
is tubectomy or vasectomy. None of the respondents
in the Chamarajanagar survey mentioned this as a reason
for deciding on sterilisation, but it could have been
a contributory factor among the more impoverished couples.
By far the highest percentage, 60% of those
sterilised, accepted when they had category B families,
(2-3 children). It seems likely that more couples
would restrict their family size to two if it were not
for what I call the 'spare son syndrome', to be discus¬
sed in a following chapter. The mean number of living
children at acceptance of sterilisation was 3 ♦ ^ Cha¬
mara janagar taluk, compared with the all-India figure of
3.5 for the same period (cf Jain and Adlakhar, 1932),
and with 3^6 for vasectomy acceptors and 3.7 for tubec¬
tomy acceptors in Karnataka (Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, 1981). The most surprising thing about
these figures is that five (1.6%) of the couples steri¬
lised decided on the operation after only one child. In
the case of a Brahman and (significantly as we shall see),
a poor Lingayat couple, the reason given was that they
wanted to concentrate on the education of that one child
to give him/her the best possible chance in life. The
Brahman couple was Westernised and, probably for that
reason, appeared untroubled that the only child was a
daughter. The Lingayat only child was a son. The
other three cases occurred among low caste couples. In
two of the cases the reason given was the wife's poor
health. In the third case the husband had been married
before and was contributing to the support of three child¬
ren by his first wife. (The one child was a girl and the
wife wanted one more child in the hope of having a boy.
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However her husband had not only refused to agree but
had insisted on her undergoing the operation). Incident¬
ally, when these five couples are added to the eight
Sholiga couples who claimed to have ceased reproduction
after one child, we have a figure of k.3% of the total
sample having decided on only one child, which seems
somewhat unusual for India.
The most frequently reiterated reason given
by acceptors of sterilisation in the Chamarajanagar
survey was their inability to afford more children. Of
the accepting couples, 56.8% of husbands and k2.2% of
wives gave this explanation for their decision to termin¬
ate the procreative period of their lives. The number
of those in each caste-groiip citing this economic ration¬
ale was more or less proportionate to the number of acc¬
eptors in each group, but not quite. More members of
caste-group II, Poor Lingayats, did so that any other
group, followed by the Other High Castes, group III. Since
the Poor Lingayats on the whole combine low income with
high expectations this is understandable. In the case
of the OHC the increasing cost of children was also the
motivation. The 'modern' expenses of higher education
and the gadgetry demanded by the increasingly sophistic¬
ated young - hi-fi equipment, tape recorders, scooters -
have merely increased and not replaced the huge cost of
grand weddings: anything from Rs.15,000 to Rs.20,000 for
a son and Rs.20,000 to Rs.100,000 for a daughter. But
in general the desire to have children, especially sons
of course, capable of earning in the towns so as to con¬
tribute to the family patrimony, (usually but not invar¬
iably land); means economic investment in the child while
the child remains a dependent much longer. At the same
time the cost of food and clothing is rising to make the
support of dependents an increasing burden.
It is ironic that, although the contributions
of educated children, especially in the 'Governmenx job'
so often hopefully mentioned as the much-desired goal
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towards which parents strive, is deemed to be vital
to the survival of the corporate family and family
property, this ambition contains the seeds of its
own destruction. Educated sons, daughters and
daughters-in-law are less biddable. If coerced
they are able, and therefore likely, to break away
from parental control to form their own nuclear house¬
holds. Educated wives tend to have more influence
over their husbands and less fear of their mothers-in-
law. Thus while on thejone hand more and more parents,
especially those with some education themselves, feel
it incumbent upon themselves to invest in. the education
of their children in the hope of a return from those
children's outside earnings, at the same time the re¬
turn in veneration, cooperation and obedience on the
part of children is diminishing. A number of well-off
parents whose income and property would suffice for
their old age were aware of this. They were educating
their children, they said, to enable them to be indepen¬
dent, to stand on their own feet in the world. The re¬
turn they expected was in the form of intangibles such
as pride in the achievements of their young. As the
less sophisticated put it: "They will enable us to
hold up our heads in society. They will bring us a
good name". Although Chamarajanagar respondents did
not always spell it out in this way their comments,
with few exceptions, were to the effect that while in
the past a large family was an asset it was no longer
a worthwhile proposition. The survey showed that by
1979-30 the modal number of children after which a
couple opted for sterilisation was three.
The next most important reason given by both
husbands and wives was the wife's health, or sometimes
the health of both spouses. A great many low caste
women were anaemic as a result of the stresses of preg¬
nancy, lactation, childcare and housework (which includes
the carrying of heavy water vessels, sometimes for
long distances), over and above their daily manual
labour. Some of them felt that child-bearing was
killing them. In some cases the wife confided to
the interviewer that she was so drained and exhaust¬
ed that she was convinced she had not long to live -
and the poor soul may well have been right. Although
a few husbands seemed disinclined to give a thought
to the difficulties of their wives, others were tru¬
ly concerned. Indeed more husbands than wives gave
the wife's health as a reason for sterilisation. In
all 34.4% of those sterilised gave as their reason
the health of one or other of the couple, usually
that of the wife. The wives' fear for their own
health included fears (among the low castes) that
repeated pregnancies and lactation would reduce their
earning capacity in the fields or on the coffee
estates.
The third most frequently cited reason
for acceptance of sterilisation, 24.1% of the accep¬
tors, was the desire to concentrate care and avail¬
able income on the existing children. One may sup¬
pose that this wish had always existed among a large
proportion of the population but that with the avail¬
ability of modern family planning techniques it is
now amenable to fulfilment. It is also possible
that the FP programme has motivated couples to con¬
centrate on quality rather than quantity, so to speak.
One Harijan with two sons and two daughters said he
would not have minded having a fifth child, but had
been persuaded into a vasectomy by a health worker on
the grounds that the four existing children needed all
the nurturing the couple could expend on them. An Upu
liga whose wife had borne him five children, two of
whom had died, described how, while he was in hospital
after an accident, the compounder had talked him into
having a vasectomy while he was there. The manager of
one of the coffee estates had advised a number of his
workers to undergo sterilisation. Their reappearance
from hospital alive and well and able to undertake work
again and their subsequent freedom from anxiety about
unwanted pregnancies encouraged other couples on the
same estate to follow their example.
Several of our male respondents had made cover
arrangements to have a vasectomy, their decisions to do
so having been governed, if not by impulse, at least by
an unilateral resolution which precluded any prior con¬
sultation with kin which might have turned them from
their purpose. In one case a high caste husband from
a strict joint family household, married to a classifi-
catory sister's daughter with mentally handicapped re¬
latives in her lineage background, deeply feared their
production of such a child. After their third normal
child he consulted a doctor secretly and underwent the
operation, to the subsequent outrage of his parents and
relief of his wife. In another a Sholiga husband with
four children took the unprecedented step, for a Sholiga
of travelling to the town to have a vasectomy. He did
so, he explained, because his wife would not take any
steps to avoid further births and his beloved eldest
daughter,eight months pregnant, had just been deserted
by her husband. "Women have so much sorrow", he said,
"I can't bear the thought of seeing another little girl
of mine suffer like that."
While the majority of Chamarajanagar respon¬
dents were well aware of changes in the socio-economic
climate as well as the availability of advice on family
planning, and were willing, often anxious, to discuss,
at times with pithy shrewdness, the reasons for change
and the advantages accruing from family limitation, a
good deal of the fear and doubt referred to above was
also voiced among the poor about the consequences of
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sterilisation. Many of the wives who wanted to cease
child-bearing nevertheless said they dared not have
the operation "Because I can't afford to rest after¬
wards", or "I can't afford to be weakened, as I have
to do manual labour". On the other hand, when a couple
did agree on sterilisation more often than not, as we
have seen, it was the wife who had the operation, not
only because of the castration association for vasect¬
omy, but because in most cases it is still the husband's
well-being which is more important in economic terms to
both spouses. Nor does this situation look like alter¬
ing in the near future. Of the 69 Chamarajana gar
couples,(23/o of those interviewed) who proposed to use
family planning in the future, 36 (52% of these couples)
planned for a tubectomy. In Mahadevan's 1979 Tamil-
nadu survey more low caste couples planned for steril¬
isation in the future than did members of any other
group. In Chamarajana gar this situation was reversed,
with more high caste than low caste couples planning for
future sterilisation.
3« Modern Contraception and 'Bark Juice'
Table 2 gives the distribution of those couples
who alleged that they were using some form of family plan¬
ning. It reveals that only 10% of group III were not
using any specific kind of family planning compared with
20% of group I. The Sholigas take third place in this
table, with 28% unprotected, followed by group II, the
Poor Lingayats (30% 'at risk'), group IV (3^% 'at risk')
and lastly, group V, with 38% 'at risk'. However, these
figures fail to include the twelve pregnant wives in our
survey, 2 in group 1, 1 in group III, 5 in group IV, 3 in
group V, and 1 in group VI. The term 'at risk' is used
for convenience only, since many of those not using contra¬
ception wanted children. The questions of voluntary abor¬
tion and lactation will be discussed below. This table
indicates that of those who were using modern contracep¬































































and more urbanised groups, I, II, and III. Eight per
cent of all couples in the sample were using an IUD,
8 (2.7%) were using a condom or nirodh, and only one
(0.35'o/was on the 'pill'. She was needless to say,
a 'westernised member of caste-group III. Only two
couples in caste-group IV were using modern contra¬
ceptives, one nirodh and one IUD. In both cases, a
higher 'class' status had been achieved through educ¬
ation and a reasonably-paid Government job. Apart
from these no low caste couples were using contra¬
ceptives. By contrast, 52% of Sholiga wives report¬
ed that they had taken bark-juice.
Before going on to discuss the use of trad¬
itional methods of family limitation among all groups
in the sample surveyed, it is necessary to devote some
space to the subject of Sholiga contraception. An
interesting ethnographic sidelight revealed by the
survey is the circumstance that whereas Sholigas had
the highest percentage of category A families (0-1
children), and caste-group V, the Hinterland Low
Castes, the highest percentage of category C families
(^-8 children), both these groups occupy a habitat
well outside the normal range of family planning pro¬
paganda, advice and assistance. The members of
group V mostly live near the foot of the Billigiri-
rangan range or on the hills as coffee plantation
workers. Sholigas live on the hills and nowhere
else. It might have been supposed that both these
illiterate and impoverished groups would have had
large families. But whereas we found a good deal
of ignorance of family planning and fear of modern
methods of contraception among group V, the majority
of Sholiga women claimed to be able to control their
fertility at will by resorting to specialist women
who provide them with a brew made from the powdered
bark of a tree known to them as the Kambi Mara which
has since been tentatively identified as either
Gardenia latifolia or Gardenia gummeria . Accoriing to
Sholiga informants the powdered bark is mixed with raw
sugar and taken, after a ritual hairwash, on the third
day of menstruation. This is repeated for the next
two menstrual cycles, and sexual abstinence must be
observed for six months. The upshot of all this is
that the menses are said to cease after the third month,
and the women insist that they are then sterile. There
was some difference of opinion as to whether this con¬
stituted permanent sterility. Most of the wives who
had taken 'bark juice' believed themselves to be no
longer at risk of pregnancy for good, but a few said
they were using the specific to postpone the next preg¬
nancy. An even smaller number said that the bark had
unpleasant side-effects and that they dared not take it.
Whether or not the Kainbi Mara bark is actually instru¬
mental in enabling Sholiga wives to regulate their child
bearing with such apparent success remains to be seen.
In the comparatively few cases we came across of their
having large families it was always because they wished
to have them, but it seems likely that a number of other
factors in combination contribute to the desired effect,
as we shall see in the following chapters.
The Sholiga husbands were as convinced of the
efficacy of 'bark juice' as were the wives, and it is
indicative of the autonomy of the women of the tribe
that the men appeared to have no control over the sit¬
uation and were resigned to the consequences. In the
case of one wife who had taken the juice after only one
child, a girl, and who said firmly at her interview,
"I don't want any boys", the unfortunate husband said
that he would have preferred a child of each sex but
that he could not prevent his wife from following her
inclination. In another case where the couple had only
one living child, again a girl, both spouses had wanted
a second child to take the place of an infant who had di
But the wife's mother thought that two pregnancies
were enough for her daughter and persuaded her to
take 'bark juice'. "I had hoped for another," the
husband said philosophically, but she has taken
'bark juice1 and now it is not possible". This is
a typical Sholiga reversal of the more normal sit¬
uation in India where the wife is often persuaded
against her will by relatives to bear another child.
In a third case where the husband was not consulted
his wife had decided to cease child-bearing and had
taken the potion after one child, a boy. The husband,
unaware of this, confided to the interviewer that he
hoped their next child would be a girl. However,
most Sholiga husbands were aware that their wives
had resorted to this form of contraception (or sup¬
posed contraception), and some applauded the decis¬
ion. One, whose wife had taken it after one child,
a daughter, said, "We only want one child to love and
look after. I don't care which sex it is". Another,
with two girls, supported his wife's action saying,
"Two children are enough. It doesn't matter whether
they are male or female".
Until the bark of the Kambi Mara has been
analysed it seems wiser to reserve judgment on its
efficacy or otherwise. It is true that a combination
of other variables could well account for the lower
fertility of this group, but on the other hand one
would suppose that the women would know what they
were talking about when they claimed that they had
ceased menstruating after several doses of the stuff.
Colin Turrbull, Mary Douglas, and the contributors to
the symposium on 'Man the Hunter', all agree that pri¬
mitive structures which must encourage maximal use of
the environment are likely to necessitate forms of
birth control,although they admit that little is known
about such control in these communities, apart from
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the fairly widespread method of (generally female)
infanticide (Turnbull 1972, Douglas 1975, Lee and
De Vore 19 68 ) .
4. Single-purpose Traditional Contraceptive Practice
Table 2 shows that comparatively low per¬
centages of caste-groups I, II, and III reported the
practice of traditional methods, whereas around one
third of IV, V and VI claim to use these methods.
Prior to collapsing the values, it was revealed that
group V had the highest percentage of those claiming
to postpone or avoid further pregnancies by means of
sexual abstinence. Sholigas had the highest percen¬
tage of all users of traditional methods, with 52)c
using 'bark juice' and 10% practising rhythm or absti¬
nence. Only three respondents were practising coitus
interruptus, two in caste-group III and one in caste-
group II. These are of course both urbanised, or
fairly urbanised, groups. The three rural groups
did not seem to be aware of this method. Of those
using traditional methods 21% relied on rhythm. Since
these were fairly evenly divided between six groups
and included Sholigas, it may be concluded that this
is a method which has been known and practised in the
past .
Turning to the 41.4% of those Chamarajana gar
respondents using traditional methods of family plan¬
ning who claimed to have resorted to abstinence, the
majority of these reported that they were abstaining
because they had enough children. But there are other
xmportant reasons for abstinence which have the same
effect on fertility. The primary one is that of perm¬
anent (terminal) abstinence on the grounds of having
adult children of marriageable age. It is still, among
those who cling to traditional beliefs, regarded as
shameful for a couple who are grandparents or potent-
xal grandparents to have a child. It is more a
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question of etiquette than a taboo ana sanctions
against its infringement are unlikely to be more
severe than the gossip and head-shaking of neigh¬
bours and kin. Nevertheless in the past it was
a thing that was 'not done' and this is still the
case today among the more traditionally oriented,
to the amusement of some of the young.
Two couples, one Sholiga and one from
group III, were already abstaining permanently
although the wife was only thirty-one, while fif¬
teen (15) couples with wives aged thirty-two to
forty had also opted to cease having children by
this method, all on the grounds that they had mar¬
ried children. When it is remembered how early
girls in India tend to be married, it is not par¬
ticularly surprising that a number of the women in
our cohort had children of marriageable age. Alto¬
gether 19.6% of the total sample claimed to be ab¬
staining permanently. It was hard for the respon¬
dents themselves to disentangle their motivations,
but 11.3% of them seemed sure that their reason was
to restrict family size on account of expense or
inability to cope with more offspring, while 8.3%
explained their decision in terms of grown children.
It is possible, of course, that the use of tradition¬
al methods such as abstinence, 'rhythm' and the rare
coitus interruptus overlapped even if only one method
was mentioned in the questionnaire interview.
5. Voluntary Abortion
Although the sole purpose of abortion is
to prevent an unwanted addition to the family and it
is a method of immemorial usage in south India as else¬
where, it has been discussed under a separate heading
rather than included with other single-purpose birth
control practices. This is because it does not involve
an adjustment of sexual practices and also because it is
socially deprecated in our area. It is hard to say
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whether this type of fertility regulation is actually
infrequently resorted to in Chamarajanagar or simply
under-reported. Many wives have abortions without
the knowledge and possibly against the wishes of their
husbands and are therefore afraid of being found out.
In the course of the fieldwork, we were approached by
several poor and illiterate low caste wives who were
pregnant, had not told their husbands, and wanted an
abortion. It is possible that in some of these cases
the woman had been involved in an extra-marital affair.
But it is also true, as the Mysore Population study
(UN 1951) revealed, that men and their kin tend to
desire a greater number of children than do their
wives, who have to bear them and look after them. Still,
it is true on the whole, as Srinivas points out, that
"Women may not have the status to resist unwanted con¬
ceptions but they do have the knowledge and ability to
abort" (Srinivas 1977, p.l4). The 1971 Medical Termin¬
ation of Pregnancy Act made abortion in India legal in
the case of rape, contraceptive failure or medical
grounds, and most of the abortions reported to inter¬
viewers were procured legally through doctors at the PHC
or nurses at rural clinics and achieved either by dila¬
tion and curettage, or by injection. The figures for
those reporting abortions to the interviewers are as
follows:
Caste-group I: 6% of group
Caste-group II: 10% of group
Caste-group III: k% of group
Caste-group IV: 10% of group
Caste-group V: 8% of group
Caste-group VI: 6% of group
These figures are not very high and it is
that all groups under-reported, especially
It was said that the nurse at. the plan-
spensary added to her income by procuring






doctor. According to case histories I collected in
the course of informal interviews, women may attempt
abortion by taking abortifacients such as the seeds of
the 'drumstick tree' (Murungakai) , or go to old women
who use horrific methods such as the insertion of sticks
or applications of powdered chillies to cause a spasm
of the uterus. Some of those I was told of were ulti¬
mately successful but others resulted in sepsis or seri¬
ous illness. We heard of one woman who died and ano¬
ther who had to have a hysterectomy to save her life.
In one case the husband urged his wife to abort, so
the gossip went, and she took somet^hing which blinded
her. One woman said her husband was so anxious not to
have another child that xvhen she became pregnant he made
her watch the total eclipse of February 19&0. When this
unusual remedy failed, to his disappointment, he sent her
to have a legal D.& C.
On the whole attitudes to abortion in all caste-
groups in my sample were mildly disapproving. In none of
them did it appear to be a major method of birth control
as in the case of the Tamilnadu Gounders studied by Maha-
devan (op.cit. 1979 ) • In fact the situation in Chamaraja-
nagar resembles that described by MandeTbaum when he wrote,
'...despite a general condemnation of induced abortion by
villagers it appears that a good many of the elder village
women,and a few of the younger, have obtained abortion,
generally by crude means.' (Mandelbaum 197^, p.74b). Another
reason why induced abortion is not included in table 2
is because nearly all those reported by wives in the
survey were 'one-off' affairs, and the respondents could
hardly be said to be currently 'practising' this method,
whether it was achieved by modern or traditional means.
An exception is the case of an Upuliga woman with two
sons and a daughter, her ideal family, who said she had
ended one unwanted pregnancy by taking the Murangakai
abortifacient and intended to do so again should she
become pregnant in the future.
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6. >jultipurposive Traditional Family Planning Practices
Ritual Abstinence
Apart from the grounds for abstinence discus¬
sed above, which have been termed 'single purpose' since
their sole intention is that of birth control, two other
practices involving abstinence must contribute consid¬
erably to the reduction of fertility in the area. The
first is that of avoidance of intercourse on special or
sacred days of the week, as well as over the period of
the major religious festivals. Cf couples in the sample
as a whole ^9 • 3% refrained from intercourse on one^ (51«7%),
two (15%) i ®r three (2.7"') days in the week. Cf these,
the smallest number, eleven couples (or 7 • '±% of those
abstaining on certain days) were members of group III,
the generally more sophisticated OHC. In all the other
groups over twenty couples, about k0% of the group,ab¬
stained for one, two or three days of the week. The
highest proportion (38 couples or 76% of the group),
was found among group V, the Hinterland Low Castes.
A second and more important category of abstin¬
ence is post-partum abstinence, which is truly multi-
purposive, since it is intended to secure the best and
most tender care for the mother, (and it is held that
only her own family or kutumba will provide that), the
best chance of survival for the infant, and also to en¬
sure an adequate birth interval. In south Karnataka it
is the custom for wives to return to their parental home
for some months before the birth of their first child, as
well as for the second and often subsequent births, and
yKti
to remain there for at least six months after^ birth or
longer - sometimes over a year in the past. This'^known
as the 'child-care period', but its underlying and often
unacknowledged function is to separate the spouses to
avoid a premature resumption of sexual relations.
205.
Post-partum abstinence is therefore an accepted
method of reducing fertility, though - as in the case of
other local customs - fears about its contravention were
more powerful in the past. Replies to questions on post¬
partum abstinence in the Chamarajanagar survey were collap¬
sed into three periods: 6 months or under, 7 months to
one year, and over one year. Of those who abstained for
only six months or less the highest percentage, 26.3%,
was found in group III, OHC, which is to be expected.
The next highest percentage for this short period was
caste-group IV, which may help to explain the high rate
of reproduction in this group. Of those who abstained
for 7 months to a year after the birth, the highest per¬
centage was in group III, followed by group V. And those
whcjabstaine d, or said they abstained, for more than a year
after the birth of a child were nearly all Sholigas (86% of
their group), with only three cases from other caste-groups.
As Caldwell says, the main reason for post-natal
abstinence has been to maximise the duration of lactation
and thus the likelihood of the child's survival (Caldwell,
1977). In the context of south Karnataka he found that
informants claimed that the period had been shortening at
least since the nineteen-forties, and that it had previous¬
ly been about two years. Today, because control of such
matters is ceasing to be the prerogative of the older gen¬
eration, it is being eroded by young husbands who exert
pressure on the wives to resume sexual relations after
about six months of abstinence. As a matter of interest,
since so many Sholiga wives claim to practise post-partum
abstinence for over a year, the question of their husbands'
attitude arises. One suspects that their wives'insistence
on lengthy abstinence causes husbands to wander, new liaisons
to be set up, and wives to depart in disgust. Tho\igh many
Sholiga marriages are permanent partnerships, others seem
to consist of a kind of serial monogamy. (Nor is it only
husbands wto take the initiative in abandoning their spou¬
ses. A Sholiga friend of mine described with amusement
how his wife's brother had been left by five wives in succes¬
sion, ostensibly because they objected to his bossy mother).
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Lactation. The subject of lactation is linked
■with that of post-partum abstinence, since In our area,
as in other parts of India, it is believed t^at to engage
in sexual intercourse during the early months of lact¬
ation is to endanger the child through 'spoiling' the
milk, as well as to risk the emasculation of the husband.
Table 3 shows that for caste-groups I, Rich Lingayats,
III, CHC, and IV, Town and around Low Castes, one year
was the most frequently given period for lactation. For
group II, Poor Lingayats, the period was divided equally
between one and two years. Group V, Hinterland Low
Castes, had a higher percentage (33% of the group) of
wives breast-feeding for two years than for any other
other period, and Sholigas were the only group in which
considerable numbers (37«6% of the group) of wives breast¬
fed for three to six years. The two wealthier groups,
I and III, included high percentages (20% and 25% respect¬
ively) of wives breast-feeding for less than one year.
These are the two groups most likely to be able to make
informed and successful use of commercial substitutes
for mother's milk, to say nothing of their ability, in
general, to afford it. A surprising fact revealed by
this table is the very large numbers of wives in group
IV who breast-fed for only one year. This is a poor
group, and although they are more urbanised than V and VI
one would have expected them to have made more use of the
economical form of feeding, and comparatively reliable
method of child spacing, provided by lactation. It is
possible that since they are the more urbanised of the
low caste groups, they have been seduced by milk-powder
advertising posters. Mandelbaum suggests that poor
women may have shorter lactation periods because the
death of their infants reduces the time after which
they become fecund again (Mandelbaum 197^, p.^1). But
this does not explain why in this group their early-
mortality figures were 1ower than those of group V, and
indeed of group I.
Table3:BreastFeedingbyCast :P rcentageDistribut ons
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jl : 14 months
Caste-group II: 17 month s
Cast e-group III: 10 months
Caste-group IV: 17 months
Caste-group V: 20 months
Caste-group VI: 27 months
On the whole these averages do reflect the re¬
spective differences in income, urbanisation and compara¬
tive Westernisation in the groups. Echoing the comments
of Chamarajana gar elders, Caldwell tells us that in south
Karnataka in the past:
'Breastfeeding was of....longer duration.
Thus in the 1940s the great majority of
women breast-fed for two years and many
for three to five years.' (Caldwell, op.
cit . 1982, p . 13 ) •
It will be remembered that the authors of the
Bangalore Population Unit's comparison of the Mysore and
Bangalore Population Studies noted that as a result of
partial abandonment of traditional socio-cultural checks:
'
. . . .the fertility of married women aged
below 30 years has recorded a substantial
increase .... indicating that the spacing
between children has narrowed.... during the
past two decades.' (Srinivasan, Reddy and
Raju, op.cit. 1977, p.270).
The time-honoured customary checks mentioned by the authors
were those I have been discussing under the heading of
Multipurposive Practices. In Chamarajanagar prolonged
post-natal abstinence and lactation, along with abstin¬
ence on certain days of the week or month, are still prac¬
tised in a modified form, and the fact that they co-exist
with the acceptance by some members of all caste-groups of
modern forms of contraception may help to explain the re¬
latively lok family size figures for our sample. The fi¬
gures for birth intervals are as follows:
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The figures for birth intervals are as follows:
Caste-group I: to •
Caste-group II: 3.22
Ca s t e-group III: 2.90
Caste-group IV: 2.95
Caste-group V: 3.^2
Ca s t e-group VI: 3.35
int erval
According to an eminent Mysorean anthropologist:
'Most of the prac
to as traditiona










ing the health o
of restricting b
tices which have been referred
1 methods of restricting births
explicitly concerned with the
. They are merely part of the
in which people live, and which
al effect on fertility. It is
tinguish those factors whose in-
is to restrict births from those
egral part of fertility beha-
st-partum taboos, child-rearing
stinence are methods of dealing
f honour and shame, or safeguard-
f mother and child, rather than
irths' (Srinivas 1977, p.9).
These questions of honour and shame can be
seen as the concurrent motivations which go hand in
hand with those of family planning in the multi-pur¬
posive practices. It seems hard to believe, with due
respect^ that the cultural practices mentioned above
are as adventitious in their effects as Srinivas sug¬
gests. Terminal abstinence to avoid the shame of
bearing a child when one's daughter is an actual or
potential mother may not be practised to keep to a
given family size, but its purpose is none the less
to prevent further births to the actual or potential
grandparents. Breast feeding is of course primarily
a matter of nurture but Chamarajanagar wives are also
well aware that it tends of itself to inhibit conception.
In fact they tend to place too much reliance on their
freedom from risk at this time. A Chamarajanagar doctor
told me that women often said to her, "But I can't be
pregnant. I'm still breast feeding". Breast-feeding
more frequently than six-hourly may delay the resumption
of ovulation and menstruation by about a year (cf.Mandel-
baum 1974) , but women breast-feeding on demand older
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older children partially weaned in the belief that they
are protected from conception may be caught out that way.
It happened to my next-door neighbour in Somaravarapet,
who was occasionally breast-feeding a four-year-old boy
when she conceived. When her abdomen began to swell she
went to the doctor, believing herself to be seriously ill.
In the same way the 'child care period' so often
referred to by Chamarajanagar people, during which wives
do often remain in their parents' home, is primarily con¬
cerned with the health of mother and child, but it is well
understood that one of the ways in which it safeguards
their health is by preventing an untimely conception.
While there are too many Chamarajana gar women who are still
ignorant of or afraid of modern methods of family planning,
they are able and willing to manipulate cultural norms con¬
cerning marriage and childbirth in attempting to avoid fur¬
ther pregnancies. It is, however, true to say that such
factors as lactation and post-partum abstinence are by no
means always regarded as directly affecting control of fer¬
tility. Perhaps this was the reason why some wives found
it hard to remember precisely the length of such periods
except in the case of their last child.
6. Discussion
Acceptance of family planning has been equated
with termination of fertility in the case of those steril¬
ised (38.6%), or using an IUD, (5%), which accounts for
43.6% of all the couples interviewed. A further 8,3% had
settled for permanent or terminal abstinence, having reached
the grandparental stage of their lives. This gives us just
over half the sample highly unlikely to continue reproduc-
fion. Another 7.6% of those interviewed also claimed to be
now sterile. These were the Sboliga women who had taken
'bark juice', and were, they alleged, no longer menstruating.
A further 38 couples (12.6%) were using condoms or such
methods as safe period, temporary abstinence and coitus
interruotus. Of these, l4 couples, (4.6% of those inter¬
viewed), said they were currently using contraception to
avoid more pregnancies altogether. This gives us
67.5% of the couples interviewed whose intention was
to cease child-bearing. Of the 32.5% remaining, 12
wives were pregnant (k%). Forty-three couples, or
l4.3/'t|of all the couples, planned for sterilisation
in the near future, most of them after one child, and
nearly all of them for tubectomy. Of those who said
they did not intend to use birth control in the future,
twenty-seven couples (9%)? said they wanted another
child or more children. The rest were nearly all
afraid or ignorant of the whole business of contra¬
ception.
It would be naive to assume no failure rate
with traditional methods of contraception, or indeed
with the use of a nirodh. A strong element of wish¬
ful thinking was detectable in the replies of couples
in groups IV and V, the low castes,who claimed to be
relying on abstinence and safe period, and it is no¬
table that only 8% of group II, the most sophisticated
of the impoverished groups, were relying on such met¬
hods. As for Sholigas, it is hard to say. Twenty-
two per cent of those Sholigas not already using some
kind of fertility control said they were planning to
use 'bark juice' shortly. Whether or not this prev¬
entive measure does turn out to inhibit menstruation,
their reliance on it in conjunction with what appears
to be systematic use of Multi-Purposive checks on
fertility seems to be quite effective.
In the case of the Sholigas, and perhaps
also of group II, there appears to be a direct asso¬
ciation between lengthy lactation and post-partum
abstinence and fewer children. This is also true
of group IV, which, with relatively short periods of
lactation and post-partum abstinence, has the great¬
est number of children. The figures for these groups
appear to testify that the Multi-Purposive cultural
practices of some Chamarajanagar castes have been im¬
portant determinants of low fertility even today,
whether intentionally or not. But group V presents
us with a puzzle. With the second longest mean
breast feeding period and a fairly high record of
post-partum abstinence, one would expect their fer¬
tility to be lower, especially as they had the longest
birth intervals. One explanation may be that their
family planning relies on lactation and abstinence to
the exclusion of other methods.
In his paper, The Evolution of Human Repro-
duction (previously mentioned in the Introduction),
R.V. Short states that 'Throughout the world as a
whole more births are prevented by lactation than all
other forms of contraception put together' (Short,
1976, p.l7)» He argues that amenorrhoea is the natur¬
al state of the human female, that in a 'primitive'
closed society women would be in a state of pregnancy,
lactation or post-partum amenorrhoea from a few years
after puberty to menopause, and that births would oc¬
cur at intervals of about four years. (cf. Demography
of the Dobe jKung, Howell, 1979 )* Now although the
Sholigas are the nearest of our representative groups
to the type of hunter—gatherers described above, and
though they do appear to have the longest periods of
lactation and post-partum abstinence, resulting in
mean birth intervals approaching four years, the major-
ity of them manifestly do not have^families of about
seven children such practices should produce, given
their low child-mortality figures. Instead, as we
have seen, caste-group V fits in much better with the
pattern of prolonged child-bearing ending with a fair¬
ly large but well-spaced family postulated by Short
for the 'primitive' woman. Sholiga wives, on the con¬
trary, if their current family size figures are anythin
to go by, appear to cease child-bearing when they wish
do so, which is often after one or two children. They
claim to achieve this result by using their purposive
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contraceptive, the bark of the Kambi Mara, and to date we
have no way of disproving this claim. Of course this is
not to say that some Sholiga wives do not adhere to the
natural norm suggested by Short.
Except in the case of group V the birth inter¬
vals make quite good sense. The mean birth interval
for caste-group III need not give us pause, as this group
goes in for the shortest periods of lactation and post¬
natal abstinence, preferring to use modern contraceptives
for spacing or to concentrate their reproductive efforts
into the early years of the wife's fertile period. Caste-
group II, which has - after the Sholiga - the least number
of children, breast-fed and abstained, on average, longer
than the other two high caste groups, thus accounting for
their longer mean birth interval.
A further significant though as yet unexplained
feature is implicit in the following percentages for wives
in each caste-group whose first child was not born until







It will be noted that Sholigas had the highest
percentage of wives reporting such a gap. In the cases
of other groups, with the exception of the relatively
modernised group III, the early or post-puberxal steril¬
ity of those girls married at or shortly after puberty
is likely to account for this phenomenon, at least part¬
ially, but this does not apply with such force to Sho¬
ligas, who have the highest mean age at marriage of all
castes after group III, (OHC). Among the Sholiga wives
reporting such a gap those with only one child had a
i
mean gap ofj5 • 3 years between consummation and first birth,
Among the 30% of Sholiga wives with only one child, many
women specifically volunteered the information that
they had been using indigenous herbal potions to avoid
having a first child too soon. Since their ages at
marriage ranged from l6 to 2k years early post-puber-
tal infertility can be discounted and it is hard to
explain the length of time during which they remained
infertile if the possible efficiency of their contra¬
ceptive methods is to be entirely discounted. Unless
of course, the explanation for their overall relative
infertility lies in undisclosed sexual practices.
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CHAPTER VIII THE STATUS OF IvOMEN AND FERTILITY
We have already looked at the question of the
status of women in India through the lenses of anthro¬
pological theory, mythology and cosmology, to say
nothing of facts and figures derived from such prosaic
sources as the Registrar General's Office. This chap¬
ter will examine the ways in which aspects of female
standing and roles may affect fertility in India as a
whole, in south India, as represented by south Kar-
nataka, and in Chamarajnagar taluk.
In 1973 R.G. Amonker observed that: 'Women
have been forced to believe that child-bearing and
child-rearing are their only goals in life' (Amonker
1973, p.39). He suggested that this state of affairs
directly contributed to population growth in the coun¬
try. Three years later his premise was supported by
R.H. Cassen, who noted with some pessimism:
'Economic development is only very gradually
diffusing the correlates of fertility decline.
This is particularly the case with the status
of women, which is changing extremely slowly
in any aspect one looks at.....One might well
believe that as long as women have little chance
of enjoying status-giving activities outside
the family, whil^rithin it status may actually
depend on child-bearing, the prospect of major
fertility decline are for this reason alone
somewhat slim' (Cassen, 1976 , p. 1175).
Toward the end of the decade a growing number of demo¬
graphers and sociologists were reaching the same con¬
clusion, the most insistent voice among them being that
of Ashok Mitra. The social status of women, he main¬
tains, is probably the most important single factor gov¬
erning India's present population dilemma (Mitra 1978,
1980).
At the beginning of the eighties this perception
was further refined and elaborated upon by the contribu¬
tors to D.E. Sopher's An Exploration of India, who re¬
vealed through their research into sex ratios, differential
literacy and the spatial structure of marriage in
India a significant cultural dichotomy between north
and south India, on which anthropological discussion
had previously been mainly confined to the field of
kinship (Sopher et al., 1980). Their findings have
already been touched upon in the Introduction to this
thesis, and it will be recalled that the regional dif¬
ferences in 'woman's place' they disclosed (i.e. a
very high value for masculinity in the North and a
somewhat more equitable orientation in the South),
were confirmed in the following year by Babara Miller
in her book, The Endangered Sex (Miller 1981). These
arguments receive ample support from the contributors
to the cross-cultural collection of papers, Women's
Role and Population Trends in the Third World (Anker,
Buvinic and Youssef, 1982), many of whom plead for a
recognition of the importance of women's work in the
household^ its relationship with their participation
in the labour market, and the effect of both on their
status and fertility.
The literature on gender relations in India, in¬
cluding the polarisation of cultural patterns which pro¬
duce low female status along with high birth and death
rates in the North and North-Vest and comparatively
better female status along with relatively favourable
demographic performance has been synthesised (see my
Introduction), by Tim Dyson and Mick Moore in their
paper on regional contrasts in India, (Dyson and Moore,
1983). In this paper, it may be remembered, the au¬
thors draw our attention to the differential effects
on fertility arising out of the contrasting traditions
of north and south India. The contrasting principles
of north and south Indian kinship which the authors be¬
lieve to be a key contributing factor to lower fertility
in the South have already been discussed in my chapter
on kinship. To recapitulate, isogamic marriage (or the
social and ritual equivalence of affines, and indeed of
siblings); approval of marriage to kin; relatively equal
contributions to marriage expenses by the parents of both
bride and groom; the retention of parental and sibling
ties by females; all subserve a higher estimate of the
worth of females. They are also conducive to a some¬
what greater freedom of choice and movement for women,
depending of course on community and class as well as
on the individual situation, for south Indian women.
In Chamarajanagar, on the whole, and depending
again on caste and on class to some extent, the posit¬
ion can be summed up roughly thus: when it comes to the
sex of children, boys are more desirable than are girls,
but unlike north India, where the birth of a girl is a
disaster in an orthodox family, girls are far from ne¬
gligible. Indeed they have an important part to play-
in the family schema. Many years ago, when a man em¬
ployed on my parents' coffee estate took leave because
his wife was about to give birth, my father (who had
three daughters and no sons), said dutifully, "I hope
it will be a boy". The man chided him reproachfully:
"You, of all people, should know that whatever sex it
is, it will be loved and wanted." This reply seems to
sum up fairly accurately the kind of attitude which is
the norm in the taluk, with the reservation that, after
the first-born child, less care may be taken of girls.
For instance, many couples will take an ailing second
daughter to the public hospital where they would have
taken a son to a private doctor. I shall deal in more
detail with questions of the value of children in a la¬
ter chapter, but would like to emphasise here that by
and large women in the taluk appeared to be manifestly
less disadvantaged than they are in the northern and
north-western States, and that this does seem to be
reflected in their fertility.
While it became increasingly clear in the course
of the survey that the desire for an extra son almost
certainly mitigated against fertility decline in the
area, the desire for a daughter was very strong among
218.
couples with no girls. "Girls are auspicious", 03.- "A
girl in the house bring happiness" were phrases common¬
ly used. Many couples wanted a girl 'Tor love and af¬
fection". Indeed one of the most commonly encountered
plural attitudes in Chamarajana gar are the dual convic¬
tions that on the one hand girls are not much use to par¬
ents when they grow up as "they will only get married",
and that on the other girls love their parents more than
boys do and can be more relied upon to care for them in
sickness or other troubles. An illustration of the lat¬
ter sentiment was the reaction of a Chamarajanagar Brah¬
man when asked his opinion on what has been described as
'the indigenous belief' that a woman's bodily substance
becomes transmuted in the course of the wedding ceremony
from that of her father's line to that of her husband's.
IU o i—
(cf -^ggi.'Jntrurdu-c-tiion tc. this thesis; Or ens t e in , 19 70 ; David,
1973; Carter,1973; Fruzetti et al.,1976). He was most
indignant. "How could she change ? If her blood chang¬
ed to that of her husband's lineage, how could she go on
loving her parents, brothers and sisters as girls do ?"
The feelings thus expressed have been strengthened in
recent years by a phenomenon to which Caldwell also refers
(Caldwell,1982, p.22). Sons, especially those with some
education, today try to get jobs in the towns, with the
full approbation of the parents, since that was the in¬
tention in educating them. But once they move out they
tend to lose interest in their parents and their rural
natal place. The possibility of sons failing them is
now well recognised by married couples in south Karnataka.
A second son is frequently desired because "if one is bad,
the other may help", but often a daughter is desired be¬
cause it is believed that her parents' welfare remains par¬
amount with her. A daughter is never entirely lost to
her kutumba, or family, in south India, as she is in the
North. This tradition is not only institutionalised by
the usage of cross-cousin and sister's daughter marriage,
by which sisters and brothers renew their ties, and by the
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wife's annual holiday with her parents and her retreat to
their household to bear her children, but also by the fact
that daughters in the South are entitled and expected to
return to their parents if their marriages turn out to be
disastrous. Daughters are therefore increasingly regard¬
ed as a fall-back support in the event of betrayal by sons.
The gist of all this is that in general women in
south India do have allies who may back them up should
their desire to cease child-bearing be ignored by husbands
and husband's kin. An illustrative case is that of one
Chamarajanagar high caste wife who wanted to stop after
three children, but whose husband insisted that he wanted
more sons. When she became pregnant for the fourth time
and went to her parents' house for the birth she refused,
with her parents' support, to return to him until he agre¬
ed to her having a tubectomy first.
A further development of this theme suggests an
amendment to the submission by Amonker and Cassen that
women may have large families because child-bearing is
their only way of achieving prestige. While this is
undoubtedly the case with the majority of high caste, non-
working, restricted women, it does not follow that unsans-
kritised women - at any rate in south Karnataka - have
large families to gain prestige. Not only does constant
child-bearing wear them out but it also prevents them
from working in the fields during the later stages of
pregnancy and so of contributing to the family income.
Also the fact that marriage among them is not stable,
particularly with regard to our caste-group V and the
Sholigas, makes large families a disadvantage. While
divorce is fairly rare now even among the low castes be¬
cause, they allege, even caste panchayats today demand
bribes in return for favourable decisions, separations
and common-law unions are quite frequent and the prob¬
lem of what to do with the children remains. As we
have seen, I was approached again and again in 'Nagar
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by low caste women who wanted me to procure than an
abortion because, they said, they could not cope,
either physically or economically, with another child.
Given the occasional exception, most couples among the
poor low caster-groups wanted at least two or three chil¬
dren, and it may be correct, as Srinivas suggests, that
they do not have preconceptions about optimum family
size. But there does not seem to be any particular
prestige attached to a large family now, whatever was
the case in the past, and indeed, as soon as they feel
that they cannot cope with any more, the women are only
too anxious to cease child-bearing. On the other hand,
it seems that among the orthodox, sanskritised high cas¬
tes, where the women are restricted, the bearing of many
children may still confer status on a wife, so long as
the family, whether joint or nuclear, is able to afford
it. But with the rising cost of living the number of
them who can is steadily decreasing.
1: Wife's Age at Marriage
A cardinal feature of the tangle of myths,
beliefs, customary usages and masculine self-inter¬
est surrounding the image of the female in India is
the stress on early marriage. Apart from the Wester¬
nised and the highly educated, women in Chamarajana-
gar marry young (or rather are married since the mat¬
ter is more often than not out of their hands),
either before or shortly after the onset of puberty.
They are married young because of an intense anxiety
on the part of parents, and sometimes of brothers, to
shuffle them off into this honourable state as soon as
possible. One element of this general idea is that a
woman's primary role is that of a mother, especially
the mother of sons. Another, as we have seen, is con¬
cern about her purity, both as a virgin and as a wife,
the transmitter, if not the vehicle, of the 'blood' of Kar
husband's patrilineage. The latter perturbation is
mainly confined to the high castes, where the young wife
is even more closely guarded than the young unmarried
girl. Among the low castes, where extra-marital affairs
are more common, worries about female purity are not
paramount, but it is still important to know the ante¬
cedents of children. According to the Mysore Gazet¬
teer of 1931, an unmarried Harijan girl could in the past
entertain lovers in her father's house. When she formed
a permanent connection, the lover could pay bridewealth
and tie her tali (wedding necklace) to legalise the de
facto union. If she became pregnant, he would have to
marry her or become outcasted. If this information is
correct, the Harijan system has changed^ overtly at least,
in the past half-century, since many Harijan girls are
now married before puberty like those of the orthodox
high castes though they remain in their parents' home
until after the first menstruation. One low-caste
woman announced that her first marriage had been a
kuduvali ceremony, (normally used for subsequent mar¬
riages among the low castes, and lacking the prestige of
a first marriage ceremony), because she was married
shortly after puberty. However she aid not appear to
feel in the least disgraced by this and volunteered the
information while replying to a different question.
Others said, laughing, that today unmarried girls only
received men before marriage without the knowledge of
the elders. Harijans have been trying to improve their
caste image through 'sanskritisation' over the past
forty years or so, and it is only recently that the
political advantages of their present 'unsanskritised'
and 'scheduled' position has become plain to their edu¬
cated leaders. With the emergence of alternative routes
to upward mobility low caste morality as far as early
marriage is concerned seems to be in a state of flux.
As for Sholigas, their customary systems of
marriage by elopement or by service to the girl's
parents preclude much anxiety over female purity. The
Sholiga women interviewed on this subject all roundly
declared that their choice of mate was their own affair.
However, for most of the other castes the whole
family feels keenly the responsibility for finding hus¬
bands for daughters. One reason for not wanting female
children cited by respondents in Chamarajanagar was not
so much the cost of their weddings as the problem of find
ing them husbands (in fact for the low castes, daughters'
weddings cost less than sons', because of the necessity
to give thera or bridewealth gifts). This need is so
over-riding that several respondents who wanted to edu¬
cate their daughters admitted nevertheless that should
they get a good offer they would seize the opportunity
of marrying them off before the completion of their edu¬
cation.
One reason, for this urgency is the convention
that brothers should not wed until their sisters are
safely married off. Married women engage actively in
match-making on their unmarried sisters' behalf as much
for the sake of the brothers as for the sisters them¬
selves. Moreover, if parents die, the responsibility
devolves on the eldest son to provide husbands for his
sisters and then wives for his brothers, and this can be
a serious burden on him. One Brahman whose wife had
had a tubectomy after two sons expatiated on his heart¬
felt relief. He had been left on the death of his
father to arrange and pay for the marriages of four
sisters, and consequently had been unable to get married
himself until he was over forty.
Since the older a woman is at the time of her
marriage the shorter the reproductive period left to
her, especially as delayed marriage may miss out the
years of greatest fecundity, the age at which it is
usual for women to marry may have a considerable effect
on the fertility of a country, region or community. In
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Chamarajanagar however, though there was a noticeable,
if not unexpected, variation between the communities,
the correlation between age at marriage and mean cur¬
rent family size was not very close in the case of our
six caste-groups. Group III, containing the most edu¬
cated members, had the highest mean age at effective
marriage (19.8 years) but marginally more children (2.88)
than group II with a low age at marriagej and significant¬
ly more than group VI. Group VI , the Sholigas, with the
fewest children, had the second highest mean age at mar¬
riage, (17.56 years). Group II, with the second lowest
mean age at marriage, (16.08 years), had the second low¬
est number of children. (2.78).
Table refers to the wife's age at prastha or
consummation rather than to her age at the actual wed¬
ding ceremony. This is because, contrary to what Cald¬
well found in his study area of Karnataka (Caldwell 1982),
early adolescent marriage, officially illegal, is still
fairly common in Chamarajanagar, especially among the il¬
literate low castes. Most of those arranging the cere¬
mony are probably unaware that it is a penal offence and
that, according to the Child Marriage Prohibition Act of
1929, the minimum legal age for brides was fifteen, until
April 1976, since when it has been eighteen. When a
Harijan friend in Somaravarapet invited me to the wed¬
ding of his daughter, I asked him if he did not think
she was too young. "Young ?" he said in astonishment^
"but she's twelve years old J". Fortunately the wife
does not join her husband until she reaches puberty,
which in most - but not all - Chamarajana gar communities
is celebrated within the family as a rite of passage.
These ceremonies vary according to community culture,
but most of them underline the polar images of the fe¬
male, for the menstrual fluid is both polluting as an
excretion and auspicious as a sign of fertility. In
most cases the girl takes a bath, sometimes after a








































































brief period of segregation, and is then dressed in
festive clothing and sits in state to receive mem¬
bers of the cognatic kin group, mostly the women folk,
who bring her kura-kum (the red powder used in many
rituals) and flowers. They also offer her balls of
the local brown sugar mixed with gingelly, a spice
which acts as a purgative. The prestation, similar
to that of temple ritual, is called arthi. Table 4
shows that in all caste-groups but III and VI, more
wives married, or experienced prastha)between the ages
of fourteen and sixteen than at any other age. In the
case of group VI (Sholigas) an equally high percent¬
age married between the ages of seventeen and twenty,
while in group III, the highest percentage married
between seventeen and twenty. The higher age at mar¬
riage of caste-group III is almost certainly due to
the fact that so many of the wives had secondary edu¬
cation. The age-spread of Sholiga marriage can prob¬
ably be accounted for by the varying ages at which girls
become nubile, in view of their marriage system of 'rati¬
fied elopement'. That more wives in caste-group I were
married at fourteen to sixteen, rather than seventeen to
twenty, is an indication that this group contains on the
whole a membership more devoted to Hindu orthodoxy than
is the case for group III. Group II, the most 'sanskrit-
ised' community, and group V, the unurbanised Hinterland
Low Castes, had the highest percentage of prastha occur¬
ring at ages eleven to thirteen, and Sholigas the lowest.
For the sample surveyed as a whole, wives were most common¬
ly married, or experienced post-pubertal consummation,
when aged fourteen to sixteen (42%), the next most fre¬
quently-occurring age-group being seventeen to twenty (35%)♦
Tab1e 5 underlines the ' sanskritised ' culture of
group II, where traditional anxieties about female purity
are likely to be at least partly instrumental in provid¬















































































surprising that as many as 13% of the total sample
of wives were fertile so young, and one suspects that
some of the illiterate wives may have been fairly in¬
accurate about their age. It is noteworthy that after
group III, the Sholigas had the highest percentage of
girls not marrying until they were over twenty-five
years old. In group III, this must in some cases
have been due to the fact that they were still study¬
ing. In other cases it may have been by virtue of
parents having turned down previous offers because the
horoscopes of suitors did not harmonize with those of
their daughters. In the case of Sholiga girls, there
could have been problems about finding boys who were
not of their own kula, or clan, within walking distance
of their podu.
All in all, the data on wife's age at marriage
is indeterminate. It may well be that the ambiguities
merely imply that, bearing in mind the effects of post-
pubertal infertility, the differences in mean age at mar
riage between communities were not enough to have a sig¬
nificant effect. Chamarajanagar taluk is after all sti
a rural region centred on a provincial town, where most
girls are still wed in their teens. It is significant
that mainland China's current family planning programme
includes postponement of marriage for women until the
age of twenty-three.(cf. Y.C.Yu,1979)• It may follow
that the effect of wife's age at marriage needs to be
combined with additional factors to have a decisive in¬
fluence on fertility. One such factor appears to be
education.
2: Education of Women
Over the past three decades, it has become ac¬
cepted increasingly by demographers, economists and an¬
thropologists that education, especially of the wife, is
an important determinant of fertility. In short, edu¬
cated women everywhere tend to have fewer children.
Since the Mysore Population Study of 1951, which showed
that fertility declined with women educated above pri¬
mary level, the authors of numerous other fertility stu¬
dies in India have come to the same conclusion. But, in
spite of their concern over India's population growth, suc-
cesive Governments have concentrated their efforts on other
aspects of the problem. R.H. Cassen summed up the posi¬
tion succinctly when he wrote:
'As for female education, which in study
after study is consistently related to
fertility reduction in nearly every
country in the world, we can only lament -
and not just on fertility grounds alone -
that it is among the most neglected features
of development in the great majority of
Indian States' (Cassen,1976,p.1175)•
Caldwell argues that mass education, which includes
the education of women, is 'the primary determinant of the
timing of the onset of fertility transition' (Caldwell, 1980
p.225). Mandelbaum points out that educated girls tend to
be married late because of the time taken to complete their
studies - with a second degree, this brings them to their
mid-twenties at least - so reducing their fertile period.
'More importantly' he adds 'an educated couple usually
shares a life-style in which there is less reason to have
many children and more reason to have fewer'. (Mandelbaum,
197^ , p • 5 ^) • T.N. Krishnan equates the phenomenal reduc¬
tion in the birth rate of the State of Kerala with a rise
in the average age at marriage due to female education.
(Krishnan, 1976). And, in a more recent paper, H.M. Rajy-
aguru summarised his findings thus:
'The respondent's education and her age at
marriage were closely intertwined in the
sense that respondents who had high education
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married late and conversely acquired
relatively higher education. Jointly
they explained family planning accep¬
tance better than either of them alone'
(Rajyaguru,1981, p. 1^7).
In Chamarajanagar the testimony of informants who
approved of the education of women cut right across caste
and class groupings, although some of the reasons given
for disapproving were manifestly governed by the communi¬
ty culture of the respondent. For instance there was
frequent reiteration among the orthodox high castes that
they could not, or would not, expose their daughters to
secondary education - or alternatively higher education -
once they had 'matured', that is, had reached puberty. It
was, of course, a question of the protection of their pu¬
rity. Some said that they would have educated their girls
if there had been sex—segregated secondary schools or even
colleges in their vicinity. In some cases it was a matter
of keeping the girls physically sheltered and chaperoned.
In other cases the worry was over the notions the girls
might pick up along with their higher education, especially
at university. As one rich Lingayat put it: "The college
environment encourages loose morals". Girls at university,
he added, were in danger of making inter-caste marriages.
An oft—repeated reason, not confined to any par¬
ticular caste-group, for spending little or nothing on the
education of daughters was that "they will only get married".
This was basically a matter of not getting a return on a
financial investment. Another commonly expressed fear was
that women, if educated, would get ideas above their station.
They would begin to feel "superior". "Education makes girls
too independent", said a Brahman father. "With women's edu¬
cation the quality of Hindu culture would deteriotate".
Others believed in some education for women but not equal
to that of men. Secondary education, they said "is enough
for girls". A rich Lingayat father expressed the view that
girls should not be educated beyond Secondary School Leaving
Certificate (SSLC)./
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because graduate women tended to hanker after equal
rights and "The desire for equal rights ruins family
happiness". A more sophisticated member of caste-
group III foresaw different kinds of trouble. If
girls had equal education they would only "g'o wander¬
ing outside the house to clubs and films and then
make love marriages". In other words, if the women
began to behave as men already do, parents would lose
control of the marriage market.
A more topical reason for not educating
women has been triggered off by increasing unemploy¬
ment. Some people in most caste-groups feared that
they would take jobs from men. A low caste man grum¬
bled that "Woman's place is in the home and not taking
jobs from men", and a member of the high castes said,
with reason, "Boys are finding it difficult enough to
get jobs now. It would be even worse for girls". This
point will be discussed more fully in the next section.
Low caste respondents were more concerned with
practicalities. "Poor people can't afford to educate
their women", one Harijan said, "because then they would
not want to work in the fields". Others claimed, with
some truth, that educated women would never find husbands
because there are so few educated low caste men and no
uneducated man would agree to marry a girl who was his
superior in this particular. Some low caste husbands
took exception to questions on education for women as
reflecting badly on their wives, and pointed out loyally
that illiterate mothers also took good care of their
children. As an Upuliga husband pronounced indignantly:
"Uneducated mothers are just as capable of teaching their
children good manners".
Among those interviewed in Chamarajanagar who
were for women's education, the one caste - or rather
class-as sociated motivation was the desire to find a
well-qualified son-in-law. "If she is educated, she
will get a good husband". This is a reversal of the
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loW-caste fear that educated daughters would not get
husbands. As Mandelbaum says: 'Many parents now
want to educate their girls, partly as a wise invest¬
ment towards finding a worthy husband for a beloved
daughter'. He goes on to say that a bridegroom who
has had a good education is prized, and 'such a young
man commonly requires that his bride also be educated'
(Mandelbaum, 197^, p.53)« In Chamarajana gar a proviso
is sometimes added: even when the wife is a graduate
S>vc.i.Ui
or has further qualifications, her education^be below
that of her husband. To achieve 'status consistency',
as Victor D'Souza has it, there is a general preference
for the wife to be either less well educated than her
husband or at least to have no more than equal educa¬
tion with him (D'Souza,1975)• Once again the lurk¬
ing fear of a wife feeling 'superior' to her husband
raises its head. While educated women among the high
castes may no longer reasonably be expected to worship
their husbands as gods, the anxiety even among educated
men over the possibility of relinquishing their position
as the dominant sex is still evident.
Sometimes an educated and 'modern' young man
will decide on a well-educated bride against his parents'
wishes. In one case the well-qualified scion of an
orthodox Chamarajanagar joint family turned down the
bride they had chosen for him and asked for the hand
of a distant cousin resident in Bangalore. His family
were against the girl because she was a graduate of the
university there and thus in their view a woman of lax
conduct. In the end he succeeded in his aim, and to
avoid friction the couple moved out to form their own
nuclear household. They have opted for two children,
in contrast to his parents, whose output was literally
by the dozen.
A reason repeatedly given by low caste respon¬
dents for wishing to educate their daughters was the
same as for wishing to educate their sens, the longed-for
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attainment of a Government job. une Harijan father
who had had a vasectomy after three daughters, planned
to educate them all in the hope of achieving this goal.
"There is no difference in intelligence between the sexes",
he declared. "Girls should have equal chances". It
was noticeable that parents without sons were no longer
prepared to take a back seat in society and accept
ignominy. They seemed to be spurred to educate their
daughters to show that girls were as good as boys. How¬
ever, having no sons was not a universal motivation. One
Harijan labourer with three sons and two daughters said
that, while he had no intention of educating his sons, who
were an idle lot, one of his daughters was clever and he
was determined that she should get a Government scholar¬
ship and go to university. Another Harijan couple with
a child of each sex were also delighted with their daugh¬
ter, the wife because she "loves little girls", and the
husband because he was sure she would make a good teacher.
He had been to primary school, and said that he had learned
nothing because the teaching was so bad. His daughter, he
said, would be an excellent teacher and so serve her
community.
Some of the educated high castes were determined
to educate their daughters for the very reasons that more
orthodox and less educated members of their communities
feared to educate them: to give them independence. As
a factory manager, a member of caste-group III, remarked,
"Girls must be able to stand on their own feet today". A
Banajiga doctor said shrewdly: "Graduate status for both
sexes is the minimum requirement for success in life now¬
adays". An Ursu banker whose daughter was training to be
a doctor insisted that education for women was essential.
"The entire family depends on the mother". Several Rich
Lingayats were also of the opinion that higher education
for girls was a necessity today, and a Poor Lingayat, strug¬
gling to afford his daughter's fees.summed it up thus:
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"Education is an asset to her in every way". Incident¬
ally all the respondents quoted in this paragraph had
themselves been sterilised after two children.
Tables 6 to 7b remind us that Sholigas, with no
education, had the fewest children. But leaving out
this caste for the present, we see that large families
are associated in this table with uneducated wives. Since
caste-groups IV and V had insignificant numbers of wives
with secondary education we turn to the high caste and re¬
latively urbanised groups, I, II and III. In Table 7a,
a strong relationship is revealed between secondary and
higher education and smaller families. As Mahadevan puts
it, "The influence of the husband's level of education on
the wife's fertility is much less than her own education".
(Mahadevan,1979,P•34)• There is a much higher percentage
of B (2-3) families compared to C (4-8) families in the
Secondary/pre-University College category of this table.
And, though only 3% of wives in the whole sample were grad¬
uates, they are very important. As Robert Cassen has ob¬
served, a negative correlation exists between children born
and female post-primary education, 'the sharpelst drop oc¬
curring, as we might expect, at the level of college edu¬
cation' (Cassen,1978, p.58). S.N. Agarwala also found
that differential fertility by education was on the whole
only observable for women educated above the level of sec¬
ondary school. (Agarwala 1972). None of the graduate
wives in our sample had large families, and it must be
stressed yet again that the B category includes all those
with only two children.
Table 8 confirms the findings of the previous
education table. Fertility is reduced when both couples
have secondary education. It is reduced still further
if the husband is a graduate, and it remains low if the
wife is a graduate even when her husband is not. An
interesting point about this table is that it throws up
three cases of wives with secondary or higher education
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Table 6: Wife's Level of Education by Caste:
Percentage Distributions










I 52.0 44.0 4.0 50
II 82.0 18.0 0.0 50
III 24.0 56.0 10.0 50
IV 90.0 8.0 2.0 50
V 98.0 2.0 0.0 50
VI 100.0 0.0 0.0 50
N 223 69 8 300
All Caste-groups
% 74.3 23.0 2.7
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Table 7: Current Family Size by Caste by Wife's Education:
Percentage Distributions
Wife's Education by Caste-group Current Family Size
A(0-1) B (2-3) C(4+) Total
% % % (=100%)
I None or Primary 15.4 42.3 42.3 26
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 16.7 70.8 12.5 24
II None or Primary 14.6 58.5 26.8 41
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 22.2 66.7 11.1 9
III None or Primary 8.3 50.0 41.7 12
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 18.4 60.5 21.1 38
IV None or Primary 20.0 42.2 37.8 45
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 0.0 40.0 60.0 5
V None or Primary 20.4 38.8 40.8 49
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 0.0 0.0 100.0 1
VI None or Primary 42.0 36.0 22.0 50
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
N 64 145 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
Table 7a: Current Family Size by Wife's Education:
Percentage Distributions
Wife's Education Current Family Size
A(0-1) 8(2-3) C(4+) Total
% % % (=100%)
None or Primary 22.9 43.5 33.6 223
Seconbary/PUC 14.5 62.3 23.2 69
Graduate 37.5 62.5 0.0 8
N 64 145 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
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Table 7b: Current Family Size of Graduate Wives by Caste -group:
Percentage Distributions








I 50.0 50.0 2
III 40.0 50.0 5










Table 8: Mean Current Family Size by Husband's Education
by Wife's Education
Wife's Education Husband's Education
None or
Primary
Secondary Graduate All Educational
Levels
None or Primary 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.9
Secondary 5.0* 2.8 2.6 2.8
Graduate - 1.7** 1.6 1.6
All Educational
2.9 2.9 2.5 2.9
Levels
Notes: - No cases
* Only one case
** Only two cases
married to husbands with lower educational achievements.
As we have seen^D'Souza says that as a rule men feel
that if a wife is better educated than her husband
their traditional positions of subordination and super-
ordination relative to each other are threatened. That
is to say, the husband feels threatened. Perhaps this
does not matter so much if the wife is not working, be¬
cause the real threat to 'status consistency' in the farai
ly is if the wife has a more prestigious and remunerative
job than that of her husband. As there were only five
working graduate wives in our sample, it is highly prob¬
able that the three with husbands having no more than
secondary education were non-working. In one case the
wife was a Chemistry graduate whose husband was a Field
Writer on one of the coffee estates. She said that she
could see no possibility of ever working again (she had
taught Chemistry before her marriage), as her husband's
job, which he loved, was in such an isolated place.
Table 9 shows that education for the wife
does have a cumulative effect. Where wives had secon¬
dary education, not only did far more husbands plan to
provide their daughters with secondary education, but a
larger proportion still planned to send them to univer¬
sity. Where husbands of graduate wives had daughters,
all intended their daughters to be graduates. The ef¬
fect on fertility is also demonstrable: a higher per¬
centage of B (2-3) and a lower percentage of C (large)
families with each step upward in the wife's education •
Table 9a, which leaves out the factor of the
wife's education but introduces that of caste, holds
few surprises - except that apparently in group IV alone
the seven htisbands who desired graduate daughters had a
higher mean family size than those xn the same group who
had no such desires - one suspects that in this group,
as in group V, the gap between wishing and putting into
effect (in the case of limiting fertility to pay for ed¬
ucation) is still fairly wide.
Table9:Wife'sEducationbyHus and'sDesirefoDaughter'sEd ca ion:P rc tageDistributions






































































































































It looks as if the evidence for the negative correlation
of education and family size in Chamarajanagar is fairly
unequivocal. And since at least higher education today
implies a degree of Westernisation (e.g., all higher ed¬
ucation in Karnataka is conducted in English), we may
take it that these two linked factors together tend to
reduce fertility. Incidentally, in Karnataka, as men¬
tioned earlier, the word 'modern' is used interchangeab¬
ly with 'English' as a synonym for 'Western'.
It is tragic therefore that the efforts of
State and Central Governments in India, to say nothing
of the official and private sectors of the family plan¬
ning campaign, have done so little to promote the cause
of female education in the country. In her paper on unmar¬
ried adolescent females in rural Maharastra, Carol Vlassof
concludes that the educational process in its present form
is an ineffective agent for the advancement of riaral women.
She found that the general knowledge of girls was less
than that of boys at every stage, partly because the daily
routine of girls offered less scope for variety in recrea¬
tion; and that the girls themselves saw their own futures
restricted to marriage and motherhood, although they did
hope for educated husbands and most of them desired less
than four children. It looks as if there is a gaping
hole in the family planning programme awaiting the at¬
tention of State and Central Governments.
5: Women's Participation in the Labour Force.
The question as to whether work outside the home
for women has the effect of reducing fertility is a vexed
and controversial one. A number of variables are invol¬
ved, such as the type of work, especially the intangible
values attached to it, and the level of reward. The con¬
tributors to S. Kupinsky's symposium on the fertility of
working women (cf.Introduction to this thesis), showed
that the issue is probably best examined within the con¬
text of the country concerned. In Africa, for instance,
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■where women traditionally have played a significant econ¬
omic role, the birth rate is high, while in the U.S.,
where the economic role of women is also conspicuous,
the birth rate is low. (Kupinsky, 1977). Clearly the
association between female participation in the labour
force and fertility is not direct but depends on inter¬
vening variables.
One of these factors appears to be the level
of development in a nation or region. In the developed
countries, Kupinsky found that: 'labour-force participa¬
tion of the wife is highly negatively associated with
fertility'. The higher the socio-economic status of
the wives, the lower was their fertility. (Kupinsky, 1971)
p.364). The level of remuneration and type of employment
is obviously of great importance. As Kupinsky remarks,
while there is in general some association between female
labour and fertility levels, this is more often found in
the modern sector of the economy. C. Safilios Rothschild
maintains that the element of choice, implying a woman's
emancipation, may apply only to a small percentage of wor¬
king women, usually in the middle or upper middle classes.
'In their case, their employment may often
be a tangible indicator of a corollary of
'modern' attitudes and values that may also
determine their smaller desired family size.
For most other women, their work involve¬
ment may hardly represent a choice or an
assertion of the right to work but rather..
...a necessity in order to survive'
(Safilios Rothschild in Kupinsky 19775p.356)
The low caste and Poor Lingayat women I interviewed in
Chamarajanagar would agree. The majority of them re¬
plied that it was not a question of the right to work
or the right to keep their own wag.es but of survival.
They pooled their wages with those of their husbands,
and often of their children, to pay for food, clothing
fuel and shelter for the family \init .
However that may be, it is a matter for con¬
cern that throughout this century women in India have
been pushed increasingly out of the labour market, as
we saw in the previous chapter on women's status, so
that even work traditionally done by women has now been
taken over by men, leaving more and more women limited
to work in the household or the fields, with no way of
achieving any kind of status other than by reproduction.
'Women's work may not tend to depress
fertility as long as it does not pro¬
vide an alternate and equally impor¬
tant identity' (Safilios Rothschild
in Kupinsky,1977, P.359).
Ashok Mitra, in his ICSSR paper, reveals the extent of
the decline in occupational participation for women in
a single decade, 196l to 1971, and deplores this situa¬
tion. Remunerative work with which women can identify
themselves is a function, he insists, not only of health,
education and technological skill valuable to the com¬
munity as a whole, but of deferment of marriage and of
reduction of fertility.
'The first aid to the perception of the
economic utility of females and quickening
of the need to put them into productive
work....will be the first to add to the
value of females as human resource by in¬
vesting more in their health, education
and the learning of skills and also by
prolonging the total span of their work¬
ing life by postponing age at marriage'
(Mitra, 1980,p.42).
Although Scarlett Epstein protests that 'To advocate en¬
couraging or forcing women within the reproductive age to
enter formal employment ... is not going to improve the wel¬
fare of families in the LDCs , nor is there much evi¬
dence to sxiggest that it will reduce fertility' (Epstein
in Anker, Buvinic and Yousseff, 1982, p.l64)j she does
not explain how the women in the past;whose jobs have now
disappeared, managed to integrate household responsibilit¬
ies with economically productive activities. The exist¬
ence of non-nuclear households and wide kin networks in
India clearly facilitated these activities although a high
proportion of them may have included elements of self-emp-
1oyment.
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E.D. Driver found that agricultural labourers
and cultivators in general have the highest fertility,
while clerical workers had the lowest fertility (Driver,
1963). This is confirmed by the Chamarajana gar data.
Although clerks are not usually well paid, they are edu¬
cated at least to secondary level and tend to have expec¬
tations, especially for their children, beyond their in¬
comes, which leads to a desire for small families. This
circumstance could account for the fact that Poor Ling-
ayats had the lowest fertility of all the groups inter¬
viewed. S.N. Agarwala goes further. Fertility, he
finds, is high among the lowest paid, declines as income
increases, and then rises again among high-income couples.
(Agarwala, 1972). This, too, concords with the Chamaraja-
nagar finding, with the proviso that where high income is
combined with high education of both spouses, fertility
remains low.
Turning to the Chamarajanagar data, we have
Tables 10, 10a and 10b which testify to a correlation
of high contribution (50% or more of joint income) with
small family size, that is, with low fertility. Thus
the percentage of C(4-8 children) families is much lower,
and that of A (0-1) much higher in the 50% and above brac¬
ket. An interesting point about Table 10a is the strong
contrast between the 1 Sanskrit ised' and the 'unsanskritised'
groups, which underlines the low status of manual labour
among high castes. It is noteworthy that in caste-group
III the only women who earn all contribute over 50%, the
implication being that they all earn comparatively high in¬
comes as professional women. However, it should be borne
in mind, as Mandelbaum reminds us, that it may be that edu¬
cated women in India who are employed have fewer children
as a consequence of their education rather of their employ¬
ment .
Another notable contrast here is that between the
urbanised groups I to IV and the rural groups V and VI.
Table 10: Current Family Size by Caste by Proportion of Family
Income Contributed by Wife: Percentage Distributions
Wife's Contribution by Caste-group Current Family Size
A(0-1) 8(2-3) C(4+) Total
% % % (=100%)
I Contribution Nil 15.2 60.9 23.9 46
Contribution bel ow 50% 33.3 0.0 66.7 3
Contribution above 50% 0.0 0.0 100.0 1
II Contribution Nil 14.9 59.6 25.5 47
Contribution bel ow 50% 100.0 0.0 0.0 1
Contribution above 50% 0.0 100.0 0.0 2
III Contribution Nil 12.8 61.7 25.5 47
Contribution bel ow 50% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
Contribution above 50% 66.7 0.0 33.3 3
IV Contribution Nil 18.5 37.0 44.4 27
Contribution bel ow 50% 6.7 46.7 46.7 15
Contribution above 50% 37.5 50.0 12.5 8
V Contribution Nil 50.0 25.0 25.0 4
Contribution bel ow 50% 16.7 16.7 66.7 6
Contribution above 50% 17.5 42.5 40.0 40
VI Contribution Nil 50.0 50.0 0.0 2
Contribution bel ow 50% 9.1 54.5 36.4 11
Contribution above 50% 51.4 29.7 18.9 37
N 64 145 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
247.
Table 10a: Proportion of Wife's Contribution to Family Income
by Caste: Percentage Distributions
Caste-group Wife's Contribution
None Below 50% 50% & above Total N
(=100%)
I 92.0 6.0 2.0 50
II 94.0 2.0 4.0 50
III 94.0 0.0 6.0 50
IV 54.0 30.0 16.0 50
V 8.0 12.0 80.0 50
VI 4.0 22.0 74.0 50
N 173 36 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 57.6 12.0 30.3
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Table 10b: Current Family Size by Proportion of Family Income
Contributed by Wife: Percentage Distributions
Wife's Contribution Current Family Size
A(0-1) E5(2-3) C(4+) Total
% % % (=100%)
Contribution Nil 15.2 55.1 27.7 173
Contribution below 50% 13.9 38.8 47.2 36
Contribution above 50% 34.1 37.4 28.6 91
N 64 145 91 300
Total
of
/o 21.3 48.3 30.3
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Even in caste-group IV, comprising the same low castes as
group V, less than half the wives are earning outside the
household, (Not that there is any reason why housework should
be excluded from the social definition of production, cf.E.
Jelin, in Anker, Buvinic and Yousseff, 1982 ) . D1Souza
suggests that two contradictory trends exist in women's
work-force participation in India: Firstly, at lower pre¬
stige levels of husband's occupations the rate of work par¬
ticipation by wives goes on diminishing with increase in
occupational prestige, and secondly, at higher prestige
levels the rate goes on increasing with the increase of
occupational prestige. But, he adds,
'So long as only the man in the family is
working there is no ambiguity about the
status of different members of the family.
If the wife is also working, this raises
problems for family status consistency
For consistency the wife should follow an
occupation which is...equal in prestige to
the husband's or slightly inferior to it.
If the wife is not able to fulfil this con¬
dition she does not participate in work'
(D'Souza, 1975. p.136).
By the time of the Chamarajana gar survey, which ended in 1980,
it looked as if soaring inflation was fast putting paid to
quibbles about status consistency when the wife's job was the
more prestigious. In the few cases where the wife's job
was better paid, the husband's attitude was compounded of
pride in her ability ard somewhat dazed relief that someone
was going to be able to pay for the children's education.
The Chamarajanagar survey showed that the highest
percentages of those wives whose contribution was 50% or
over occurred in groups V and VI, those with the second
highest, and the lowest, number of children respectively.
Clearly there are ambiguities here, and it should be emphasi¬
sed that on the plantations where the majority of group V
respondents worked equal pay with men had just been granted
in the first year of the survey. Before 1979 the financial
contribution of wives in group V, although a little higher
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than that of group IV (mostly agricultural labourers where
women get half the male pay for the same work), was still
well under 50%. Table 10 is therefore rather misleading
because the effects of equal pay on the fertility of group
V cannot yet be judged, and for this group the relation¬
ship is not valid. But the findings of - among others -
Promilla Kapur (Kapur 1970), Esther Boserup (Boserup 1975)
and the contributors to Kupinsky's symposium (Kupinsky,1977),
disclose, as we have seen, that where the status of women is
already low their ability to contribute to the family income
is not necessarily advantageous to them in terms of prestige.
It does not therefore follow automatically that equal pay
will give group V wives greater control over their own fer¬
tility, though higher pay might well do so. Equal pay is
however likely to diminish fertility in this group simply
because husbands may decide that it is advantageous to
both spouses for the wife to go on earning a wage which com¬
pares so well with the agricultural pittance. It would be
interesting to observe the result in five year's time.
When Kupinsky wrote that equalisation of male and female
job opportunities and rewards are likely to be associated
with low levels of fertility, he was referring to American
women (Kupinsky, 1977 ) • M.N. Srinivas reminds us that 'Fe¬
male labour is the rule in the lower classes and castes but
paradoxically it is these working women who have a higher
fertility' (Srinivas, 1977 , p. 15). From this we may deduce,
as he indicates, that where a woman's employment is unskil¬
led and requires no education it does not have a significant
effect in lowering fertility. Presumably this is partly
because their children have cost little in education terms
and had a high utility value in economic/security terms, ana
partly because of ignorance or fear of contraceptive prac¬
tices.
In the case of group VI, the Sholigas, the sit¬
uation is different. The women's contribution in a tradit¬
ional hunter-gatherer's non-market economy (such as that of
this tribe until fairly recently) is of equal importance.
Apart from the tree-climbing involved in the collection
of honey from wild bees, which is only undertaken by the
men, Sholigas of both sexes gather forest produce, culti¬
vate, and slaughter animals trapped in pits or by other
means, and, today, both sexes earn equal pay picking cof¬
fee on the estates when the crop is ripe or collecting
lichen and other jungle products for the Forestry Depart¬
ment. In her Women and Men Ernestine Friedl claims that
where women's contribution is equal to or greater than
that of their husbands their status is high and relations
between the sexes is relatively tension-free. (Friedl,1975
There is no reason to suppose that relations between Sho-
liga women and men are unusually tension-free, but intra-
tribe behavioural transactions seem to operate according
to a recognition of and respect for the autonomy of the
individual of either sex. It is not just a question of
Sholiga women not being easily coerced but rather that
Sholiga society is individualistic.
Nancy Birdsell and Helen Ware both imply that
reduced fertility may be expected (a) where the rewards
for female labour are not lower than those for male labour
(b) where the status of employment is high, (c) where the
economic value of children is low (Sirdse11, 1976, Ware in
Kupinsky, 1977 ) • The first two requirements are filled in
the Sholiga case, since they are perfectly satisfied with
the status of their traditional work, which hardly differs
from that of their men-folk. The third is not, since Sho
liga children start helping their parents relatively early
Further conditions must therefore be considered in this
context and perhaps one is that it is impossible to scram¬
ble up trees and through undergrowth carrying bundles of
fruit or tubers with babies and small children on the hip
and at the knee. One Sholiga wife put it succinctly: "It
is more difficult to work if you are pregnant". Nor is
it possible to leave an infant in. the jungle while gather¬
ing, as it would be to leave it in a shady corner of a
field/
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Even today the jungle is a dangerous place for someone
accompanied by toddlers or infants. Being unarmed, one
has to be ready to run. It seems likely that Sholiga
fertility has always been fairly low with long birth in¬
tervals because of the nature of the work the women do.
Both the women and the men frequently mention the dangers
of their daily forays into the jungle, and from my own
experience I would say that they are far from overstating
the case. But the forays are necessary since they bring
in food, they are also undertaken in the worker's own time,
and though they may be tough the conditions are not un¬
pleasant. On the contrary, they offer a good deal of free¬
dom. The gatherer is self-employed, and chooses whether
or not to work that day. One begins to see how the work
of tribal women is quite compatible with low fertility.
And lastly, an important point to be borne in mind here is
the necessity to distinguish between two factors, that of
women working because a large family means large consump¬
tion needs and that of women having fewer children because
they are working. Thus the patterns of work by women in
caste-groups II, IV and V at least, as reflected in the
Chamarajana gar survey, may have been due either to the
wives having worked all their lives or in some cases due
to their past reproductive output.
4 ; Female Autonomy
'Work for women is not a panacea for the world
population explosion,' writes Stanley Kupinsky,
'but viewed in the context of an increase
in the status and educational opportun¬
ities for women, declining family size
norms, the development of a self-concept
as worker whose economic activity makes
an important contribution to society, the
worker role for women may yet prove to be
an important element, lowering fertility
in an industrialising society or maintain¬
ing the existing level in a more developed
economy' (Kupinsky,1977iP•380).
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A.K. Jain approaches the issue of fertility from an¬
other direction when he suggests that:
'Advancement in female education can be
expected to influence fertility behaviour
even without simultaneous changes in other
factors such as increasing scope for par¬
ticipating in the paid labour force in the
modern sector' (Jain,198l, p.59^).
The two authors are not really contradicting each other,
Both education and well-paid work - which involves special¬
ised training - give women a chance of independence, the
autonomy which Dyson cites as an immensely important fac¬
tor in the reduction of fertility. As Mandelbaum says,
'An educated woman is usually less closely confined, phy¬
sically and psychologically' (Man delbaum , 197^ , PoM.
Caldwell noted in his study area in Karnataka that hus¬
bands treated wives who had been to school differently
and listened to them more (Caldwell,1982). This state¬
ment may be qualified by the addition that in Chamarajana-
gar at least (except in the case of the Sholigas) the school¬
ing would have to be of a fairly high level, SSLC or
above, the wife's economic contribution equal to his, or
the wife to have a very strong personality, for the hus¬
band to be decisively influenced by her. When one or more
of these requisites are present he might well listen to her,
or she might go ahead and make unilateral decisions. We
have seen that this occurs in the case of Sholiga women.
An illustration of the same situation with a high caste
couple is the case of the son in an orthodox joint family
recently married to a graduate wife with an earning ca¬
pacity far above his. At the same time as he was confid¬
ing to an interviewer that he wanted three children she
was announcing firmly that she intended to have a tubect-
omy after her second child whether her spouse liked it
or not.
Status is an amorphous concept with many and
various indices, no single one of which is adequate to
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convey its totality. The relative restriction of wives
in Chamarajanagar has been employed as one useful pointer,
with the qualification that taken alone it is not neces¬
sarily a basis for fertility behaviour. Table 11 con¬
trasts restricted with unrestricted wives. Those who
do not have to ask permission to go out but may come and
go at will have a lower percentage of C(4-8) families and
a higher percentage od A (0-1) families. But the differ¬
ential between B (2-3) and C (4-8) families is greater
among those who have to be accompanied by a chaperone in
the form of spouse, brother or mother-in-law, so the re¬
sult is rather inconclusive. Basically it brackets Sho-
liga wives and the few modernised and Westernised wives in
the area, the low reproduction groups, along with those low
caste wives, the high reproduction groups, who walk abroad
unaccompanied, whether at will or by necessity. The main
point of interest in this table is that all Sholiga wives
except two said they were free to come and go at will. The
two who said they must ask first explained that it was not
safe to go unaccompanied into the jungle because of the dan¬
ger from wild animals and snakes, which is quite true. This
table also stresses the contrast between 1 sanskritised 1 and
'unsanskritised' women. In the latter group, the majority
of the wives were unrestricted. The wives in group III
seem to suffer the least restriction of the 1sanskritised'
category, probably on account of the larger number of rela¬
tively Westernised couples in this group.
Freedom of movement alone is not therefore a dir¬
ect determinant of fertility. As with so many of the vari¬
ables we have considered (including the important factor of
education, since the illiterate tribe has the fewest child¬
ren), it needs to be considered as part of a sum or corpus,
which I have designated 'the autonomy package'. An impor¬
tant component of female autonomy in developed countries is
the right of choice as to marriage partner, or indeed be¬
tween marriage and less formal unions. In Chamarajana gar,
255.
Table 11: Current Family Size by Caste by Restriction of Wife:
Percentage Distributions
Restriction of Wife by Caste-group Current Family Size
A(0—1) 8(2-3) C(4+) Total
% % % (=100%)
I Restricted 10.7 50.0 39.3 28
Not Restricted 22.7 63.6 13.6 22
II Restricted 15.6 53.1 31.3 32
Not Restricted 16.7 72.2 11.1 18
III Restricted 20.0 70.0 10.0 20
Not Restricted 13.3 50.0 36.7 30
IV Restri cted 22.2 22.2 55.6 9
Not Restricted 17.1 46.3 36.6 41
V Restricted 25.0 25.0 50.0 4
Not Restricted 19.6 39.1 41.3 46
VI Restricted 50.0 50.0 0.0 2
Not Restricted 41.7 35.4 22.9 48
N 64 145 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
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Table 11a: Restriction of Wife by Caste : Percentage Distributions
Caste-group Restriction of Wife
Not Restricted Restri cted Total N
% % (=100%)
I 42.0 58.0 50
II 32.0 68.0 50
III 56.0 44.0 50
IV 76.0 24.0 50
V 74.0 26.0 50
VI 96.0 4.0 50




as in the rest of India, most girls except those of the
most sophisticated, 'modernised' or Westernised classes,
have their husbands chosen for them by parents or other
relatives (married sisters are leading protagonists in
match-making in south Karnataka), and in the high castes
all too frequently do not meet them until the wedding
day, except when they marry close kin (as they do in
the South but never among Hindus and Sikhs in the North).
Young men also have their brides chosen for them, but with
a stronger right of veto and a better chance of viewing
their future brides in advance, if only from a distance.
It seems (cf.Thurston,1909) that Upuliga girls have tra¬
ditionally had the right of veto, but the prerogatives of
girls in the Sholiga tribe, as with a large proportion of
all the other hill tribes, are very different. Asked
whether they believed in freedom of marital choice, 90%
of Sholiga wives replied that they already had that free¬
dom. A number of them added that who they chose to wed
was no business of anybody else. Traditional Sholiga mar¬
riage consists of what M.N. Srinivas has described as 'rati¬
fied elopement'. The young couple take to the jungle to¬
gether for a few days before returning to the parental house¬
hold " of either the boy or the girl. There they under¬
go a token scolding, followed traditionally by a feast
given by the boy's kin to the local community, which seals
the arrangement. Another form of Sholiga marriage con¬
sists in the putative bridegroom staying for a few months
in the household of his prospective parents-in-law and wor¬
king for them. If the girl approves of him the young coup¬
le sleep together, and if he conducts himself as a desirable
member of the family the union is later solemnised by a
feast. As to the 10% of Sholiga wives who said they thought
marriages should be arranged, it can only be assumed that
their daughters had made disastrous marriages and that they
thought parental advice would not come amiss. Marriage by
arrangement does occur sometimes among Sholigas who are losing
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their traditional culture (although the girl can always
refuse). In such arranged marriages, the bridegroom
and his family bring gifts, thera ,to the bride and her
kin; but 'ratified elopement' is still the most common
form of marriage for the tribe. Sholigas say that this
is because the god of the hills, Rangaswamy, eloped with
a Sholiga girl in the mythological past, and is thus
their brother-in-law.
This chapter has at least provided evidence
to show that in the case of caste-group VI women's auto¬
nomy and low fertility are closely associated. However
it is doubtful whether Sholigas trouble themselves much
with abstract questions of the relative status of male
and female. When asked for their opinion on equal rights
for women some Sholiga wives did not appear to understand
the question, which seemed to them absurd. It required
re-defining in terms of what they had the right to do. It
should be emphasised once more that the impression one re¬
ceives when talking to members of the tribe is that there
is a basic acceptance of individual self-determination
which results in independent decision-making on the part
of both sexes and thus of both partners within a marriage.
Again and again in the course of the survey we found that
Sholiga husbands were as much at a loss to control or even
to explain their wives' choice of action as the wives were
to control or explain their husbands'. Both sexes on the
whole appear to accept the vagaries of the other without
much surprise, though often with considerable annoyance.
This is not to say that Sholiga social sanctions are not
strong where they do apply - for instance where incest is
involved or stealing from other Sholigas - but that they
simply allow latitude to both sexes in areas where in other
castes latitude is only allowed to the male sex.
Tables 6 to 9a have certainly given us reason to
believe that education, especially higher education for
women, along with 'modernisation' or Westernisation, have
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a decided effect on fertility reduction in Chamarajana gar.
But, as we have seen, Caste-group VI are neither educated
nor modernised. Neither are they urbanised, and their
economic status is low. Most of the variables examined
so far do not, then, apply to this group, and in explain¬
ing the validation of the first premise of the introduc¬
tory hypothesis a different set of factors, 'the autonomy
package' must be predicated in view of the fact that these
people have the lowest fertility of all. It will be re¬
called that while the hypothesis stated at the start of
this thesis proposed that education could influence fer¬
tility in all castes, its central postulate was that where
women were able to control their own fertility because of
their relative independence, their fertility would be re¬
duced.
Apart from the few graduate wives in caste-
group III the tribal wives of caste-group VI turn out
to be the only group in Chamarajanagar to fit into such
a category. Without education, (but with equal work-force
participation and equal rewards for their labour), they
none the less possess the autonomy which Ashok Mitra (l978,
1980) and Dyson and Moore (1983) all regard as the single
most important determinant of reduced fertility. The gra¬
duate wives among group III, all of whom had small families,
all regarded themselves as the equals of their husbands.
"Why should women be regarded as inferior ?". "We must
prove ourselves". "Women should stand on their own feet",
(a female doctor). "The purpose of marriage is not sla¬
very to one's husband but a happy partnership", (A female
social worker). Sholiga women seemed to take their situ¬
ation more for granted, and to be positively smug about it.
"Because we are in the jungle we help each other in all
our work. We earn equally, so we have equality". "We
don't rely on men to keep us but work equally with them.
Why shouldn't we have equal status ?" "We tribal people
have very independent natures. Women share the family
burdens with men, so why should we think ourselves infe¬
rior ?" "We people go together to the forest, so we have
equality/ "
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Education and extra-familial economic activity
(if well-paid and status-enhancing) are then other rout e s
to the self-respect and independence which Sholiga women
have traditionally possessed, possibly through their tra-
ditionayeaual economic contribution. The most highly ed¬
ucated women in our sample shared with the illiterate tri¬
bal women the twin attributes of a relative independence
conducive of self-respect and self-sufficiency, and low
fertility. It seems therefore, as Esther Boserup urged
in 1970, echoed by Ashok Mitra in 1980, that girls and women
need to be provided with the means (other than of rearing
a large family) of achieving self-sufficiency and asserting
themselves in their social environment. This being so, a
question How arises: how, then, can the comparatively low
fertility of the more restricted and orthodox wives of caste-
group II be construed ? The explanation of this phenomenon
lies, I believe, in another and different 'package' subserving
low fertility, which will be examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IX EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC STATUS AS
DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY
1: Education in General
It will be recalled from the discussion in the
chapter on Caste (Section One, ch.II), that education per
se is highly esteemed in Chamarajanagar and throughout
south Karnataka. As a collateral therefore to the tes¬
timony in the previous chapter as to the cardinal impor¬
tance of education for wives, it should not be forgotten
that education also plays no small part in the influencing
of husbands' fertility behaviour. Educated men tend to
want educated wives. They certainly want educated sons
and, to a lesser extent, educated daughters. Caldwell
argues that the primary determinant of the timing of fer¬
tility transition is the effect of mass education on the
family economy:
'The direction of the wealth flow between
generations is changed through the intro¬
duction of mass education, at least part¬
ly because the relationship between members
of the family are transformed as the moral¬
ity governing these relationships changes.'
(Caldwell , 1980,p.225) •
It may be remembered from the Introduction to this thesis
that he cites a number of mechanisms by which education in
general has an effect on fertility. The first three are
economic: the reduction of children's work potential,
increased cost of their upbringing and the delayed returns
owing to their prolonged dependency. The rest embrace
shifts of attitudes: the cultural changes brought about
by the introduction of Western middle-class values, includ
ing a closer relationship between husband and wife. When
the husband is educated, he is more likely to support his
wife in withstanding the pressures to keep on having child
ren, if only because the cost of educating them in the hop
of securing the white-collar permanent town jobs to which
the literate aspire is prohibitive.
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The reason most often cited by all Chamaraja-
nagar caste-groups for preferring small families was the
cost of bringing up children, most often expressed in
the three high caste groups in terms of the cost of edu¬
cating them. For instance, a civil servant in group III
(Other High Castes) who was planning to have a vasectomy
shortly and whose wife was using an IUD said that they
wanted to concentrate on giving their one child, a girl)
"the best possible education", and a nich Lingayat who
had had a vasectomy after two children, accepted steril¬
isation "so as to educate them properly". A grain mer¬
chant with three children whose wife had had a tubectomy
said: "If we had had more, we could not have afforded
to send them to university". A Poor Lingayat tradesman
said his wife had agreed to a tubectomy "Because of the
cost of education and weddings". These people and many
others had reached the same conclusion as those 'Kannad-
igas' cited by Caldwell who found that 'during the process
of education a small or medium sized family suffered less
than a large family' (Caldwell,1982,p.25).
Many of the low castes also hoped to, or at
least wished to, educate their children, in most cases
motivated by the possibility of that universal objective,
the Government job. One Harijan said, touchingly, that
he wanted to educate his son and daughter "So that they
won't be like us". But a number of 'unsanskritised' re¬
spondents were less starry-eyed on the subject. An Upu-
liga said shrewdly that school was a waste of time and
money unless the scholar achieved SSLC or graduation, be¬
cause anything less would be insufficient qualification
for a decent job. A very intelligent Harijan was bitterly
disillusioned about the outcome of education for the poor:
"What good does it do to them ? It only makes them want
things they can't afford". And Sholigas almost unani¬
mously claimed that education was not necessary in their
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community. "What good will it do for us when we live
in the jungle ? We don't need it".
Education, at least for the male and the higher
castes, seems to have been much valued in India since the
Vedic period, possibly because, like purity, it was once
the unique and distinguishing property of the Brahman. It
is only recently, due to Government policy of protective
legislation on behalf of the Scheduled Castes that members
of the low castes have had any chance of achieving educa¬
tion without first achieving wealth. Table 12 shows, not
surprisingly, that nearly all the graduate husbands belonged
to the two well off caste-groups, I and III. Caste-group IV
boasted of three graduates, almost certainly owing their posit¬
ion to the Government's protective legislation. The figures
for those with little or no education, are also quite predict¬
able, but those for husbands with Secondary Education are in¬
teresting in that they have a bearing on a point to be discus¬
sed in part 3 below, the special case of caste-group II. Here
we see that although Table 12 shows that Poor Lingayats (group
II), have as a group the worst academic achievement of the
three high caste groups, nevertheless more than half of them
have had a secondary education (even if by no means all have
reached SSLC), and far more in this group have secondary ed¬
ucation than in any of the three 'unsanskritised' groups. The
'secondary' category of course only covers those who go no
further than the secondary level of schooling, which is why
fewer of the well off groups attained this level. Lingayats,
as a caste, (or a sect) set great store by education, per¬
haps in emulation of or competition with the Brahmans with
whom they claim equality of status.
We see in Table 12a that the graduates have the low¬
est percentage of large families and the highest percentage of
B (2-3 children) families. The effect of secondary education
alone on fertility is doubtful. According to a number of
studies carried out in India (Mysore Population Study 1951-
Driver 19&3> Cassen 1978), the effect of male education in
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Table 12: Husbands' Education by Caste: Percentage Distributions









I 18.0 48.0 34.0 50
II 48.0 52.0 0.0 50
III 20.0 50.0 30.0 50
IV 76.0 18.0 6.0 50
V 98.0 2.0 0.0 50












Table 12a: Current Family Size by Caste by Husband's Education:
Percentage Distributions
Husband's Education by Caste-group Current Family Size
A(0—1) B (2-3) C(4+) Total N
% X % (=100%)
I None or Primary 11.1 33.3 55.6 9
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 17.0 60.9 21.9 41
II None or Primary 12.5 62.5 25.0 24
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 19.2 57.7 23.1 26
III None or Primary 10.0 50.0 40.0 10
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 17.5 60.0 22.5 40
IV None or Primary 21.1 44.7 34.2 38
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 8.3 33.3 58.3 12
V None or Primary 20.4 36.7 42.9 49
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 0.0 100.0 0.0 1
VI None or Primary 42.0 36.0 22.0 50
Secondary/PUC/Graduate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0
N 54 145 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
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Table 12b: Current Family Size by Husband's Education:
Percentage Distributions
Husband's Education Current Family Size
A(0-1) B(2-3) C(4+) Total
% % % (=100%)
None or Primary 24 .4 42.2 33.3 180
Secondary/PUC 16.5 54.1 29.4 85
Graduate 17.1 65.7 17.1 35
N 64 145 91 300
Total
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
depressing fertility is only significant in the case of
higher education. On the other hand secondary education
does lead to raised expectations, especially for the next
generation. As Driver pointed out, clerical workers seem
to have lower fertility than either cultivators or those
in better-paid occupations.
2: Economic Status
In the past, whatever wives may have suffered
through unrestricted child-bearing, it made good economic
sense (if we are to believe Chamarajanagar informants),to
have a reasonably large family of which all the sons and,
in the low castes, the unmarried daughters, dutifully con¬
tributed to the household income pool. This was true of
all castes and classes. Today, the shrinking of landhold-
ings (cf. my chapter I, Part One), due to the survival of
sons and subsequent fragmentation as much as to Government
edicts, has led to a surplus of farm labour. The cost of
living has soared. More and more families rest their
hopes on the attainment of town jobs for at least one of
their sons and town-employed husbands for their daughters,
because it is in the towns that the labour market has ex¬
panded, and the income from outside jobs is a valued sup¬
plement to the family income from land or labour on the
land. Unfortunately not only does the standard of edu¬
cation required for such jobs represent an economic burden
on the family but also in many cases a large bribe is a
prereqisite to the acquisition of one for which the appli¬
cant is qualified. The scale of these bribes seemed to
be common knowledge among Chamarajanagar students.
To realise family ambitions for the rising gen¬
eration the sons - and,increasingly among the educated,
the daughters - have to undergo a long and expensive pe¬
riod of processing, which in its later stages begins to
inculcate a different culture. As Caldwell says of his
study area in Karnataka, 'It is generally agreed that
schooling teaches another message, an 'English' one'
(Caldwell,1982, p.20). A part of this message is that
educated men require educated wives as partners and com¬
panions. Another part of it is that educated daughters-
-in-law are capable of and prone to insist on, bringing
up the number of children they think fit without the ad¬
vice and coercion of mothers-in-law. Yet others are
that the husband is not a god and the word of the pater¬
familias is not necessarily law. Rural fathers stand
slightly in awe of sophisticated and independent daughters-
-in-law. The whole concept of the corporate integrated
family or even lineage working as a team under an authori¬
tarian patriarch is breaking down rapidly, to the constant
reiteration, in Chamarajanagar, of the refrain "small fami¬
ly, less expense". In view of which the time is ripe for
the message of the family planning programme to be heeded,
and it is evident that, in our area at least, this has be¬
gun to happen. 'The number of children that a family can
usefully absorb on its farm depends on the size of the hold¬
ing' , observes M.N. Srinivas (Srinivas 1977, p.17).
Referring to Mamdani's assertion that a farmer accepting
family planning is courting economic disaster (Mamdani, op.
cit. 1973), he goes on to argue that it is only if work is
available that every child can turn out to be a net asset.
How then does size of landholding affect fertility in Chama-
rajanagar ? Tables 13a and lyb reveal that those with the
largest landholdings had the lowest percentage of large
families and the highest percentage of B (2-3 children) fami¬
lies. As at least two modern Indian studies (Srinivas 1977
and Mahadevan 1979) have emphasised, the scope for expansion
of landed property is limited in India today, both by the
Land Ceiling laws and by pressure on the land. Inheritance
in Indian tradition takes no account of primogeniture ana
land can be owned individually as well as corporately by
the lineage or lineage segment. Thus the reproduction of
a large number of children, especially sons, will lead to
Table13:LandholdingbyCast :Percen ageDistributions











































Table 13a: Current Family Size by Landholding in Acres:
Percentage Distributions






o -P" + Total
(=100%)
Little or no Land 21.7 47.0 31.3 166
Small to Medium Holdings 21.0 47.5 31.4 105
Large Holdings 20.7 58.6 20.7 . 29
N 64 145 91 300
Total
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
271.








I 2.6 3.3 3.1 3.0
II 2.9 2.7 - 2.8
III 2.9 3.3 2.1 2.9
IV 3.0 3.3 5.0* 3.1
V 3.2 2.7 - 3.1
VI 2.2 2.3 - 2.2
All Caste-groups 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.9
Notes: - No cases
* Only one case
Landholdings: Little or none = less than 2 acres;
Small to medium = 2 to 10 acres;
Large = 11 acres or more.
partitioning of land, increasing fragmentation and a re¬
sulting diminishment of family prestige. (Equally, many
daughters can also lead to impoverishment, as 'big men' are
expected to provide grand weddings and magnificent jewel-
lry for their daughters. Furthermore, with reciprocal
gift-giving, the weddings of sons cost big landowners in
the south a pretty penny as well).
In Chamarajanagar in the nineteen-fifties the
average landholding was eight acres, while today it is two
acres (Land Registry figures, Chamarajanagar 1981). It
is hard to say whether this is entirely due to population
growth and subsequent fragmentation or whether it may part¬
ly reflect a more equitable distribution of land, but probab
ly it is a combination of both,to say nothing of the possib¬
ility of the current units being at least partly a result of
nominal re-distribution among the family of large estates as
a result of land-ceiling laws. Certainly enough tenants
have succeeded in their claims to possession of land they
previously cultivated on various types of tenure contract
to make tenancy rare in Chamarajanagar today.
One would suppose that those with smaller holdings
would be as anxious to reduce fragmentation (and therefore
to reduce fertility), as those with more extensive lands,
but the fact that those with two to ten acres had a higher
percentage of large families can be explained by 'ethno¬
graphic residual analysis', as G.Fry has it (Fry 1981).
People in Chamarajanagar say that six well-cultivated and
irrigated acres will just about support a smallish family
which employs labour. Below that acreage a holding would
only be viable if the family owning it supplied its own
labour. Since the high castes will not do manual work if
they can help it (although Poor Lingayat Gowdas with their
Cultivator tradition do undertake it), this means that most
of the low-acreage holdings are owned by low castes who have
no status to lose and who all work together and whose child¬
ren may also all work together on the family plot. Frag¬
mentation still occurs, but not so fast, and there is a limi
beyond which a plot is too small to be of any use at all.
When landholding was controlled by education it
became clear that since is the well—off \vho can afford ed¬
ucation and the educated who have fewer children;(leaving
the Sholigas out of this equation), the relationship between
landholding and family size is fairly indirect. It should
also be mentioned here that the category 'Little or None' of
the landholding tables is somewhat misleading because many
affluent people in Chamarajanagar do not own land, prefer¬
ring to invest in house property, cinemas or mills to avoid
the farmer's perennial anxiety about the coming of the rain,
or irrigation problems.
Neither do Tables l4,l^a or l^b do much to illumin¬
ate the possible relationship between economic status alone,
as denoted by the type of housing in which the couples inter¬
viewed lived, and fertility. For instance, the fact that
the dwellings of the poor showed the highest percentage of
small families is obviously due to the inclusion of Sholiga's
huts in this bracket. In fact, before Table l^a was collap¬
sed, the highest proportion for family size in almost every
one of the ten categories of dwelling was three children.
The exceptions were the Sholigas 'grass huts,where the highest
proportion was one child, and the traditional tiled village
house, typical dwelling of the poorer Lingayat, where the
highest percentage was two children. However, the first
category, the houses of the well-off in the collapsed Table
shown here, does show a higher percentage of B families and
a lower percentage of C families than occurs in the second
category, the lower-income housing. It may be noted that
only the tiny cluster of educated low castes in good jobs
in group IV owned 1st. Class houses. By the same token no
member of caste-group I, the Rich Lingayats, lived in 3rd.
Class houses, which is hardly surprising, but three members
of group III did so. These were poor Banajigas, high caste
and orthodox but indigent members of that large and respected
merchant caste of Chamarajanagar. The low castes do not
have a monopoly of poverty in the area, though the reverse
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Table 14: Dwelling Grade by Caste-group: Percentage Distributions
Caste-group Dwelling Grade
1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class Total
(=100%)
I 60.0 40.0 0.0 50
II 2.0 48.0 50.0 50
III 60.0 32.0 8.0 50
IV 8.0 20.0 72.0 50
V 0.0 0.0 100.0 50












1st Class = Modern, mod. cons.; large traditional; large
transitional.
2nd Class = Traditional village houses; peasant farmer's dwellings;
lower middle class town dwellings, few mod. cons.
3rd Class = Rural or urban slum dwellings,' Sholiga forest huts.
Table14a:CurrentFamilySizbyDw ll ngGrade:Pe centageDist ibut ons
DwellingGradeCurre tF milySiz


























Table 14b: Mean Current Family Size by Caste and by Dwelling Grade
Caste-group Dwelling Grade
1 2 3 Total
I 2.8 3.3 - 3.0
II 4.0* 3.0 2.6 2.8
III 2.4 3.3 4.5 2.9
IV 4.3 3.6 2.9 3.1
V - - 3.1 3.1
VI - - 2.2 2.2
Total 2.7 3.2 2.3 2.9
Note:
1 = 1st Class: Modern, mod. cons.; large traditional, large
transitional.
2 = 2nd Class: Traditional village houses; peasant farmer's
dwellings; lower middle class town dwellings, few
mod. cons.
3 = 3rd Class: Rural or urban slum dwellings; Sholiga forest huts.
*0nly one case
situation, the higher castes having the monopoly of wealth,
was more or less the rule until fairly recently.
Tables 15 , 15a and lpb are yet another ambiguous
index of economic status. They show that the highest per¬
centage of C families (the crucial dichotomy) occurs in the
high-income bracket. But we know from Table 1 that the high¬
est percentage of B families was found in group II, the Poor
Lingayats, who had the second lowest number of children per
group. We also know that Sholigas had the highest percent¬
age of one-child families and Table 15 and 15b show that no
Sholigas at all were in top jobs. But the collapsing of the
tables to avoid peering at a lengthy printout has concealed
one significant point. While Sholigas did have the highest
percentage of one-child families, professional, executive and
academic people had more cases of two-child families within
their group than any other family size. All the rest had more
three-child families than any other family size. So while it
seems that any relationship between economic status alone and
family size is either spurious or at least indirect, it is prog
nostic when combined with intervening variables.
One of these is the influence of Westernisation ac¬
quired through the educational, or higher educational process
for which high economic status is for most groups a pre-condi¬
tion. Tables l6,l6a and l6b introduce one index of Western¬
isation. In spite of the fact that it is also an index of
economic status, ownership of electric consumer durables is
an indication of attitude. Clearly those who possess such
goods must be well-to-do in India. But in a traditional area
like Chamarajana gar many rich families - perhaps the majority
of them - see no reason to spend money on modern gadgets when
there is a flock of restricted wives in the joint-family or
any number of servants to share out the work. Those with
electric gadgets are mostly the 'new elite' who, as described
in chapter I, Part One, live in new modern houses, more often
than not in nuclear households; and the husbands who build, buy
or rent such houses for their families and embellish them with






































































































Table 15b: Mean Current Family Size by Caste and by
Husband's Occupation
Caste-group Husband 's occupation
1 2 3 All Occupations
I 2.5 3.3 5.5 2.8
II 6.0* 2.7 2.7 2.9
III 2.6 2.6 3.6 2.9
IV 4.0 3.1 3.1 3.1
V 0.0* 3.2 3.1
VI - 2.2 2.2
All Caste-groups 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9
Notes: - No cases
* One case
Husband's occupation: Group 1 = High-income jobs, large landowners,
merchants and manufacturers.
Group 2 = Low-income jobs, smallholders, small
traders.
Group 3 = Manual labourers, forest gatherers.
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Table 16: Ownership of Modern Household Gadgets by caste:
Percentage Distributions







I 48.0 52.0 50
II 100.0 0.0 50
III 54.0 46.0 50
IV 94.0 6.0 50
V 100.0 O•o 50
VI 100.0 0.0 50
N 248 52 300
All Caste-groups
% 82.7 17.3




























Table 16b: Mean Current Family Size by Caste and by Ownership of
Modern Gadgets
Caste-group Ownership of Modern Gadgets
None Some Total
I 3.2 2.8 3.0
II 2.8 - 2.8
III 3.2 2.5 2.9
IV • 3.1 3.7 3.1
V 3.1 - 3.1
VI 2.2 - 2.2
All Caste-groups 2.9 2.7 2.9
comparatively Westernised, and who have opted for the
'modern' path to prestige and high status. The type
of goods on which this assessment was based were re-
Jc
frigeator, electric cooker, electric iron, grinder,
A
table and ceiling fans. In those two caste-groups
where a significant number replied 'yes' to the query
as to whether they possessed these objects there is a
strong relationship between the ownership of modern
household gadgets and small/medium families. There
were only 21% of C families to 65% of B families in the
'Yes' category, compared with 32% of C famiies to 44.3%
of B families in the 'No' category. Table lob shows,
however, that in the cases of the couples in group IV
who owned luxury gadgets the relationship goes the
other way. It is not known whether they had already
produced their families before they 'arrived' at riches,
or whether perhaps new-found security encouraged them to
have another child or two.
3: Raised Expectations and Fertility
Little or none of the foregoing economic
comparisons throw much light on the question of why
caste-group II, the Poor Lingayats, had the lowest fer¬
tility after the Sholigas. One possible answer may
lie in an Indian parallel to the 'Easterlin Hypothesis'
which predicts that a couple's economic status relative
to their aspirations can determine their fertility be¬
haviour (Easterlin 1968, quoted by Ermisch 1979). Al¬
though the Poor Lingayats were on average the most con¬
ventional in some respects of all the groups in my sam¬
ple, which would lead one to expect them to have higher
fertility as a corollary, they actually had a higher per
centage of sterilisations than their better-off brethren
of group I, and the second highest percentage of wives
using IUD. In their replies to interviewers, respon¬
dents from this group constantly reiterated their desire
for few children, not only because "We are only earning
enough to support a small family", (many Poor Lingayat
wives have to work for the family to survive), but
because "We want to educate the children properly", or
"If we have more children we can't give them a good
education". These observations reflect the pressures
of poverty in a group with higher aspirations and ex¬
pectations than income. As a sect and as a caste
Lingayats in general have a reputation for being con¬
cerned with education, as have the Brahmans with whom
they claim equality, and group II had the third highest
level of education in our six communities. It also oc¬
cupied the third level of economic status, 50% of its
members living above the poverty line as denoted by
jobs and housing. Of those members of group II who
had accepted sterilisation of one or other spouse, 30%
of the husbands had been educated to secondary school
level, compared with the l8% who got no further than
primary. (But only l8% of the wives in this group, ste¬
rilised or unsterilised, had achieved some sort of sec¬
ondary education compared to 82% of the husbands). It
seems as if the 'favourable' family planning performance
of this conservative group may also be explained by use of
concept of 'relative deprivation' (Merton and Lazarfield
1950). Here are men with more education than the low
castes, (with the exception of those few successful so¬
cial climbers from group IV), and greater expectations
of life in consequence. It seems more than probable
that they were the group which felt the most threatened
by inflation, leading to a decision by the husbands to
limit the size of their families. As we shall see in
the next chapter, 9^% of Poor Lingayat husbands and 90%
of their wives cited the cost of living as their reason.
The remark of one smallholder in this group illustrates
their general attitude: "My education ceased at lower
secondary because of poverty. I want my son to be a
graduate to ease his father's difficulties".
CHAPTER X ALTERNATIVE DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY
1; Early-Age Mortality
Infant and Child mortality rates in south
Karnataka have gradually declined over the past forty
years from about 230 to about 100 per thousand. (Cald¬
well 1982, p.13). This improvement may be attributed
partly to the fact that modern medicine in both its pre¬
ventive and healing aspects has penetrated into rural
areas, averting epidemics and curing diseases once re¬
garded as generally fatal, and partly to the progress
of secularisation. More and more couples bring their
seriously ill children to health centres and private
doctors, (the girls more often to the former and the
boys to the latter, since the survival of sons is on
the whole regarded as the better investment), instead
of ascribing the illness to divine or demonic interven¬
tion .
Many demographers agree with D.G. Mandel-
baum that:
'Women of lower and poorer groups
tend to bear more children, in
part because more of their children
die in infancy and so these women
have shorter lactation. .. periods
before becoming fecund again, and
in part because they need more child¬
ren to replace those they lose'
(Mandelbaum 197^»p*^l)»
Indeed this is one of the principal tenets of Note-
steinian demographic transition theory, in regard to
the pre-transition state. 'the higher the infant mor¬
tality', Mandelbaum says:
'the more offspring are produced,
but for couples who follow patterns
of lower fertility, whether through
traditional controls or modern ones,
low infant mortality helps to assure
them that their children have a good
chance of surviving, and so they need
not try for additional births as an
insurance' (Mandelbaum,op.cit. 197^ p.^9)
S. Chandrasekhar had reached the same conclusion two
years previously. High infant mortality, he points
out, leads to short birth intervals.
'Most parents would have fewer child¬
ren if there were an assurance that
the children would survive... There is
no question but that improved infant
and child nutrition will provide in
the long run one of the most effect¬
ive means of lowering the birth rate
in the developing countries.'
(Chandrasekhar 1972,p.233).
Susan Scrimshaw, on the other hand, reverses cause and
effect,suggesting that high fertility may lead to high¬
er mortality through intentional or unintentional neglect
of children (Scrimshaw 1978).
T.R. Balakrishnan's analysis of the effects
of child mortality on fertility in Latin American coun¬
tries is another study which does not appear to support
conventional theory in its entirety. He came to the con¬
clusion that in these populations, all with high fertility
and low contraceptive use, the number of births was large¬
ly a function of exposure to risk rather than of fear of
child mortality (Balakrishnan 1978). Nevertheless, since
the women must become fecund at shorter intervals than if
their children survived, his findings only partially ne¬
gate those of Chandrasekhar, Mandelbaum and others.
It is true that the likelihood of losing
children was seldom given by Chamarajana gar respondents
as a reason for having large families, although it was
sometimes expressed in a different form when a desire for
a second son was mentioned. "If one dies, the other may
survive". Caldwell also remarks that there was no great
fear of child loss in his field area of Karnataka, apart
from an acceptance of the possibility that an only boy
may die leaving the couple without sons (Caldwell 1982).
It cannot be denied that Chamarajanagar informants were
perfectly well aware that while bubonic plague, smallpox,
cholera and malaria were endemic in the taluk up to the
end of the nineteen-fif ties, the first two of these
diseases have now been virtually eradicated, and though
malaria has made a come-back, cholera occurs less often
and is more easily controlled and cured than in the past.
More children are surviving and everyone knows it .
Of the 135 child deaths reported by respon¬
dents in the Chamarajana gar survey were girls and 57%
were boys. That a higher percentage of male children
than female children died would be considered normal in
most developed countries, but in India, as discussed in
my introductory chapter, the all-India ratio (males per
100 females) was 107 in 1981 while the Karnataka sex
ratio for the same year was lO^t (P. Padmanabha , Provisional
Population Tables, Census of India 1981, quoted in Dyson
and Moore,1982). The 1971 figures for Chamarajanagar ta¬
luk, rounded off, were' 95•28 females per 100 males. In
all caste-groups in my survey except the Sholigas more
male child deaths than female child deaths were reported.
It is curious that the situation is reversed in the case
of the Sholigas, because in general the sex-ratio in India
is more favourable to females among the hill tribes, and
certainly the status of women is higher in the Sholiga
tribe than in any of the other groups in Chamarajana gar
taluk. It is possible, of course, that female child-
deaths may have been under-reported by our respondents,
but I rather doubt this, not only because daughters are
usually loved in spite of the fact that the cost of their
weddings is dreaded among the higher castes where the
bride's families bear the heaviest expenses, but also
because the birth of girls is welcomed, especially among
the low castes, and their death is deeply mourned. I am
unable to explain why the figures in my survey for the sex
of children who died seem to contradict the sex ratio
figures for the taluk, except possibly in terms of the
inconsiderable size of my sample, and can only repeat
that, except among those most confidently affluent and
modernised, there seemed to be an acceptance, obliquely
expressed and possibly not consciously recognised,of the
vulnerability of boys. The findings of the Chamarajanagar
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survey seem to confirm this disquiet. Other things being
equal (although they mostly are not, even is south India),
boys die more easily than girls, and people in Chamaraja-
nagar seemed to know it.
According to Table 17, group V had far the high¬
est incidence of early-age mortality. Its unfortunate con¬
stituents suffered 31.8% of all the child deaths reported
by the total sample. This figure compares badly with the
16% reported by the equivalent low caste group, IV, which
earns even less and lives - in general - in much the same
conditions of squalor. There are two possible explanations
for the difference: cold and wet monsoons engender chills
and chest disorders, and the Hinterland Low Castes live mo¬
stly at a greater distance from qualified and caring medical
aid. Throughout my two periods of fieldwork in the taluk
there was no competent practitioner on the hills or, to my
knowledge, in the villages immediately to the West of the
range. In. 1979, as related in Part One above, the labour
force on the estates went on strike for this reason. The
managers alleged that they found it impossible to get even
a sub-assistant surgeon to stay in such an isolated place,
and this was probably perfectly true. It will be remember¬
ed that when a compromise was reached by which a doctor came
up from Chamarajana gar to run a clinic two days a week, he
complained of being obliged to spend two consecutive nights
in such a remote place. Sad to say, young people in India
who acquire a training in skills valuable to rural communit¬
ies seldom want to return to practise these skills in rural
areas.
The majority of those interviewed in group V live
and work on the coffee estates on the hills where the climate
is often cold and wet, against which they have little pro¬
tection beyond that of the oiled wool blanket or kamb1i is¬
sued to all employees once a year and which serves as a
kind of rain cape and hood combined. Many of the children,
as well as the adults suffer from chronic bronchial com¬
plaints, and this is the group which, like the Sholigas,





















































percentage of child deaths, (11.9%) occurred among the
Sholigas, who live under the same climatic conditions as
do group V, and are, financially speaking, worse off.
I think it may be due to the fact that Sholiga podu, or
forest settlement, are sparsely populated, with widely
separated huts, fewer flies and a comparatively unpollut¬
ed water supply. Certainly Sholiga children and adults
do get colds and coughs in the monsoons, and if they con¬
tract pneumonia as a result are likely to die for want of
proper treatment, but they are also less likely to contract
gastro-enteritis and dysentery and to be less prone to
virus infections such as influenza simply because when left
to thJemselves, they avoid living in overcrowded conditions.
They are only crammed together in close proximity with each
other where they have been persuaded or coerced into 'reser
vations1 by officialdom or plantation employers.
In even more striking contrast to the plight of
group V than the Sholiga case is that of group III, the
Other High Castes, with only 5% of all the child deaths
reported. This is hardly surprising since the members
of this group either lived in the town, within easy reach
of the Primary Health Centre or of private physicians, or
were well able to afford and arrange for an emergency dash
by car there. On the other hand the high numbers of child
deaths reported by group I, the second highest of all the
groups after group V, is an anomaly for which I am unable
to account. This wealthy section of the Lingayat caste
has nothing in its culture or circumstances to prohibit
the employment of the best possible medical care for its
children. Most of the husbands interviewed in this group
were either professional men or landed Gowda cultivators
with motorised transport, if only a scooter or a tractor.
The only ethnographic explanation I can think of is that
the wives of this group were on the whole much less educ¬
ated than those of group III, over half of them being in
the 'Little or None' category. But since a much higher
percentage of wives in group II and group IV, both of
which had lower child mortality, were in this category,
this does not get us much further. Certainly Scrimshaw's
argument, which also involves the neglect of daughters, doe
not help to explain this particular data.
Apart from the puzzle of the Rich Lingayats the
early-age mortality figures for our survey seem to sup¬
port accepted demographic experience. The group with the
second highest fertility had the highest mortality. That
those with the highest fertility had somewhat lower mor¬
tality (though there is very little difference between the
two) could be construed in terms of the accessibility or
otherwise of medical practitioners, whether allopathic (Ives
* *
tern) or Ayurvedic. The most 'modernised' group had the
lowest mortality and the lowest fertility. And lastly,
the Poor Lingayats, with the second lowest fertility, had
fairly low (the third lowest) mortality.
2: Family Type
Demographers do not appear to see eye to eye on
the effect of family structure on fertility. For instance,
the Mysore Population Study, (1951), Driver, (1965), Nag,
(1968), and Mahadevan, (1979) all found that fertility was
higher in nuclear families than in joint families. The
reason for this was said to be the segregated roles of
spouses in joint families, shyness .in the face of taboos
against affectionate behaviour between husband and wife,
the lack of privacy in general in this type of family. But
in a paper published in the journal Social Change on re¬
search undertaken by the Bangalore Population Centre, P.H.
Reddy came to the opposite conclusion for the Bangalore
District of Karnataka (Reddy 1978). Mandelbaum goes some
way^towards resolving the contradiction when he suggests
that the apparent lower fertility of women living xn joint
families may be merely a function of the typical domestic
** one of the indigenous schools.
development cycle
'A newly married couple lives with the
husband's parents and brothers until..
...the married brothers separate into
nuclear families, each of which becomes
a joint family when the sons bring in
their brides. Among poorer people the
joint family stage is likely to be short 1
(Mandelbaum 197^, p.50)
The typology of Indian family structure is not
universally applied by anthropologists and sociologists,
though that oi Pauline Kolenda (iColenda 1968) is regarded by
some anthropologists as the standard one. A revised
classification suggested by J. Caldwell (1972) and used
by Reddy (op.cit. 1978) approximates most closely to the
one I finally arrived at as the most applicable to the
structures commonly found in Chamarajanagar. For Tab1es
l8, l8a and l8b the sense in which I have used this clas¬
sification is as follows: Nuclear: a married couple
with or without children. Into this category has been
collapsed (in Tables l8a and l8b) a separate value, that
of Nuclear with Accretion, where an unmarried sibling of
either spouse may be living in the household. Joint:
a corporate group consisting of more than one married
brother, with their children, if any, and usually with
their parents and any unmarried brothers or sisters, plus
further accretions, if any. (I say 'usually with parents'
because on the death of both parents joint families tend
to segmentation, leaving one brother and his wife and child¬
ren - not necessarily the eldest - in the family house).
Ext ended: parents with one married son, his wife and any
children, along with unmarried daughters and sons, if any,
of the parents, and accretions, if any.
In his Tamilnadu Study, as with some of those
cited by Mandelbaum, Nag, Driver and others, Mahadevan con¬
trasts only two types, Joint and Nuclear. In the Caldwell
typology used by Reddy, 'Stem' family corresponds with my
Extended family while Joint and Stem-Joint correspond with













































































































Table 18b: Mean Current Family Size by Caste and by Family Type
Caste-group Family Type
Nuclear Joi nt Extended Total
I 2.6 3.1 3.9 3.0
II 2.9 1.7 3.1 2.8
III 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.9
IV 3.2 2.0 3.3 3.1
V 3.2 2.8 3.0 3.1
VI 2.2 1.0* 2.1 2.2
AIT Caste-groups 2.9 2.5 3.0 2.9
*Only one case
Study (195l)i joint families are shown to be associated
withjLower fertility and nuclear families with higher fer¬
tility. The tables reveal that in Chamarajana gar there
were more joint families in the three 'sanskritised1 groups
and a higher percentage of these in the better-off groups II
and III. The three 'sanskritised' groups are also the
most urbanised. A.M. Shah has pointed out that the joint
family tends to be a small-town phenomenon (Shah 1973)*
Such families subjected to a big-city milieu are likely to
hive off into nuclear flat-dwelling segments. The inhabit¬
ants of villages, on the other hand, are mostly poor people,
whose accommodation would not suffice for the average joint
family, which is usually a fairly well-off, orthodox lineage
segment holding property in common. There are of course
rich landowners living in the country on farms, in large
joint family households, but their numbers are insignifi¬
cant compared to the far larger proportion of villagers liv¬
ing in nuclear households.
Shah's analysis of the household dimension of the
Indian family is confirmed by the Chamarajana gar situation,
where most of the joint families reside in the town. Tables
l8, l8a and l8b also se em to confirm, at first sight, the ob
servation of Mahadevan cited above. Nuclear family house¬
holds are shown to have a higher percentage of C families
(4-8 children) and a lower percentage of A families (0-1)
than is the case for other types of household. However,
the percentage of B families (2-3 children) are about the
same, which weakens the apparent positive relationship be¬
tween large families and nuclear households, especially
when it is noted that 70% of all Sholigas lived in nuclear
households, (only one of the Sholiga couples interviewed
lived in a joint family), and Sholigas had the lowest fer¬
tility. But, as explained in Chapter I of the first part
of this thesis, the type of household in which a couple is
living at a given time may well vary with the exigencies of
the developmental cycle of the domestic group to which the
couple is attached.
3: Consultation on Family Planning.
Caldwell draws our attention to the signs that
a sexual revolution is beginning to take place in south
India, which rural people attribute to the influence of
the cinema and the spread of urban and educated or 'Eng¬
lish' attitudes 'This tends to strengthen the bond be¬
tween the young husband and his wife at the expense of
that between the former and his parents'. (Caldwell
1982, p.22). The age at which women marry is also going
up (see Chapter VIII in this part of the thesis). Thus
various aspects of social change are combining to foster
increasing consultation between spouses on most subjects,
including that of family planning. Thomas Poffenberger
has shown that where there is consultation on family plan¬
ning between marital partners, fertility is likely to be
reduced (Poffenberger 1969), and this certainly appears to
be the case in Chamarajanagar. Tables 19, 19a and 19b
reveal that in the category which replied 'No' to the
question on consultation, the percentages of those with
large and those with B (2-3) families are equal. In the
'Yes' category, those couples who did consult on family
planning, the percentage of those with B familes is much
higher than of those with C, or large, families. The
fact that there are more A(0-1) families in the 'No'
category could be explained in terms of some couples only
consulting when they had reached what one or the other
spouse regarded as an optimum. And the optimum is un¬
likely to be no children or (except in the case of the
Sholigas), only one child. With the exception of group V,
the Hinterland Low Castes, more couples in each group con¬
firmed than denied consultation. Group II reported the
least consultation in the high caste division and had the
second lowest rate of consultation of the whole sample,
albeit nothing like as low as group V. Since they also
had the second lowest fertility and more couples in the
group with the highest fertility of all alleged that they
consulted on family planning the Chamarajana gar data on
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I 22.0 78.0 50
II 36.0 64.0 50
III 22.0 78.0 50
IV 28.0 72.0 50
V 54.0 46.0 50
VI 24.0 76.0 50
N 93 207 300
All Caste-groups
% 31.0 69.0






























Table 19b: Mean Current Family Size by Caste and by Consultation on
Family Planning
Caste-group Consultation on Family Planning
Yes No Total
I 2.7 oo•CO 3.0
II 2.8 2.7 2.8
III 3.0 2.6 2.9
IV 3.1 3.3 3.1
V 3.6 2.7 3.1
VI 2.3 2.2 2.2
All Caste-groups 2.9 2.8 2.9
this variable is rather inconclusive. It may be that
in a conservative group where most of the wives are
quite uneducated while quite a high proportion of the
husbands have secondary education the husbands, con¬
cerned about educating their children, called the tune
about family size and the wives submitted, or at least
agreed. Certainly more than one Poor Lingayat wife
said that it was better to have few children so that
they could be educated properly. Few of these wives
worked outside the home, and most led fairly restricted
lives. It is quite probable that they tended to iden¬
tify with the concept of taking pride in the achieve¬
ments of a few children rather than producing many child¬
ren because this is what their husbands desired. A ques¬
tion of settling for quality rather than quantity. Cer¬
tainly more husbands in this group than in any other des¬
ired small families, as we shall see in the next chapter.
k: Health and Nutrition
Replies to questions on this issue were so subject¬
ive and difficult to assess, especially with regard to
their effect on fertility, that they may be discussed only
at a very superficial level. According to the literature
on the subject as well as personal communication by inform¬
ants at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine,
the Centre for Reproductive Biology, Edinburgh, and the
Community Medicine Department of St. John's Hospital, Banga¬
lore, nutrition per se has very little effect on an individ¬
ual's fertility. That is, even grossly undernourished
people (as under famine conditions or in Nazi prison camps)
can and do reproduce themselves. In any case there were
no examples of serious malnutrition among those interviewed
for my survey. The millet ragi (eleusine corocana) which
provides the staple diet of the poor in our area, is extreme¬
ly nutritious, much more so than the rice which is the staple
of the better off, and nobody complained of food shortage.
Poor people mostly said they had two ragi mudde a day. A
mudde is a double handful of boiled ragi dough rather like
very stiff porridge formed into a rough ball and eaten
with sambhar or 'curry' sauce. This means that they
ate between one and two kilos of grain a day. One
result of eating ragi is that, on the whole, the poor
and low castes have very good teeth.
Although Moni Nag cites venereal disease as a
major factor in fertility reduction in non-industrial
societies, questions designed to investigate the incid¬
ence of venereal disease were dropped from the Chama-
rajanagar questionnaire after the pilot survey^
partly because they were likely to give rise to pre¬
varication and partly because they were liable to annoy
and embarrass respondents when asked by non-medical in¬
terviewers. In any case group V, the community wherein
V.D. seems likely to be an important factor (on account
of the promiscuity alleged by the estate staff and attrib¬
uted to overcrowding and the breakdown of traditional vil¬
lage norms), turned out to have the second largest number
of children. We only came across one case of infertility
which could be ascribed with a fair degree of certainty
to venereal disease. This was a Harijan couple of whom
the wife had been a prostitute with a thriving trade on
one of the estates. She was childless. Her sister,
whom she described as her husband's 'first wife' was
also part of the menage and was also childless. (It is
hard to say whether this could be described as a case of
sororal polygyny or of concubinage).
The possibility that the relative infertility of
the Sholigas might be due to sickle—cell anaemia, a com¬
mon characteristic of south Indian hill tribes, has been
considered, but those we interviewed all lived well above
the altitude level of the anopheles mosquito.
Most of the ill-health reported by respondents of
both sexes were ill-defined 'fevers' , possibly malaria
or influenza; intestinal disorders such as gastro-enter-
itis and dysentery; and bronchial complaints on the hills.
There were a few cases of heart disease, diabetes and
gastric ulcer, mainly among the men. The vagueness
of low caste respondents was partially due to the uncom¬
municative tactics of medical personnel and the appar¬
ent incuriousness of the patients. To the question:
"What did the doctor say was the cause of these sympt¬
oms ?J'the answer repeatedly given was that he/she
"didn't say". The patients seemed to be satisfied by
being given an injection and tablets, although they
quite frequently added that they were no better.
A high proportion of the low caste women were
anaemic. Of those wives who complained of feeling
permanently tired, the lowest percentages were in the
two wealthy communities, I and III. They were follow¬
ed by VI, the Sholigas. Group V had the highest per¬
centage of wives complaining of permanent tiredness (56%
Most of these had the very pale inner eyelid which de¬
notes anaemia. The high incidence of anaemia among
the low castes, where women work as labourers as well
as doing all the heavy work of the household, such as
fetching water from well or standpipe, is the. result of
a vicious circle. When her first child is born, the
wife is usually a healthy girl who produces a sturdy
infant, the apple of its parents' eye and brought up
with loving care. But with every successive pregnancy,
the strain of continuous heavy work, almost continuous
lactation and inadequate feeding, (because the husband
and children, in that order, must be fed first and best)
drains the wife of energy. Subsequent children are les
and less well cared for because the mother is too tired
even to take them to a doctor, if there is one in the
vicinity. By theYime they are forty most of the low
caste girls have become exhausted hags. "Why should
they get equal pay ?" the men ask^"When they can't work
as hard as we do ?" When it is pointed out to them
that at the end of the day they can rest, while wives
have to fetch water, light fires, cook and clean, they
shrug. That sort of thing is woman's work and men
* *
can't be expected to do it.
Physical weariness in women, as Anne Sharman
maintains, can have an indirect effect on fertility by
causing child mortality:
'The less help a woman has the less likely
she is to be able to carry out her numerous
tasks satisfactorily....In these circumstan¬
ces marginal differences between consumption
units such as the distance to fields, distance
to fetch water, ease of collecting firewood...
may be important in the effect they have on
the care the women take of their children....
Allocation of time and resources directly
affects the matrition of children in that it
determines the quantity and quality of the
food they receive and the frequency with
which it is prepared' (Sharman 1970,pp.83,8^ ) .
According to S. Chandrasekhar the diet of the
nursing woman in the majority of Indian communities is
not adequate even for a woman who does not have to meet
this demand, and he reminds us that the average Indian
woman is in a state of lactation, however meagre, for
most of the child-bearing period of her life:
'While it is difficult to estimate precisely
what part of infant mortality is due to
maternal overall weakness, the direct
relation between the overburdened mother
and infant morbidity and death is obvious'
(Chandrasekhar 1972,p.l96).
Of those Chamarajana gar wives who felt that child
bearing was affecting their health the highest proportion
were in groups V (5^%) and group IV (26.3%). This was
hardly surprising since these were the two groups with
the highest fertility. The lowest proportion was found
among the Sholigas, who also had the lowest fertility.
Only one Sholiga wife complained of the ill-effects of
** One curious symptom of anaemia found among low caste
women labourers on the coffee estates is a craving
for a certain kind of pinkish clay, which they eat.
This addiction is sneered at by the men. The women
eat earth because they are stupid, they say, and
eating the earth makes them stupider. In fact a
doctor of the Community Medicine Department (P.T.O.
child-bearing. In fact Sholiga women in general seem
to take parturition very lightly, most of them report¬
ing that they returned to work a day or two after the
birth and that they worked a normal daily stint until
the labour pains began. The relationship, therefore,
between perception of disability caused by frequent
child-bearing and actual fertility was close and direct.
One health variable on which questions were
asked in the survey schedules involved the incidence
of involuntary abortions (miscarriages). The results
were curious. The highest incidence was found in
group III, where 3^±% of the wives reported having had
involuntary abortions. This was somewhat unexpected.
Group III wives may be either restricted or emancipated,
but they never engage in manual labour heavier than using
a grindstone to crush cereals and spices. One suspects
either that some of the miscarriages were not accidental
or that a fairly sedentary life is conducive to aborting.
The lowest incidence was found among Sholiga wives, al¬
though they lead physically active and often dangerous
lives, gathering forest produce on steep hillsides, climb¬
ing trees and hoeing stony soil. But Sholiga wives are
free to choose when they will stop work and go home. The
next highest incidence of involuntary abortion was found
among the plantation and agricultural labourers of group V
One might have anticipated that this would be so, for here
women do heavy work for long hours to a schedule not of
their own devising. On the other hand, the next lowest
incidence was among the wives of group IV, where those who
work for a cultivator employer do so under conditions even
more arduous than those experienced by their caste-sisters
on the hills. But only 25% of the wives interviewed in
* of St. John's Hospital, Bangalore agreed with me
that the clay probably contains salts and other
minerals lacking in the anaemic women's bodies,
although as far as I know it has never been analysed.
this group were employed for wages. The rest worked at
home at cottage industry such as silkworm rearing or flow¬
er-tying, or sold produce in the town or village bazaars,
or simply engaged themselves in the manifold household tasks
of the Indian peasant woman. It is possible that because
the lives of these women, half of their group, who were not
agricultural labourers, were active enough, without being
too exhausting, to keep them fit and their muscles in good
shape, they were less prone to miscarriages than the seden¬
tary wives of group III. But it does not explain why the
equally sedentary wives of group I did not also have a high
incidence of abortion, unless it is the case that the exer¬
cise taken by the Lingayat Gowda women, in supervising farm
work helps to keep them fit. But tempting though these sup¬
positions are they are merely speculative, albeit based on
ethnographic information.
5: Wife's Age at the Time of the Survey
Table 20 presented a problem at first. It may be
recalled that the ages of our cohort were 29 to 39. It
turned out that in the sample interviewed far more wives
claimed to be 29 (24% of the total sample interviewed) and
30 (22%) than any other age. The third largest group was
of wives aged 35 (12%). There may be no single explana¬
tion for this phenomenon, and various possible reasons spring
to mind. Among the uneducated, ages are as a rule only ap¬
proximately known, and the clustering at ages 30 and 35 could
be due to a tendency towards 'rounding up' among illiterate
respondents uncertain of their exact age. But that does not
explain the disproportionate number of women, including grad¬
uates, claiming to be 29 years old. It is true that even
numbers are said to be inauspicious, but the interviewers,
all Mysoreans and one a Chamarajana gar girl herself; were as
puzzled as I was. It may of course have just been due to a
tendency on the part of the women to regard the thirties as
a dismal prelude to middle-age and therefore to under-report.
Or of course they may actually have all been telling the simple
truth. As an added complication, two women aged 40 crept in.
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Table 20: Current Family Size by Caste by Wife's Age at the
Time of Survey: Percentage Distributions
Caste-group Wife's Age Current Family Size
A(0-1) % B(2-3) % C(4+) % Total
of caste of caste of caste N
group group group
I 29-32 10.0 36.0 6.0 26
33-40 6.0 20.0 22.0 24
II 29-32 12.0 48.0 8.0 34
33-40 4.0 12.0 16.0 16
III 29-32 16.0 26.0 8.0 25
33-40 0.0 32.0 18.0 25
IV 29-32 10.0 34.0 26.0 35
33-40 8.0 8.0 14.0 15
V 29-32 14.0 24.0 12.0 25
33-40 6.0 14.0 30.0 25
VI 29-32 42.0 16.0 8.0 33
33-40 0.0 20.0 14.0 17
N 64 145 91 300
All Caste-groups
% 21.3 48.3 30.3
(As the sole checker, I must accept responsibility for
this error, my only excuse being the conditions under which
we were all working). In view of ail this it seemed exped¬
ient to collapse Wife's Age into two categories: Below 33
years and Above 33 years. This way the numerical dispar¬
ity between the groups is considerably reduced and it became
possible to produce a viable table with these values. For¬
tunately the age-groups were distributed fairly evenly with¬
in the castes.
Table 20a is of considerable interest in that it
shows that the younger women are taking to contraception
sooner. That is, when they have reached a smaller size
of family than is the case with the older women. This is
particularly striking in view of the fact that the age dif¬
ferences between the two categories are not great. Another
noteworthy point is the very small family size of the young¬
er women still 'at risk' .
Table 21 may throw further light on the problem.
When the mean ages of wives in all caste-groups interviewed
at the time of the survey were calculated it turned out that
Sholiga wives averaged one year less than groups II and V,
and two years less than groups I and III. Although the age
differentials between Sholiga wives and those of group IV
were negligible, they were just marginally the youngest group
of wives. However, this circumstance would carry more force
as a possible argument to account for their lower fertility
were it not for the fact that group IV, which shares the
youth honours with them, has the highest fertility of all
the groups. But two otheijobservable conditions, when com¬
bined with mean age, may provide some circumstantial evi¬
dence. The first is that the mean age of Sholiga wives at
effective marriage was the second highest after caste-group
III, the most 'modernised' group. The second is that Sho¬
liga wives had the shortest duration of marriage, which is
presumably linked with their later age at marriage.
Incidentally, it should be borne in mind that Indian
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minority, marry so young - and Chamarajanagar is no excep¬
tion—that by the age of 29 the majority of them will have
been married for around fifteen years, (the mean figure for
the Chamarajana gar sample was 15.02) and not only have pro¬
duced a number of children but may even have a daughter of
marriageable age and therefore wish for that reason to
cease child-bearing themselves.
6: Consanguineous Marriage.
It would wrong to close this chapter without a
glance at the testimony of the data collected during the
survey on the incidence of marriage to kin. Although such
evidence as it affords is dubious, since I suspect a consid¬
erable degree of under-reporting, it should not be ignored
entirely if R.M. Reid's theory (op.cit. 197 1) mentioned in my
Introduction has any validity. Reid, it will be remember¬
ed, suggested that inbreeding in south India as the result
of the preference for consanguineous marriage in the South
(cf. my chapter on kinship in India) is associated with low¬
er fertility (i.e. fewer offspring per consanguineous couple
reach marriageable age than those per unrelated couple, and
some of these consanguineous offspring may be sterile).
These genetic consequences lead, he believes, to population
stability and '...may have very important but unperceived
adaptive and evolutionary significance.' (Reid op.cit.1975,
P.l6p ) .
Dyson and Moore (1983 ) also cite the traditional
south Indian system as a determinant of reduced fertility.
In their case the premise is based on the way isogamous
marriage and the renewing of links between male and female
siblings by the union of their children contribute not only
to the retention of ties between a wife and her parental kin,
and to marriages within the wife's own locality, but in gen¬
eral to attention being given to the needs and wishes of
daughters and sisters. In Somavarapet, the village of my
residence, I found that the mean distance between the wife's
natal place and her virilocal household was only ten miles,
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although the sample included a few wives of well-off men
with wider networks who came from towns over a hundred
miles away. Of course not all consanguineous marriages
are happy ones, and we came across a few cases where the
fact that the husband had known his little cross-cousin
or niece as a child led him to continue to treat her as
child after the marriage, although the couple had sexual
relations. By that I mean he did not confide in her or
treat her in any way as a responsible adult, and in one
case the wife complained that her husband, who was also
her mama or mother's brother, beat her if she crossed him
in any way. But on the whole Chamarajanagar people seem
to be vindicated when they say, as they often do, "We know
our child will be well treated if she is married to a
young man we know well, and also we are able to keep an
eye on her". Most of the consanguineous unions of
people with whom I was acquainted seemed to be happy ones,
arranged within the close family circle by mothers and
daughters. That is, a married woman will plan with her
mother to marry her young daughter to her younger brother,
still living in the household which the married woman left
when she wed. As mentioned in the chapter on Kinship, in
the case of sister's daughter or father's sister's daughter
marriage, the bride goes back, so to speak, to the house¬
hold from which her mother came. And this household will
usually be one which she has regularly visited as long
as she can remember. Moreover, it must not be forgotten
that in the case of sister's daughter marriage, the bride's
mother-in-law is her maternal grandmother. This refers of
course to genealogical or sothera rather than classificat-
ory kin marriages. Obviously some cross-cousins may only
be terminologically close kin, and the same is true of clas¬
sif icatory 'sister's daughters'.
For what it is worth, therefore, it is interesting
to note that Sholigas, with the lowest fertility, had the
highest percentage of kin marriages in our survey (36%), in
their own generation, and that group II, with the next lowest
fertility, had the next highest percentage (52%.of which
10% was to the genealogical sister's daughter). One
suspects considerable under-reporting of cross-cousin
and sister's daughter marriage because in recent years
it has become 'trendy' to regard these unions, especial¬
ly the avuncular version; as old-fashioned or even a lit¬
tle shameful. In 197^ a survey of 385 households in the
area revealed that 40.5% of the respondents were married
to the 'correct' categories of kin. In the 1979-80 sur¬
vey the figures were 39»5%. Caldwell cites a swing away
from marriage to kin in his field area of Karnataka from
35% to 20% over a generation (Caldwell op.cit. 1982).
Whether or not the south Indian marriage system
really does influence fertility, either in consequence of
its genetic or of its affective aspects, the Chamaraja-
nagar data does appear to support both Reid and Dyson up
to a point. The group with the most kin marriages also
had the lowest fertility, while the group with the next
highest proportion of kin marriages had the next most fa¬
vourable (in terms of India's official population policy)
fertility figures. In default of time, it was impossible
to take genealogies from each respondent in the sample and
therefore these results are only offered as a possibly
fruitful field for further research.
CHAPTER XI FAMILY FORMATION
1: Family Size
The main theme of this chapter comprises
the examination of attitudes rather than of substantive
data. But it is the changing of attitudes over time,
under the pressures of external social change, that ulti¬
mately affects fertility behaviour. For the Poffenbergers
there are two basic questions to be raised in regard to
Indian fertility: 'Why people want the number of children
they do, and why they do not act to terminate their fert¬
ility once they have achieved that number' (Poffenberger
1973, p. M.N. Srinivas, on the other hand, questions
the reliability of attitude questions about ideal/desired
family size:
'Are there notions.... of optimum family size ?
Or do people take children as they come and
try to make the best of the situation....?
It....needs to be noted that the optimum as
stated is consistently less than the numbers
which the couple actually had, leading us to
suppose that the answer is a forced one'
(Srinivas 1977, pp.26-27)
It is true that although most of the Chamarajanagar respon¬
dents voiced quite definite opinions about the size of fa¬
mily (large or small) they preferred, in many cases these
were expressed after the event. That is, they sometimes
said they^ould have preferred a small family after having
experienced the stresses, physical, emotional or financial,
engendered by a large one. But this does not necessarily
mean that the opinions of these people were irrelevant to
fertility trends in the area. Writing of their field
area of Gujerat the Poffenbergers could say: '....by 1969
a number of parents were telling their adult sons not to
make the same mistake they did - tlat they should have a
small family' (Poffenberger 1973,p.159). Attitudes, they
claimed, were already undergoing change towards a smaller
family size norm and the acceptance of modern family
planning. Caldwell too found in his field area of
south Karnataka a near-consensus that family economics
had changed from a past situation where large families
were an advantage rather than a burden (Caldwell, 1982) .
I think we can safely assume that though
uneducated married couples in Chamarajanagar may start
by taking children as they come, most of them pretty
soon develop their own ideas as to the desirable num¬
ber, especially the wives. Once a woman, particularly
a poor woman who works outside the home, has proved her¬
self to be fertile by having a couple of children, es¬
pecially a son, she is likely to have some idea whether
or not she wants to go on indefinitely enduring the
traumas of pregnancy and childbirth and the exigencies
of child care. The Poffenbergers suggest that while
the wives are likely to be more highly motivated to
have children in the early stages of marriage, '..once
they have the number they feel are necessary they are
more highly motivated to terminate fertility than are
the husbands' (Poffenberger 1973* p.l43). The re¬
plies of several Chamarajanagar couples illustrated
this point and showed that spouses may not be united
on their ideas as to what constitutes desired family
size. Take, for instance, the Harijan husband with
a large family who pointed out that many children meant
more financial contributions, and his anaemic wife who
said that she was worn out with child-bearing and wished
she only had two children.
Tables 22 and 22a do show that, whether before
or after the event, far more couples interviewed in the
Chamarajanagar survey wanted small families. The argu¬
ments of Mamdani for the Punjab ten years ago (Maradani
1972), and of Cain for Bangladesh (Cain,1977)1 clearly
no longer apply to the changing social scene in Chama¬
ra janagar. As Caldwell observes, with the shrinking
of landholdings - in Karnataka at least - children's
labour is worth less, while patriarchs can no longer
'demand as much work or deny as much consumption to their



























































































































Table 22a: Mean Current Family Size by Wife's Family Size
Preference and by Wife's Education
Wife's Education Wife ' s Family Size Prefer enc e
Large Smal 1 Both Total
F ami 1y Family Good
None or Primary 3.8 2.8 4.0* 2.9
Secondary 3.3 2.7 4.0 2.8
Graduate - 1.6 - 1.5
Total 3.8 2.7 4.0 2.9
*0nly one case
true that large families are 'economically rational'
propositions for poor peasants, or indeed for the rich,
and the majority of those we interviewed in Chamaraja-
nagar had already arrived at this conclusion. Where
today, they asked, with shrinking holdings and wide¬
spread unemployment, is gainful work to be found for
many children ? For the smallholder a couple of child¬
ren to gather firewood and graze livestock when young
and to weed, hoe or plough when they are older, may
still be essential, and for almost everyone an indepen¬
dently-earning child or two for support and/or assistance
in old age is equally important, but what happens to
the rest, who don't all die nowadays and must still be
fed and clothed? 'It is only if work is available
that every child can turn out to be a net asset, econ¬
omically speaking' (Srinivas,1977i p«19)«
It will be seen that 9k% of Sholiga wives pre¬
ferred a small family, and 86% of Sholiga husbands did so
In the case of caste group II these figures were reversed
9k% of group II husbands preferring a small family com¬
pared to 86% of group II wives. And with 88.7% of all
wives in the sample surveyed, along with 85% of their 1ms
bands, stating that they preferred a small family, the
evidence is overwhelming that, with due respect to Sri¬
nivas, many couples in Chamarajanagar do not any longer
philosophically accept the fact that children just come
along, and that at least the concept of an optimum may
well be spreading. Of course the question as to what
constitutes small or large families arises here. But
a kind of collective representation emerges not only
from the figures for the respondents' ideal number of
children of each sex (to be discussed below), but also
from the literature. The Poffenbergers (1969), Anker
(1973), Mandelbaum,(197^) and Caldwell (1982) all remark
that the ideal seems to be three, two sons and a daugh¬
ter. The Poffenbergers add, however, that for the ideal
number to live to maturity it was necessary for the vil¬
lagers in their field area to have more than three child¬
ren. This precaution, judging from the modal family of
three children for the Chamarajana gar sample in 1979-80,
seems to have been fairly generally abandoned, at least
in south India, by the end of the 1970s.
This is not to say that the help of children is
no longer needed. The assistance and support of the
younger generation is still badly wanted by the older.
More children may go to school and there learn to play,
as Caldwell suggests (Caldwell , 1982) , but a lot of work
is still done by children in the Chamarajana gar taluk,
especially the fuel-co11ecting and livestock-herding
which frees the parents for other, more remunerative
activities. And, though it is officially illegal for
them to do so, the landless poor still all too frequent¬
ly send their children out to work at an early age. My
neighbour's second son was sent at the age of eight to
live and work on a farm near the village of Somavarapet
where he watched over the livestock from dawn to dusk.
And, in spite of the Vlassofs' findings (Viassof, 1980 ) ,
Chamar a j ana gar people do ort the whole fear a childless
future in old age, quite apart from the still-dreaded
social stigma of unfruitfulness , especially for women.
The plight of several childless widows, of both high
and low castesjmet in the course of the fieldwork bore
witness to the validity of their anxiety. Direct des¬
cendants or immediately lateral cognatic kin are all
the more needed because of the lack, not only of State
but also of community care in India. Everyone agrees
that brothers and sisters, parents and - usually -
children will take care of each other, but in too many
cases it does not go further than that. Without very
close kin impoverished people are reduced to begging.
Th e other side of the coin is that this is an accepted
option and most people give what they can afford to
b e ggar s.
It is one thing however to want some children,
quite another to want many children, and this is where
the change in attitudes during the past two decades be¬
comes apparent. While the Poffenbergers could say that
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nobody in their field area would only have one child, we
have seen that a small but significant proportion of Chama-
rajanagar respondents had chosen to terminate fertility
after only one. Admittedly the majority of these belong¬
ed to that maverick group the Sholigas, but they were not
the only ones. Some couples had opted for only one be¬
cause of the wife's health, others because they wanted to
concentrate all their resources on the child's education
(two Brahmans, both with only daughters and one Poor Linga-
yat with an only son). In one case the Harijan father was
already supporting two children by a previous marriage. And
several of the Sholigas said they wanted only one child,
regardless of sex, 'to love'.
Table 22 and 22a disclose a negative relationship
between education and desire for a large family. At all
levels of education more wives wanted small families, but
the percentage of these went up with the ascending scale
of education. Of wives with primary or no education, 87.8%
wanted small families. Of those with secondary education,
91% wanted small families, and of the statistically insignif¬
icant but otherwise important graduates, 100% wanted small
families. When we look at the figures for the achievement
of their preference, a progression is likewise discernible.
We see that for wives with little or no education, 4?% of
those who wanted families of 2-3 children achieved their
desire. (B families). For wives with secondary education,
61% did so, and for graduates, 62.5?6 had so far done so.
Moreover, among those with secondary education, fewer who
wanted small families ended up with large ones.
Asked about their reasons for wanting small fam¬
ilies, wives and husbands camfiup with a variety of explan¬
ations: Better co-operation, 'happiness', less worry,
easier to feed the children. But the reply most often
given by both spouses (27% of wives and k2% of husbands)
was the now familiar one of 'less expense'. Chamaraja-
nagar people repeatedly told us that in the past big fami¬
lies were desired because of the contributions of children
(or in the case of the orthodox high castes, the sons).
322o
Now, they said, they could not afford to bring the child¬
ren up to the point at which they could start earning, even
if work were available. Even among the better off (jiearly
all members of the higher castes) the cry was the same.
"prices are rising". The better-off or those with higher
expectations, frequently cited the cost of education as
their reason for opting for a small family. The low-caste,
low-income groups constantly cited the cost of food: "We
can't afford to feed ourselves, let alone children. We are
are struggling night and day already", and "We can hardly
afford to feed the ones we've got. Why have more and see
them suffer ?" These comments, angry or tearful, by Hari-
jan and Upuliga respondents, were confirmed by the fact
that many of them were in debt for food alone. We have
seen that a number of social changes apart from the crucial
one of rapid inflation have brought about this emphasis on
the cost rather than the benefit of children: e.g. the dis¬
integration of traditional patron-client relationships, par¬
tly due to the introduction of cash crops, resulting in a
breakdown of hereditary service relationships and the rise
of 'class' antagonisms (cf Epstein, 1967) • We have already
discussed the question of land shortage. Another reason is
the pressure of population itself. Sholigas complained of
the shrinking of their forest habitat and the concomitant
difficulties of gathering their traditional food supplies
of roots, greenstuff and fruit. The effects of education
and the desire for educated children plus the cost of
achieving this ambition has also been enlarged upon. All
in all I would agree with Caldwell (1932) that there is
now a widespread apprehension of having too many children.
As an Upuliga woman of Chamarajanagar put it: "Children
are nothing but a burden when you have to work as we do".
One way of looking at family formation is to ex¬
amine the birth intervals of contrasted groups. If we
leave out all other factors associated with fertility in
the Chamarajanagar survey and look at the birth intervals
alone, the results illustrate the way the cultural circum¬
stances (not necessarily the traditional cultures but the
kind of conduct enjoined on them by environmental forces),
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of the six groups appear to govern their individual family
formation behaviour. Sholigas, with the lowest fertility,
had the second longest birth intervals, probably because
they had the longest lactation and post-partum abstinence
periods. Group II, with the second lowest fertility, had
the third longest birth intervals - that is after group V
and the Sholigas. But they also had the second highest
number of sterilisations. Clearly those in this group
who did not terminate fertility after only a few children
by means of sterilisation achieved the same result by the
traditional means of wide spacing between births. Groups I
and III, with the shortest birth intervals, used more modern
methods apart from sterilisation than the others and also
were high acceptors of sterilisation (III being the highest
sterilisation acceptor and I being the highest modern con¬
traceptive user). Group V, relying principally on abstin¬
ence (32% of the group), with the highest figures for perm¬
anent abstinence and for abstinence on special days of the
week, had the longest birth intervals, even longer than those
of the Sholigas, but also had the second highest fertility.
As suggested in chapter VII of the second part of the thesis,
this group had the type of family formation postulated by
Short (1976) for 'primitive' people: several children, wide¬
ly spaced, covering most of the woman's reproductive period.
And lastly we have the interesting case of group IV, with the
highest fertility of all, marginally higher than that of
group V, shorter birth intervals than any but the two com¬
paratively educated and well-off high caste groups, and low
use of modern contraception and sterilisation. It seems
that the high fertility of this relatively urbanised group
may be attributed to their tendency to abandon traditional
methods of family planning, such as long lactation and post¬
partum abstinence periods, while failing on the whole to em¬
brace modern techniques. The family formation behaviour of
this group, more than any of the others, seems to be that of
a community which has fallen between two stools when it comes
to family planning, and resembles most closely Srinivas's
model of villagers just having to make the best of it when
unpremeditated children come along instead of having some
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form of control over their fertility.
2; Family Composition
Fertility is also strongly influenced by atti¬
tudes towards family composition. As Caldwell says, 'The
community has fairly clear ideas on what a minimum adequate
family consists of' (Caldwe11, 1982 , p . 27 ) . There must be
one son, and - like Anker and the Poffenbergers - he found
that his informants tended to prefer two sons for fear that
one might die or otherwise fail to live up to the parents'
expectations. I have called this the 'spare son syndrome',
and it was voiced in many ways by Chamarajanagar respondents;
"If one dies, the other may survive"; "If one goes wrong, we
may be able to rely on the other". The latter fear was the
one most frequently expressed. Although people wanted sons
they tended to distrust them. As one high caste merchant
said, "I hope my next child is a girl. Boys are so difficult
to control". Most people wanted at least one daughter but
the plural attitudes of the society are never so evident as
when they are discussing females, so that though people
would seldom admit to relying on a daughter for support in
old age, they frequently said that they wanted a girl be¬
cause you could rely on them when in trouble. Girls were
often wanted so as to look after the parents when they were
sick, since they are supposed to be more affectionate than
are boys. "Boys often neglect their parents", said a high
caste woman, "but girls never change in their affections".
A Sholiga woman expressed the same sentiment in her own idi¬
om; "A daughter will always give you food, but you can't
rely on a son to do so". This was an attitude found in all
the caste groups.
The prohibitive cost of daughters' weddings was
often cited by members of the higher castes as a reason for
not wanting more than one girl, although several others from
the same groups said they wanted a girl so as to give her
"a grand wedding". Among the low castes in this area, the
weddings of boys costs more than those of girls, a conse¬
quence of the tradition of thera or bridewealth among the
'unsanskritised' castes. A Harijan with one son said he
wanted one child of each sex. He hoped the next child
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would be a girl not only because girls were auspicious
but because their marriage expenses were less. Other
reasons for wanting girl children revealed even more
conflicting representations. A Rich Lingayat wife
said "Girls are the real household gods. We need them
because they bring happiness to the family". A Poor
Lingayat, mindful of the omnipresent and vigilant eye
of 'society', explained, "People will think less of us
if we don't have a daughter". A Harijan with one son
and a pregnant wife said he hoped for a daughter because
"A girl is necessary", possibly referring to the role
played by girls in the festivals of local goddesses, or
to the general auspiciousness of a household with a
girl in it. Several low caste respondents with sons
said they wanted a daughter because, as one put it,
"Boys with sisters respect women and know how to be¬
have properly". Sholigas,who PaY little or nothing
for the weddings of their offspring of either sex, were
often adamant about not having any special preference as
to the sex of their children, particularly when they
were giving their reasons for taking steps to cease
having children after one or two girls.
Nevertheless, a preference for sons emerges
from the following figures for the spouses' ideal
number of children of each sex. When asked for their
ideal number of girls, 77% of all wives opted for one
girl and only 11% said they preferred two. When asked
their ideal number of boys, 47% of all wives wanted two
boys, although a surprisingly high percentage, 43%, only
wanted one. In fact, 72% of Sholiga wives only wanted
one boy. The most frequently reported reason for want¬
ing girls was "love" or "affection". The most frequent¬
ly reported reason for wanting boys was support in old
age. Of the husbands, 74% preferred only one girl,
while 15% preferred two. Forty-three per cent of husbands
preferred two boys while 39% preferred only one. As with
the wives, the husbands' most commonly given reason for
beirtg' pleased at the birth of a girl was the love she both
gave and engendered, c:nd for a boy support in old age.
Most of the fathers I knew in the taluk were devoted to
their daughters and lavished more affection on them than
on their sons. On the whole, it is fair comment to say
that while women in this part of India may in general be
subordinated and under-valued as wives, they are highly
important and valued members of the family as sisters,
daughters and mothers. When my Harijan neighbours in
Somavarapet, who already had two children of each sex,
had an unexpected and unwanted fifth child who turned
out to be a girl, those with experience of north India
might have expected her to be neglected. On the con¬
trary, the whole family were besotted about the child,
who got the best of everything that very poor parents
could provide and was thoroughly spoilt.
Asked whether they thought it worth while go¬
ing on trying for a boy if they had already borne what
they felt were all the children they could cope with,
75% of all wives said "No", including 90% of all Sho-
liga wives. A few (13%) said "Yes, but the same ap¬
plies to a girl". In fact we only came across three
cases of a wife being almost hysterically determined
to have another child in the face of her husband's re¬
luctance to have any more, and in each case it was be¬
cause she desperately wanted a girl. Once, when we
were interviewing a couple where the wife was pregnant,
wanted the coming child to be a girl, and said that if
it were not she would try again, she suddenly jumped up,
rushed outside the hut to where her husband was being
interviewed, and shouted at him, "Don't you dare let
them talk you into being sterilised until we see what
sex this child will be. I must have a girl". (Needless
to say she was a low caste woman. Shouting at husbands
and even addressing them in the insulting neuter gender
if displeased, is quite in order for low caste women,
however put upon work-wise). More husbands (59% of
them)thought it worth while going on trying for a boy,
compared with the 31% who did not think so. Those
who thought it worthwhile must either have been fortu¬
nate in the sex composition of their families or
unfortunate in that their wives would not co-operate,
since our modal figure of 3, and mean family size of 2.
for the whole sample are some indication that the major
ity of couples interviewed in Chamarajanagar taluk did
not go on trying for very long. One suspects that the
collective ideal for all but the most sophisticated or
the most self-sufficient in Chamarajanagar is two boys
and a girl, while for the small class of sohisticates
as well as for the Sholigas, it is one of each sex.
CONCLUSION
Before setting out to draw inferences from the
substance of the preceding chapters, I think it proper
to declare my own interest. Although academic conven¬
tion. may require objectivity in scholarshipj it is dif¬
ficult to achieve in the social sciences. I am convin¬
ced that in these fields researchers cannot avoid being
influenced by their own values and that scholarship is
therefore best served when these values are openly dis¬
closed and acknowledged. By the same token, I trust
that it will not only be more honest but also more use¬
ful to admit that my own experience in the field has
predisposed me to bias on the following matters:
firstly I am convinced that a population 'problem' ex¬
ists, and that, while institutional changes and an equit¬
able redistribution of resources are indeed urgently need
ed in India, no amount of reform can prevent a catastro¬
phic deterioration of the quality of life for all social
strata if the population continues to increase unchecked.
For example, in the 20-odd years between my previous and
subsequent acquaintanceship with Chamarajana gar town, the
population had more or less doubled (from l6,0^0 in 1951
to 31,069 in 1971), and its pressure on the environment
was unmistakeably evident. Since pollution levels do
appear to rise as the population expands, surely this
state of affairs alone argues that a limit should be set
to population (see Singer 1971) 1 and every effort made to
achieve a state of balance with the eco-system. A single
instance of the way the eco-system - and by corollary the
people - of the taluk are suffering is the growing scar¬
city of firewood, the cooking fuel of the poor, and of
grass as the population and its livestock encroach in¬
creasingly on the dwindling reserves of forest, scrub
and grassland.
So it follows that I also believe in population
control, albeit a control to be exercised by the choice
of the parents themselves, particularly the mother.
And in the Indian context this means the assurance that
those children who are born will grow up. It also means
that final decisions about having more children should
rest with the wives who have to bear and rear them, that
safe means, traditional or modern, of family planning
should be available to them, that childbearing should
not be their only hope of fulfilment in life and of
standing in the community, that daughters should no
longer be considered inferior to sons, and that women
who for one reason or another cannot have children are
not condemned to suffer lifelong shame and denigration.
Secondly, I have come to believe that the question
of gender relations lies at the heart of the population
problem in India, although the relationship is not always
a straighforward one and a number of other variables are
also involved. This belief is reflected in the last
lines of the paragraph above. Moreover, my fieldwork,
along with a study of the literature on Indian kinship^
has led me to agree with Dyson and Moore, Miller, Sopher
and others that there i_s a North/South dichotomy in.
Indian culture which appears to be reflected in the paral¬
lel high caste/low Caste dichotomy that - in Chamaraja-
nagar at least - has become distorted by intervening vari¬
ables such as Westernisation, education and the whole syn¬
drome loosely called 'urbanisation'.
And thirdly, if, as Caldwell asserts, it is mass
education which leads, via the adoption of liberal values,
to fertility reduction, then hooray for mass education. But
to avoid instant ostracism by angry anthropologists, I haste
to add that the values which Caldwell clearly has in mind
are by no means intrinsic to Western liberals alone but are
also to be found in many non-Western societies, from the
JKung Bushmen of the Kalahari to the Sherpas of Nepal, in¬
cluding a high proportion of Indian hill tribes. What this
moral climate really consists of is a kind of non-sexist
tolerance, an unprejudice which includes acceptance by the
society of the concept of personal integrity of the individ¬
ual of either sex. It was to be iound in Cha.nar a j ana gar
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not only among the very few highly educated and 'modernised'
residents there but also among the least educated and modern¬
ised community in the taluk, the Shoiiga tribe. This group
does not need to adopt egalitarian ideas from elsewhere when
it comes to gender relations. They already possess as part
of their own culture a code of practice which allows for
equal decision-making for both sexes as to their personal
concerns. And it appears to be no coincidence that their
fertility is lower than that of any other group surveyed in
* *
the taluk.
Throughout the chapters concerned with data from
the survey, an effort has been made to reduce the responses
collected in the questionnaire into a quantifiable form, and
to identify significant relationships between the variables
believed to be the most relevant to the fertility behaviour
of the couples interviewed in Chamarajanagar. Quantitative
methods, however indispensable for converting surmise into
substance, are of course clumsy tools when it comes to un¬
derstanding 'the complex interaction of events and circum¬
stances' as Joan BusfieId puts it (Busfield and Paddon,1980),
which bring about the conception and birth of a child in any
country. But despite the sometimes baffling and equivocal
nature of the evidence indicated by some of the tabulated
data and the labyrinthine ways taken by the analytical ar¬
gument, which from time to time disappears completely like
a river going underground in limestone terrain, certain sa¬
lient points persist.
A superficial examination of the variables gives
the impression that a positive relationship exists between
joint households, top grade housing, high income, large land-
holding and low fertility. But if we look more carefully,
we see that only one Shoiiga couple and four from group II
(the two groups with the lowest fertility) belong to joint
families; that no Shoiiga couple and only one from group II
live in top grade housing; that no Sholigas and only one
from group II have even a relatively high income; and thet
** In the interest of accuracy it is necessary to add that
Sholigas are by no means free from caste prejudice.
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no Sholigas and no members of group II have large
landholdings. This is not to say that the 'background'
variables discussed above do not have a bearing on fer¬
tility, but that they are unreliable indices without fur¬
ther specification. Moreover it becomes increasingly
clear that more than one model must be sought to account
for the reproductive behaviour of all the groups inter¬
viewed.
Certain relationships appear to have been
established.
(1) Economic status as represented by life-style
is only an influence on fertility as the prelude to and
manifestation of education and/or Westernisation, as
well as reduced child mortality. (2) Education for the
husband has an effect in two different ways: for the
poor man with ambitions for his son(s) and occasionally
for his daughter(s), the cost of educating and bringing
up the child combined with the long delay before any re¬
turn can be expected will tend to inhibit his commitments
in children. For men in a better financial position,
education may lead to Westernisation and to the acqui¬
sition of an educated wife, both of which situations
tend to result in motivation to have fewer children.
Education also reduces child mortality and therefore
the need to have a surplus of children. (3) Higher
education in the wife has a more profound effect. With
its corollary of Westernisation and 'modernisation' it
encourages her to break away from traditional attitudes
concerning the roles and goals of women; it inclines
her husband to respect her views; it qualifies her for
a profession and thus endows her with earning power
which will make it unnecessary for her to 'prove' her¬
self through child-bearing; and it encourages the couple
to have aspirations for their daughters' careers and a-
chievements beyond those of marriage and motherhood.
(4) Low child mortality, as suggested above, leads to
less need for extra children and to longer birth inter¬
vals. (5) The health of the wife and mother affects child
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mortality. (6) Consultation between spouses leads to
earlier adoption of family planning. (7) The higher the
wife's age at effective marriage the fewer children she
is likely to have since her reproductive period is thus
reduced. (8) The preference for sons leads to the desire
for an extra son if there is only one among a couple's
offspring, or to a series of births due to repeated at¬
tempts to produce a boy, and thus to a couple having
more children than they otherwise might have done.
(9) In Chamarajanagar this component applies to a lesser
degree to the desire to have a daughter among couples who
have only produced boys, although the urge to have sons
is still in general more prevalent than the urge to have
daughters. (10) It seems that consanguineous marriage, at
least if practised over time, may reduce fertility. And
lastly, if - irrespective of education and economic status -
it is accepted automatically by the community that women
are independent individuals whose control over their own
fertility is their own business and whose reproductive
capacity or intention is no reflection of their intrinsic
worth, and if these women have the knowledge and means
of controlling their fertility, and do so in the awareness
that the children they do bear are likely to survive, then
fertility may well be conspicuously reduced.
How does the fertility of our six local jati bear
out these inferences ? The two with the high/est fertil¬
ity, with no significant differences in number of living
children and mean current family size, were the two low
caste groups: poor, in the main uneducated, with high
child mortality and low age at effective marriage. The
next highest fertility was found among the Richer Lingayats,
who - strangely enough - appeared to have also suffered
the next highest child mortality. The majority (though
by no means all, there were notable exceptions), of this
group were still attached to traditional norms when it
came to such matters as the education of wives, 52% of
whom had little or no education, compared to 2k% among
the Other High Castes (III). The fertility of group III,
with far more educated wives, was lower than was the case
with the three groups mentioned above, but that of group
II was lower still. Group II, 52% of whose husbands had
had secondary education, compared to l8% in group IV and
2% in group V, was the most concerned with the cost of ed¬
ucation, because they were far more committed to educating
their children than were groups IV and V, while possessing
in general less ample means than those in groups I and III
Group VI, with the lowest education and the lowest income,
but also with the second lowest child mortality, had never
theless the lowest fertility of all.
The answer seems to be that reduced fertility in
groups I to V came about as the result of two clusters
or 'packages' of circumstances. (1) Social change lead¬
ing to education, leading to Westernisation, leading to
female autonomy (or relative autonomy), and thence to re¬
duced fertility. (2) Social change plus economic change
(e.g. inflation),leading to a desire for education of the
next generation which would be frustrated if not mediated
by reduced fertility. In the case of group VI the model
is different again: here we have tradition rather than
social change leading to reduced fertility, because the
tradition is one that accepts the female autonomy which
is only arrived at in other groups through a series of
changes. When this tradition is buttressed by low child
mortality and the women's knowledge of traditional methods
of controlling their reproduction, as in the case with
group VI, it is apparent that they have already reached
the bourne towards which the rest of the country is still
struggling and that their compatriots have a good deal to
learn from them.
Recommendations in the light of the Research
Whether or not it is usual to include suggestions
for action in a thesis, it is virtually impossible to
undertake a research project in the field without becom¬
ing aware of various desirable eventualities. A number
of these emerge from the Chamarajanagar research and
failure to mention them seems unreasonable. To wind up
this chapter therefore a few submissions on the policy
implications of this study may be in order despite the
fact that questions of procedure and legislative imple¬
mentation are well outside its remit. It is clear, for
instance, that if t.he following selection of desiderata
were to be brought about there is a strong likelihood
that fertility would be reduced. (Whether or not it
would be possible for a democratic government to effect
such admittedly Utopian reforms is another story. Legis¬
lation alone without proselytisation and inducement has
not been shown to have much success in any country).
(1) The establishment of tubectotny camps at regular
intervals in rural areas to give women access to
sterilisation as and when they wish to cease
child-bearing. (The Bangalore Population Centre
has shown that post-operative complications for
tubectomy acceptors are lower in camps than in
hospitals, while the reverse is true of vasec¬
tomy acceptors).
(2) The deployment of regular, wife-oriented 'camps'
to publicise the advisability and availability
of family planning, to advise on child welfare
and to persuade uneducated wives to return to
longer periods of lactation to bring about long¬
er birth intervals and increase the survival
chances of their infants.
(3) A drive to achieve the payment of equal econom¬
ic rewards for working women, along with equal
opportunities for their employment in high-
status jobs and a campaign to combat gender-
stereotyping both in school curricula and the
labour market.
(1) The provision of collective day-care facilities
for those women participating in the formal la¬
bour market who lack kin or employees to mind
their children.
(5) The legal promotion of wives, especially those
unable or unwilling to engage in the formal la¬
bour market, to joint proprietorship in the
couple's resources, plus co-partnership and
joint household-headship with their husbands,
thus granting to housework its due recognition
as an important factor in the household's econ¬
omic production.
(6) More effective measures to ban the institutions
of dowry, early teen-age marriage and conspicuous
ly expensive weddings for girls.
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(7) Propaganda and in-service teacher training to
combat sex-stereotyping of children, to advo¬
cate higher education for girls and to encou¬
rage them in aspirations other than marriage
and child-bearing.
(8) A massive re-education campaign, using radio,
cinema, press and television to depict girls
as combining the roles of filial daughters
and successful breadwinners, especially in
the professional fields as well as those re¬
quiring initiative and mechanical ability.
(9) Mandatory equal representation by women on
caste and village panchayat boards.
(10) A radical re-thinking of policy in regard to
hill tribes such as the Sholigas, whose dwind¬
ling numbers manifest their low fertility.
While they are at best haphazard cultivators,
the food they gather at present makes their
diet nutritionally superior to that of other
impoverished communities in the taluk. If
forced to live by cultivation alone, their
condition would be miserable. Tn ttueir forest
podus, they and their children live in a
relatively healthy environment. Placed in
closely packed settlements, they become rural
slum dwellers.
Comparing groups of foraging and sedentary
J Rung Bushmen, Patricia Draper observed that whereas in the
bush setting females enjoy a high degree of autonomy and
freedom from subordination to men, once they were settled
and turned to cultivation and animal husbandry, there was
a decrease in the influence and freedom of the women (Dra¬
per, 1975). One suspects that the same situation woulA
arise with the Sholigas unless they become recipients of a
new and imaginative 'development' programme which would
seek to preserve those elements of their culture which
would benefit the population planners as well as Indian
society as a whole. The results of the Chamarajana gar
research have revealed that Indian planners have much to
learn from tribes such as the Sholigas. There seems to
be no advantage therefore in encouraging them to abandon
their traditional norms if these are more valuable to the
State than are the norms of the society with which it is
planned to integrate them.
In winding up this chapter, and with it the thesis,
it must be said in defence of the advocacies listed above
that they are not necessarily as over-optimistic and illu¬
sory as some may suppose. Purushottam Lai, until recently
India's permanent representative at the United Nations, has
been quoted as saying (New York Times,April 4th. 1976)
"Things are always getting better and worse in India at the
same time", and while this paradox is by no means confined
to India, there is much truth in it in the case of Chamaraja
nagar and other areas of south Karnataka. On the one hand
the pressures of population, land hunger and short-sighted
utilisation of resources are destroying the environment. On
the other a Caldwellian demographic transition seems to be
gathering momentum, both encouraging and abetted by the
current family planning programme. The evidence that mar¬
ried couples in Chamarajanagar are taking to contraception
at an earlier age than was the case five to ten years ago
(see table 20a), is such a hopeful straw in the wind that
the twin goals of greater reduced fertility and the emanci¬
pation of women on an all-India basis seems less and less
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